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On 29th October 2004 in Rome twenty-eight Heads of State and Govern-
ments signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitu-
tional Treaty).
1
The reforms proposed by the document, some rather tangible, some infini-
tesimal, were put to a test in the 25 current Member States of the Union. 
Choosing one of two ways to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, through par-
liamentary vote or a referendum, Member States originally had until No-
vember 2006 to do so in order for the document to enter into force. Until 
January 2006, thirteen Member States and the European Parliament ratified 
the Constitutional Treaty. Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, 
whose populations represent almost 50% of EU’s total population, voted in 
favour of the document. France and the Netherlands, after holding refer-
enda, failed to ratify the Treaty. The remaining ten Member States have 
currently either suspended or postponed the process of ratification.
The desire for institutional reforms and the continuous process of deepen-
ing and widening of the Union defined the need for a single document, 
which would bring the Union closer to the people and would streamline the 
decision-making process. The process of conceptualizing and drafting the 
Constitutional Treaty started with the Laeken Declaration of 2001, which 
called for more democracy, transparency and efficiency of the European 
Union, simplification of the Union’s instruments and a better division and 
definition of competence in the EU. It also provided the guidelines for the 
work of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003). The Conven-
tion consisted of representatives of Governments, national Parliaments, the 
European institutions and members of civil society organizations invited as 
observers. It was followed by the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, 
which adopted the final version of the text of the Constitutional Treaty.  
1 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is available in English at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML. 8
After the ratification process came to a halt with the negative votes in 
France and the Netherlands, the European Union decided to step back and 
reassess its future development. The European Council, at its meeting on 
16-17 June 2005, stated that “the date initially planned for a report on rati-
fication of the Treaty, 1 November 2006, is [not] tenable, since those coun-
tries which have not yet ratified the Treaty will be unable to furnish a clear 
reply before mid-2007”. The state of ratification will be examined again by 
the Austrian Presidency in the first half of 2006, following a period of re-
flection in all Member States. As the need for reforms is still present, the 
debate on the Constitutional Treaty continues.
The following collection of papers examines the ratification process in each 
individual Member State, taking into consideration the most recent devel-
opments at the time of writing (January 2006). Furthermore, these papers 
discuss the position of party groups represented in the European Parliament 
on the Constitutional Treaty. The concise overview of the political and 
public debates on the Treaty, as well as the data collected on public opin-
ion, shed light on the current state of the ratification process. The publica-
tion offers an analytical look into the constitutional moods of the 25 EU 
Member States and attempts to outline options for the future of the Consti-
tutional Treaty. Constitutional Debates in Member 
States with a Referendum Spain
State of ratification 
Spain (population:  40,341,462 inhabitants) was the first country that held a 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. From a civil-democratic point of 
view, in a country in which neither entry into the Union in 1986, nor suc-
cessive treaties were submitted for consultation, the Spanish government 
was quite right to call for a referendum. The vote was held on 20th Febru-
ary 2005, with 77% of the Spanish voting in favour for the Treaty. Voter 
turnout, however, was low at approximately 42%.  The non-legally binding 
referendum was followed by parliamentary ratification on 28th April 2005.
1
Position of Political actors
The ‘Yes’ vote was never in doubt in the traditionally pro-European Spain. 
Almost the whole political spectrum, including the two main parties, was in 
favour of the Constitutional Treaty. Reflecting Spanish enthusiasm for 
European integration, there are no Europhobic or nationalist positions as 
opposed to other member countries. The small number of political actors 
that were against the Constitution Treaty argued during the referendum 
campaign for ‘more Europe’, ‘a different Europe’ or ‘a better Europe’. 
Nevertheless, the limited debate allowed different positions to be heard and 
scrutinized. Some of the small political parties in Spain, who are opposed 
to the Constitutional Treaty, argued that it is an instrument of neoliberal-
ism, a way to destroy the welfare state and a tool to militarise the E.U. On 
the left political spectrum the main trade unions argued for a ‘Yes’ vote, 
whilst at the same time the anti-globalization movements and other social 
movements asked for a ‘No’ vote. Most of them argued that such a Treaty 
1 The referendum question wording was ´´Do you approve of the Treaty by which a 
Constitution for Europe is established?`` Official results where: Yes: 76.73%; No: 
17.24%; Blank: 6.03%; Turnout: 42.32%. The constitution was than ratified in the 
Spanish Parliament with 332 votes in favour and 18 votes against. Marvin Cuschieri 
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is too liberal and too socially backward.
2 The ruling socialist party under 
Zapatero, which has been a strong advocate of the Constitutional Treaty, 
also offered contradictory views. The ruling coalition
3 did not present a 
united front because not all members of the coalition agreed on the Treaty. 
The United Left and the Republican Left of Catalonia voted against it in the 
parliamentary vote. Therefore, fearing to endanger his parliamentary ma-
jority, the Prime Minster did not push forward any debate. From the right 
spectrum the failure to implement two key issues (the reference to Christi-
anity, and the question of votes in the Council), which the former Aznar 
government disagreed with, led to a considerable number of the Popular 
Party supporters to be dissatisfied with the Constitution Treaty.
4
In some of Spain’s autonomous regions, which are generally pro-E.U, some 
divergences and intensive debates regarding the ratification occurred. For 
the classic nationalists, mainly the Basque Nationalist Party and Conver-
gence, and the Democratic Union of Catalonia, the Constitutional Treaty 
was welcomed positively though unenthusiastically. The Spanish organisa-
tion “Basta Ya”, which presses for the defence of the rule of law and the 
autonomous status of the Basque Lands, agreed with the Treaty. For the 
new nationalists, which consist of the Republican Left of Catalonia and the 
Nationalist Bloc of Galcia, contended that the Constitutional Treaty does 
not respect their identity and culture. Therefore they openly rejected and 
asked for a ‘No’ vote during the referendum. In the Catalan political net-
work named “No a La Constitucio Europea” more than a hundred commu-
nist, pacifist and youth organisations lined up against the Treaty.
5
2 Real Instituto Elcano - http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/171.asp - Rati-
fication Monitor/Update Spain by Alicia Sorroza and Jose I. Torreblanca  
3 The ruling coalition consists of the Socialists, Republican left of Catalonia, United 
left, the Canarian Coalition and the Aragonese Union 
4 Real Instituto Elcano - http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/689.asp - The Three 
points of dissensus on the European Constitution by Jose Ignacio Torreblanca 
5 German Institute for International and Security affairs - http://www.swp-
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1227 - New Impulses from Europe’s 
South by Günther Maihold and Andreas Maurer Spain
13
Public Opinion 
Judging by the Eurobarometer data, the Spanish are still among the greatest 
Euro-enthusiasts on the continent. Up to 69% (E.U average 52%) of the 
Spanish think that their country has benefited from its membership to the 
E.U whilst 62% agree with the Treaty. However, the awareness level of the 
Treaty itself is very low. Around 84% of the population claims that they 
know little or nothing about it.
The rationale for this can be summed up as follows: First, throughout the 
whole ratification process there was an overall limited debate on the Con-
stitutional Treaty. The political parties themselves denied a debate within 
their own political structures. Unlike in other E.U countries it was the par-
ties leaderships, along with the Union and business leaders, who decided on 
the issue without consultation. Of all the political parties, only two parties
6
staged an internal debate during party conferences.
7 An internal debate fol-
lowed by a vote would have created the opportunity for party leaders and 
organisations to convince members and the public of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the text and its meaning, thus providing clarification on 
the issues. Hence, a general public debate could not really emerge due to 
the absence of an internal party political discussion. In addition to the scant 
debate, the campaign to inform the Spanish people about the key matters 
was short and badly focused.  Only 4 million Treaty texts were distributed 
to the 35.4 million voters. A more exhaustive distribution of the text would 
have generated more confidence about the Treaty among the electorate.
8
Also, the government was impeded to campaign during the whole process. 
According to Spain’s electoral laws, the government could not be in favour 
of any option, nor invite citizens to participate in the debates.
The Spanish media strongly supported the ratification of the Treaty from 
the beginning. Newspapers gave extensive coverage on the referendum and 
6 Iniciativa per Cataluyna and Convergencia Democratica de Cataluna 
7 Real Instituto Elcano - http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/701.asp - Spain’s 
Referendum on the European Constitution: a Double Disappointment  by Jose Igna-
cio Torreblanca 
8 Ibid Marvin Cuschieri 
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on the Treaty itself, generally pointing out its positive aspects. Public tele-
vision stations allowed for free campaigning time for the political parties 
sitting in Parliament, including those that promoted a ‘No’ vote.
9
National priorities and the current reflection phase 
Spain’s position in the enlarged E.U is of increasing contradiction. It has 
become progressively more difficult for the country to reconcile its grow-
ing leadership role as a ‘large country’, whilst simultaneously being the 
largest net-beneficiary of EU aid. During the debates, the notion of subsidi-
ary, regarding the national and regional parliaments, and the reference to 
Christianity in the Treaty were the most discussed matters. The Spanish 
are, more than ever, posing questions regarding the position of Spain in the 
Council, the liberal orientation of the Constitutional Treaty and a deeper 
integrated Europe. After the referendum in France, Zapatero maintained 
that, “the result of the referendum in France is not good news but it is not a 
catastrophe,”
10 Yet it is difficult to be enthusiastic about the result and to 
say whether the positive vote on the Constitutional Treaty in Spain has had 
any effect on the other member states. 
Marvin Cuschieri 
9 Democracy International: European Referendum Campaign - http://www.european-
referendum.org/ - Spanish Referendum on the E.U constitution: Monitoring Report 
by Juan Carlos Madronal
10 BBC News Website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4592415.stm France
State of ratification 
The French government chose to organise a referendum on the Constitu-
tional Treaty on Sunday 29th May 2005.
1 The ‘no’ obtained 54.7% of the 
votes, thereby breaking the trend of previous referenda on the European 
Constitution and paving the way for the Dutch ‘no’ only a few days later.
2
This decision, by the second largest population of the European Union with 
approximately 62 million inhabitants, has considerably influenced the fu-
ture ratification process. 
Positions of political actors 
The French President, unlike many other European presidents, is quite 
powerful especially in matters of foreign policy and in addition to his 
power to organise a referendum. "I will campaign without any reservation 
for a ‘yes’ because it is in the interests of France, of the young and of 
Europe", said Jacque Chirac in November 2004 who clearly supported the 
‘yes’ camp. The landscape of the political parties was split on the question 
of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty, but most of the established parities 
supported it. President Chirac’s centre right party (UMP), the Union pour 
la Démocratie Française (UDF), the centre left Parti Socialist (PS), as well 
as the Greens (Les Verts), were basically in favour, although there were 
strong inner party battles.
3 The main parties opposing the ratification were 
from the extreme left- and rightwing spectrums, such as the Parti Commu-
niste (PC) and the Front National (FN) of Jean-Marie Le Pen. The gov-
ernment’s fear of a possible defeat is evident by the appearance of interna-
1 Flash EUROBAROMETER – The European Constitution – Post-referendum survey 
in France, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf 
2 The very high turnout rate of 69.3% is proof of the interest of the French people to the 
campaign, compared to poor 42.8% at the last European elections in June 2004. 
3 http://www.frankreichstimmtab.de Fabian Lohne 
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tional political leaders such as Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker. In 
addition, German Chancellor Schröder as well as the Spanish Prime Minis-
ter Zapatero spoke twice in front of the National Assembly. 
In October, the leaders of the Socialist Party (PS) officially supported the 
Constitutional Treaty, however beginning in early November the party was 
divided after two conflicting books were published by prominent party fig-
ures. At an internal referendum held in December 2004, 59% of the sympa-
thisers supported party leader Hollande and 41% of the inner-party opposi-
tion backed Fabius’ position.
4 Already at this stage we can see that the left 
opposition was split. When UDF party leader François Bayrou got involved 
in the campaign, he intended to form a coalition together with the UMP, PS 
and the Greens to support a ‘yes’ vote. The UDF with their strong Christian 
values took a stand against Turkish accession, but supported the European 
Constitution as a whole. The members of the Green party were split on the 
issue. They held an internal referendum twice on the text in November 
2004 and then again in February 2005. The Front National (FN) who were 
opposed to the Constitutional Treaty and saw it as a further step towards a 
European Federal State, believed that it would decrease the sovereignty of 
the French people and would be against their fundamental interests. The 
French Communist Party (PC) wanted a different Europe, therefore a ‘yes’ 
would not be a ‘yes’ for Europe, but on the contrary a ‘yes’ for liberal poli-
tics, which they are still staunchly against. 
Public opinion 
Eurobarometer figures show that a quarter of the voters did not turn out on 
29th May because they wanted to penalise the government and/or the 
President of the Republic for their internal policies and social reforms. 
These abstaining parts of the population saw the referendum as a way of 
protesting without electing representatives from the extreme political par-
ties. Not only can divisions within different parties be seen, but also clear 
trends for those living in rural areas. In these outlying areas, 61 % voted 
4 http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/1590.asp?rubId=1590France
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against the Constitution compared with 47% of ‘no’ votes in the urban ar-
eas. It is also noteworthy that the majority of inhabitants in the Paris region 
and the large French cities voted ‘yes’ (55%). What were the main reasons 
for voting  ‘yes’? 
x 40% considered the Constitution essential in order to pursue the Euro-
pean construction
x 16% have always been in favour of European construction 
x Strengthening the role of France within the European Union (12%) 
x Strengthening the European Union vis-à-vis the United States (11%) 
x 8% saw the Constitution as the first step towards political unification of 
Europe
x Surprisingly, 7% had the perception that the Constitutional Treaty was a 
first step towards a more social Europe  
On the other hand social concerns were at the heart of the ‘no’ voters. The 
survey of Eurobarometer states that the reasons why people voted ‘no’ are 
more numerous and are based chiefly on national and/or social themes, 
which took precedence over European considerations. 
x 31% feared that the text would have negative effects on employment in 
France
x 26% consider the unemployment rate already to high 
x Economically speaking the draft was seen as too liberal as well as lack-
ing social aspects (18% and 20%) 
x 18% explicitly mentioned opposition and dissatisfaction with French 
political leaders 
x Also noteworthy, Turkey’s membership of the EU was mentioned only 
by 6% of the voters 
Surveys came to the results that the French voters seemed to have made up 
their minds at a fairly early stage on how to vote in the referendum. Until Fabian Lohne 
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March 2005 the ‘yes’ camp held about 60% of the votes.
5 On the other 
hand, one in five voters made their decision in the last week before the ref-
erendum, at which time the votes were equally distributed. This shows how 
influence the Presidents of the Republic was able to exert, capturing the 
attention of French voters through the referendum campaign. However, 
Democracy International contends, that the ‘yes’ camp had enjoyed 2/3 of 
the TV airtime and was thereby given a better chance of making its position 
known.
6
National priorities 
Despite the victory of the ‘no’ camp, the French people do not call their 
country’s membership of the European Union into question. 62% of the 
French people believe that the ‘no’ victory will facilitate the renegotiation 
of the Constitutional Treaty in order to achieve a more social text. The fig-
ures show a deep rift between the priorities of the political class and the 
voters. During the Convention leading to the Constitutional Treaty, French 
political leaders were able to get all their issues concerning the institutional 
reforms included into the text. Even still, the French people rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty mainly due to reasons of the future social and eco-
nomic setting of the Union, which can be found in Part III of the draft. The 
social and economic aspects of the Treaty, which are important to the 
French, might become effective at a later stage when the social and eco-
nomic climate might be more favourable. The pressing need for action in 
this policy field should have become clear to every politician since the 
heavy riots this autumn. The latest figures by Eurobarometer show that 
67% of the French support the idea of a Constitution, which is an increase 
of 7 points compared to the spring 2005 survey, whilst only 21% disagree.
7
5 http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/1590.asp?rubId=1590
6 RICHARD, Arsène and PABST, Ronald (2005): Evaluation of the French Referen-
dum on the EU Constitution. http://democracy-international.org/fileadmin/pdf/ 
monitoring/di-france.pdf
7 Eurobarometer 64 (2005), http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ 
eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf
Fabian LohneThe Netherlands 
Current state of ratification 
On 1st June 2005, the Netherlands (population: 16,407,491) voted against 
the Constitutional Treaty. The “No” votes were 62% and the “Yes” votes 
were 38%
1. This vote represented the opinion of a clear majority of the 
Dutch population, although in the national parliament there was a majority 
in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. One point which is already clear is 
the different positions of the elite and citizens on the issue.
If compared to the votes in the new Member States, the outcome of the vote 
was very important for two reasons.  
First of all, the Netherlands is one of the founding six countries. It presided 
over the groundbreaking European negotiations that led to the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam. Together with its Benelux partners, it has tradi-
tionally been associated with the pleas for a more encompassing integration 
process, strong supranational institutions (European Parliament and Euro-
pean Commission) and the scrapping of national vetoes in European deci-
sion-making. Secondly, the country has a natural and traditional attitude 
towards freedom. 
Positions of political actors 
The decision to hold a referendum had a purely consultative character in 
the Netherlands but political leaders and the two largest government par-
ties, the CDA (Christian Democrats) and VVD (Conservative liberals) op-
posed this procedure of ratification. The opponent parties, the PDA (La-
bour party), the Greens and the Social Parties, however were in favour of 
this procedure. The reason for the actual political leaders to refuse a refer-
1 “Clear “No” from The Netherlands on the EU Constitution”. Radio Netherlands.   
Www2.rnw.nl.Luca Tagliaferro 
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endum was due to a fear that a referendum could be a tool for public opin-
ion to express their discontents with national political and social issues. 
Nevertheless, following the agreement to hold a referendum, all parties 
agreed to adhere to the vote as long as a majority was given and election 
turnout exceeded 30%.
Regarding the positions of political actors on the Constitutional Treaty 
there were two different sides. The majority promoting the Constitutional 
Treaty, which is represented by the CDA, VVD, D66 was the same that 
opted for the rejection of a referendum. This majority´s position on the is-
sue did not only diverge from the remaining political parties, PDA, Greens 
and Social party, but also diverge from the position of the trade unions, 
business federations and almost every newspaper in the country. The right-
wing populists of the LPF and Geert Wilders, for example, argued for their 
“No” position on the basis of an anti-Muslim campaign, while focused on 
opposing the admission of Turkey into the EU. They declared that the Con-
stitutional Treaty would throw open the borders to streams of refugees. 
The “Yes” camp adapted to these arguments, by arguing that the Constitu-
tional Treaty aligned all EU member states with the asylum and immigra-
tion guidelines that already prevailed in the Netherlands. 
Representatives of the official “No” camp, on the other hand, stressed the 
loss of national sovereignty. Jan Marijnissen of the Socialist Party warned 
that the Netherlands would become “an impotent province”
2 if the Consti-
tutional Treaty was accepted. The right-wing populist Geert Wilders sup-
plemented nationalist agitation on the question of sovereignty with anti-
Islamic demagogy. “The political elite wants to admit Turkey into the un-
ion,” he warned, “an Islamic country of millions, that will have an enor-
mous influence on the federal super-state. Because of the new European 
Constitution, Turkey will have more influence on Dutch legislation than the 
Netherlands itself”
3.
2 Chris Marsden. The Netherlands: decisive “no” vote on European constitution. World 
socialist web site. 2 June 2005.
3 Ibid. The Netherlands 
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Shortly before the vote, Prime Minister Balkenende declared that if the 
people wanted to punish the government, they should wait until 2007 for 
the next parliamentary election. But, he said, “If you want to move the 
economy forward, you must vote “Yes”
4.
Public opinion 
Since the political influence of the “No” camp is too small to account for 
the broad popular mobilisation against the Constitutional Treaty, the real 
reasons why citizens voted against it can be found in the disappointing way 
in which the government dealt with the political and economic priorities of 
the Netherlands.
Besides the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the negative result 
showed a deep social division between the Dutch elite and the citizens
5.
The division became apparent when the debate turned on national social 
and economic questions and when the latter were connected to the pro-
posed Constitutional Treaty. As a consequence, public support began to 
decline and the change of mood became evident. According to the Euro-
barometer
6, before the referendum a large majority of younger people and 
workers opposed to the Constitutional Treaty, the percentage fell from 73% 
in December 2004 to 21% in May 2005. In contrast, the higher classes, in-
cluding most self-employed people and university graduates, were in fa-
vour of the Treaty. Their support rose 11% (from 60% to 71%), during the 
six months preceding the referendum. 
National priorities and reflection phase 
There are three different priorities, which are based on the following popu-
lar discontents: political, economic and social. 
4 Ibid. 
5 For elite we mean not only the political parties, but also the richer part of the popula-
tion, which supposed to be the most informed about the Constitution and voted for 
the ratification. 
6 Flash Euro barometer, 2/4 June 2005. Luca Tagliaferro 
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x Political fears: Turkey would lead to a loss of national sovereignty.
x Economic discontent: problems with liberalization of the economy and 
dissatisfaction with the Euro. In order to face these problems the na-
tional government decided to reduce taxes for big businesses and cut 
wages and welfare benefits. The standard of living of the population has 
fallen and unemployment has continued to rise. 
x Social problems: from Turkey many unemployed immigrants would 
come to the Netherlands, and bring poverty and crime and also contrib-
ute to the loss of national identity. 
The reflection period
7, called Plan D, is to be organised jointly by the Gov-
ernment and the House of Representatives. The objectives of Plan D for the 
Netherlands are:  
x Obtain a better picture of the ideas, concerns and feelings of the coun-
try’s citizens regarding the future of the Union`s further development 
and the role the citizens want the Netherlands to play in EU 
x Clarify the public’s view of the areas in which the EU should either do 
more or less 
x Look for ways of improving the legitimacy of European decision-
making
Luca Tagliaferro 
7 Called Plan D (for democracy, dialogue and debate). Decision agreed by the European 
Council, June 2005. Luxembourg
State of ratification 
On Sunday, 10th July 2005, Luxembourg became the thirteenth Member 
State (population: 468 571)
1 to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. 57% of the 
electorate voted in favour and 43% against it. It was the first referendum to 
be held on the Treaty after the voters in France and the Netherlands re-
jected the text. It was also the first Duchy’s referendum since the 1930’s.
2
It was a consultative voting event that the Parliament had undertaken to 
respect the wishes of the electorate. 
Position of political actors 
After the Government’s decision to hold a referendum on the Constitu-
tional Treaty, the positions and the reactions among the main political ac-
tors did not vary extensively. The Luxembourg Socialist Party (LSAP) 
plead for the holding of a referendum on the Treaty with the intention to 
bring Europe closer to the citizens. The Social Christian Party (CSV), usu-
ally in favour of direct democracy, treated the EU process towards the Con-
stitutional Treaty as an intermediate result in the integration process. The 
Democratic Party (DP) considered the Treaty as a founding text of a com-
munity that would see its geographical and historical bounds tightened. The 
Green Party (DEI GRENG) asked for a decisional referendum, while the 
other ones plead in favour of a consultative one. It is quite obvious, that the 
particular political features of the "Luxembourg model" made the contest 
difficult for the supporters of the ‘No’ vote. Political life of the Grand 
Duchy is organised around the steadfast Christian Democratic Party (which 
has been in power since 1945, except for a five-year interruption) and its 
Prime Minister Jean Claude Juncker. The ‘No’ was represented by the 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxembourg 
2 http://referendum.forum-online.lu Kristina Saikeviciute 
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forces that were in a minority on the political scene: Di Lenk, the Luxem-
bourg Communist Party and the right-wing populist Action Committee for 
Democracy and Pension Rights (ADR). The far-left ‘Di Lenk’ Party said 
the text was too market-orientated and did not do enough for workers. A 
Committee for the ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty, consisting of the 
members of ATTAC Luxembourg, student union UNEL and of Di Lenk, 
conducted a massive poster campaign without receiving any public financ-
ing. Additionally, after having approved the Constitutional Treaty to start 
with, the populist Right, organised in the ADR, launched a late campaign 
for the ‘No’, which did not have a substantial impact.
3
During the last days of May 2005, the reaction to the French and Dutch 
double setback in Luxembourg was strong. First, Juncker reaffirmed his 
resignation in case of a ‘No’ vote and maintained that ratification process 
must be continued. Reactions among the rest of the political class varied. 
The Parliament resolved to abide by the referendum result even though the 
public consultation was not legally binding. The euroskeptic ADR called 
for renegotiation and now even argued that Europe did not, in fact, need 
any such text at all. In spite of that, Parliament maintained the referendum 
date and on 28th June 2005, the fifty-five MPs present voted in favour of 
the Treaty. The green light for the referendum was given. However, it was 
much riskier than originally intended. The Government was not able to or-
ganise a public consultation, since Luxembourg does not have a tradition of 
holding referendums. In the last weeks of the campaign, the political class 
had to use all its goodwill to stop the rising power of the ‘No’ voters.
4
Public opinion 
The best results for the ‘Yes’ were recorded in Luxembourg City and in the 
‘fat belt’ suburbs that surrounds it. ‘No’ was in majority in the urban work-
3 See article Theis, Andrie: When the ‚Nee’ almost won, IV Online magazine:IV370-
09/2005
4 See more comments in Hausemer, Piere: Luxembourg’s Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty, Referendum briefing paper No.14, 10/07/2005 Luxembourg 
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ing-class areas of the south of the country, which are also formally the cen-
tre of the mining and steel industries.
5
37% of the ‘No’ electors cited the risk of negative effects of the Constitu-
tional Treaty on the job situation, 23% criticised the bad economic situation 
and 22% thought that a social Europe was not sufficiently developed. Some 
opponents also showed their concern about the future of their language and 
their identity. The three main arguments of public opinion in favour of the 
Constitutional Treaty were that ‘it is essential in order to pursue European 
construction’, ‘it is essential for the smooth running of the European insti-
tutions’ and that ‘it is the first step towards a symbol of a social Europe’. 
Amongst the arguments why they opposed, the main one was ‘the lack of 
information’. 
Indeed, with the political elite forming a united front in favour of the text 
and little debate in the media, knowledge about the Constitutional Treaty 
remained very limited. Up to March 2005, most Luxembourg media was 
more concentrated on commenting on the new referendum legislation 
rather than the Constitutional Treaty itself. Main points covered the non-
binding nature of the referendum, compulsory voting and the exclusion of 
the Grand-Duke from participation in public consultation. There were also 
some discussions about the broad participation of foreign residents living 
and working in Luxembourg, including various comments on the decision 
of Council of State which rejected the participation of the EU foreigners in 
the referendum.
6
The student organisation UNEL observed a lack of the democratic charac-
ter in the Treaty, expressing their fears that Brussels dictates too many 
standards to the Member States. Students criticised the militarist trend, 
promoting not only peaceful missions, but also aggressive actions. They 
were convinced that further enlargement would deliver too much competi-
tive pressure on public services.
7 After the negative referendum in France 
and the Netherlands in May 2005, some commentators believed that the 
5 For more details, see Special Eurobarometer: The future Constitutional Treaty, Euro-
pean Commission, 01/2005 
6 See article ‘No participation of the European foreigners’, Le Jeudi, 20/01/2005 Kristina Saikeviciute 
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referendum might not take place after all.  While 71% of Luxembourgians 
remained in favour of a popular consultation as a mandatory requirement 
for ratification, 70% also wanted to postpone the referendum as a conse-
quence of the French and Dutch ‘No’ votes. 
National priorities 
The positive outcome of the Grand Duchy’s referendum emerged for three 
main reasons: Luxembourg’s exceptional europhilia, fears of a loss of in-
fluence in the EU and Prime Minister Juncker’s popularity. Almost 88% of 
the electorate believed in the Government’s argument, that a ‘No’ vote 
would violate the national interest by weakening the position of Luxem-
bourg within the EU.
8
The charismatic Prime Minister Juncker (who has served 11 years as Lux-
embourg’s Prime Minister) completely assumed his ‘father-figure’ func-
tion, declaring, that he would resign if the people of his country would say 
‘No’. During the abortive European Council on17th June 2005 on the EU 
Budget 2007-2013, Prime Minister Juncker was treated as a victim of the 
betrayal of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. According to analysts, 
people were highly convinced that they had to support their wounded Prime 
Minister. After the publication of the official result, Juncker underlined that 
the Constitutional Treaty would remain on the EU’s agenda. ‘The project 
of Constitution is not perfect. But let us not compare it with the ideal. Let 
us measure it with what Europe will need to remain tomorrow, an example 
for the world’
9…
Kristina Saikeviciute 
7 See article ‘No to the European Constitution’, Le Quotidien, 04/01/2005   
8 See more comments in Hausemer, Piere: Luxembourg’s Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty, Referendum briefing paper No.14, 10/07/2005 
9 The speech in the EU Parliament, Strasbourg, 12/12/2005 Ireland
State of ratification 
Ireland is one of the countries where the Constitutional Treaty will have to 
be ratified by a referendum. Initially it was planed to organise the referen-
dum in the second part of the year 2005 or the first part of 2006, but after 
the rejections in France and the Netherlands this process has been post-
poned. Right after the developments in these two countries the Irish Gov-
ernment remained committed to the Constitutional Treaty and to ratifying 
it. Prime Minister Bertie Ahern (Fianna Fail) said that “we will continue to 
prepare for a referendum”
1. However, after these rejections, it was decided 
to take a break from the ratification process and start with reflections and 
debates in every member state of the EU. 
Until now, Ireland has held six referendums related to European matters. It 
has to be mentioned that Ireland is one of the nations, which have always 
had a favourable attitude towards the EU. Following is a presentation re-
garding Irish referendums on EU issues: 
x 1972: EU Accession (83% YES – 17% NO, turnout 71%) 
x 1987: Single European Act (70% YES – 30% NO, turnout 44%) 
x 1992: Treaty of Maastricht (69% YES – 31% NO, turnout 57%) 
x 1998: Treaty of Amsterdam (62% YES – 38% NO, turnout 56%) 
x 2001: Treaty of Nice (54% NO – 46% YES, turnout 35%) 
x 2002: Treaty of Nice (63% YES – 37% NO, turnout 49%)
2
From these data it can be seen that over the years enthusiasm for the EU 
has declined and it can be described as a general trend in the EU. There is a 
common feeling in the entire EU that the connection with the common 
1 www.unizar.es/euroconstitution/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_Ireland.htm  
2 Data obtained from the website www.unizar.es  Valdet Sadiku 
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people is possibly being lost. Yet, if we refer to the last two referendums, 
we can see that in a very short period of time (1 year) the referendum deal-
ing with the same question had two different results. After the rejection, 
Ireland felt as it was left aside and it is an experience that this country 
would not like to evoke.  
Following the results from the 2001 referendum, the Government has es-
tablished the “National Forum on Europe” in 2001, in order to provide an 
open and balanced debate. Based on this experience, the preparations for 
the Constitutional Treaty referendum started very early. In October 2004 
the Government published an “Explanatory Guide to the Constitutional 
Treaty”, which was widely distributed. In addition a White Paper on the 
Constitutional Treaty was published in October 2005 for nationwide distri-
bution.
Positions of political actors 
Both parties forming the governing coalition – the Fianna Fail and the 
Progressive Democrats - were strongly in favour of the Constitutional 
Treaty. These parties vigorously emphasised the benefits from the EU and 
the need for strengthening the EU economy in general in order to be com-
petitive in the global market. The Irish government maintains its support 
for the Constitutional Treaty, but it must be noted that most likely this 
Government will not organise a referendum on this issue. Prime Minister 
Bertie Ahern stated in the House of Representatives (the Dáil) “I do not 
believe this issue will come up before the French presidential election so I 
do not see it arising in the lifetime of this Dáil”
3. General elections in Ire-
land, same as the presidential elections in France, are expected in 2007. 
Regarding the main opposition party – the Fine Gael – but also the Labour
Party, they were in favour of the Constitutional Treaty from the early be-
ginning. The Green Party, upon the failure of the referendum in France, 
has called to respect the will of the French citizens. As far as the Sinn Fein
3 http://blogs.unige.ch/droit/ceje/dotclear/index.php/Ireland, by Claire Mchugh, 10 No-
vember 2005 Ireland
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and the Socialist Party are concerned, they have strongly opposed the Con-
stitutional Treaty since the beginning. The Sinn Fein has been very active 
in its campaign against the Treaty. It has also drafted a document with the 
reasons why it is against its ratification. Some of the main reasons are: “it 
lays the legal foundations for a federal Europe; it significantly increases the 
powers of the European Council and Commission; it undermines national 
sovereignty, national parliaments and the rights of citizens; it will end neu-
trality of Ireland and other member states”
4.
Public opinion
The referendum results in France and the Netherlands influenced Ireland as 
well. In general citizens are undecided about this issue. According to the 
Irish Times’ poll published on 14th June 2005
5, 45% of voters believed that 
the referendum should go ahead in Ireland despite the fact that it has been 
rejected in France and the Netherlands, but more citizens would most likely 
vote against its ratification. According to the poll, 35% of the Irish people 
would vote against the Treaty, 30% would vote in favour and approx. 35% 
had no opinion on the issue. The percentage of people, who are undecided 
about the Treaty, is still high. According to the recent Eurobarometer re-
sults (data for autumn 2005) 29% of the citizens do not have an opinion on 
the Treaty. Based on these results, the support for the idea of a Constitu-
tional Treaty (as in many other European countries) has increased (from 
54% in spring 2005 to 58% in autumn 2005)
6.
National priorities and current reflection phase 
At the European level it was planed to start with the reflection phase after 
the rejections in France and the Netherlands. It is a fact that there is cur-
rently little public or media attention on the Constitutional Treaty, though 
4 http://sinnfein.ie/pdf/EUConstitution3Fold_small.pdf  
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm  
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdfValdet Sadiku 
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the “National Forum on Europe” in Ireland continues to hold seminars and 
debates on this topic.
Some of the main reasons, on part of the citizens, for rejecting the Constitu-
tional Treaty:
x fear of loosing sovereignty
x threats to Ireland’s neutrality
x absence of a reference to God in Treaty and its impact on different so-
cial issues (e.g. abortion).
These are some of the questions that need to be answered to the Irish citi-
zens before organising a referendum. However, it is almost certain that an-
swers to these questions will have wait for the new government. 
Valdet Sadiku Denmark
State of ratification 
Denmark (population 5,432,335) has been an EU member state since 1972. 
The Danish held six referendums regarding the EU since 1972. 
The last time the Danish were supposed to vote for the European Constitu-
tion was on 27 September 2005 in a legally binding referendum. However 
after the meeting of the government and political parties in the parliament 
on 21 June 2005 the government decided to postpone the up-coming refer-
endum because of the uncertainty caused by the French and Dutch rejec-
tions on the 30 May and 1 June 2005 respectively.  As a consequence of the 
reflection period, the Constitutional Debate and referendum discussions in 
Denmark seem to be shelved for the present time.
Position of political actors 
Far away from having strong and precise public support and defeated by 
the support of an anti-European Party (Danish Folk Party), referenda seems 
to be a great challenge for the Liberal-Conservative Coalition Govern-
ment.
1
In November 2004, after a long bargaining with opposition parties, the 
Government, under Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, reached an 
agreement to secure the broadest possible support for the EU Constitutional 
Treaty before going to a referendum. Consequently Danish Government 
allocated 30 million DKK for the sake of a comprehensive and convincing 
debate for the both YES and NO Campaigns. 
Following the French and Dutch rejections Prime Minister Rasmussen 
stated that they would like to continue the  process, and the Danish should 
1 The Liberal-Conservative Coalition, elected on 8 February 2005, is a minority gov-
ernment and is supported by the extremist  Danish Folk Party  out side the Cabinet. Zeynep Turhalli 
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have a chance to vote on the treaty. They had prepared everything for the 
referendum, but of course they cannot vote on the treaty until the reflection 
phase and the steps thereafter have been decided upon.
The Social Democrats, the second biggest Party in Denmark holding 47 
seats in the Parliament, are open to a revised Constitutional Treaty.  They 
would like to continue to hold voter meetings they had scheduled in ad-
vance of the cancelled 27 September referendum. By August 2005 Social 
Democrats spent 1.5 million Danish Krones, DKK, of the 1.7 million DKK 
they had received for the YES Campaign. On the other hand their tradi-
tional allies, the Social Liberal Party, the fifth largest party holding 17 
seats, did not touch the money earmarked for them. The Socialist People's 
Party, holding 11 seats in Folketing, is widely regarded as a reliable indica-
tor for how Danish voters in general will respond to the treaty. In January 
2005, a vote among all party members resulted in a 63.8% victory for the 
Yes side.  However the SF Majority of the Youth wing of the party, backs 
on the No – side ("Socialists Against the Treaty"). 
The only two parliamentary parties who are against the constitution, the 
Unity List on the left and  Danish Folk Party on the extreme right, both 
recommend voters to reject the Constitution. The Unity List, which only 
garnered 3.4 pct of the vote at the election in February, have a relatively 
marginal impact on public opinion. On the other hand the Danish Folk 
Party (DP), which gained 13.1 of the vote at the last elections, and func-
tions as a support party for the right-wing coalition government, may 
mount a more successful campaign for the ‘no’ side. Well known with its 
xenophobic and Euro sceptic discourses, the party opposes Denmark’s 
membership in the European Union and is best known for its hard line on 
immigration. DP is also against the membership of Turkey to the EU and 
uses the possible membership of the Turkey as a good argument for the NO 
- campaign. 
Public opinion 
Public support in Denmark seems to be decreased following the French and 
Dutch referendums. However the first impact of the shock effect seems to Denmark
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be revealed by time. According to the last Euro barometer survey, taken in 
October and November 2005, 45% of Danish are for and 40% are against 
the Constitution, while 15% of them answered the survey saying they don’t 
know.
A Gallup poll following the French and Dutch "No" votes indicated 38% 
on the "No" side and 34% on the "Yes" side. A poll by the same agency in 
May had the "No" side on 25%, compared with 45% for the "Yes" side.
National priorities 
Danish are known as one of the most Eurosceptic nations in the EU.  Dan-
ish political culture is traditionally connected with a certain pride of being a 
"small" and "satisfied" nation. According to the statistics, the Danish enjoy 
a happier family life than any other EU nations. Therefore several issues 
are likely to play a dominant role under the debate:  
x The creation of a European Super-state at the expense of national sover-
eignty and identity 
x The Future of the Danish Welfare State 
x Turkey’s possible accession to the EU 
The Danish fear a further loss of sovereignty, they fear the EU will ruin 
Danish democracy and they fear they will loose their welfare state through 
further integration.  However, rather than a distinguishing phenomenon, the 
Danish type of eurosceptism can also be considered as a positive challenge 
for the European Welfare Model and European Patriotism. Once assessing 
the Danish Euro scepticism, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, said: 
‘I doubt, therefore I am a European.’
2
Zeynep Turhalli 
2 Speech to EP-election Conference on April 30, 2004. Portugal
State of ratification 
After two consecutive changes of the Portuguese Constitution, one to allow 
a referendum on the entire Constitutional Treaty and the other to permit the 
public vote to coincide with municipal elections
1, the ratification process is 
currently on hold in light of the ‘period of reflection’ launched at the EU 
Summit in June 2005. In any case the results of a referendum in Portugal 
(population: approx. 10 million) would only be binding if at least half of 
the population goes to the polls, as stipulated in the national Constitution
2.
In the opposite case, a parliamentary ratification would be required.  
Positions of political actors 
Despite the difficulties with setting the date for a referendum, there is not 
much discontent with the EU and the Constitutional Treaty along the politi-
cal spectrum in Portugal, except for the extreme ends of the gamut. The 
two main political parties (Socialist Party and Social Democrat Party) are 
in favour of the Constitutional Treaty and both led campaigns for a “Yes” 
vote.
3 The Communist Party expresses concerns that the proposed Consti-
tutional Treaty distances the EU from the ordinary citizens and puts larger 
countries in more favourable light. On the opposite extreme end of the 
spectrum, the right-wing New Democracy Party fears an impingement of 
European peoples’ fundamental freedoms as a result of too much centrali-
zation.
4 Furthermore, the small Left Block leader Luiz Fazenda is not that 
vocally against the Constitutional Treaty but still considers the text insuffi-
cient to eliminate the democratic deficit in the Union.
5 Partido Popular, 
1 http://www.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm#portugal
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_referendum_on_the_European_Constitution 
3 http://blogs.unige.ch/droit/ceje/dotclear/index.php/Portugal/2005/02
4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm#portugal 
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3958609.stm Velyana Nickolova 
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which is the ever-present Euro pessimist on Portuguese political arena, 
firmly states its opposition to the Constitutional Treaty.
6
On the governmental level, Euro-optimism and support for the Constitu-
tional Treaty are key features. The new Socialist Government, which came 
to power after the February 2005 parliamentary elections, emphasises the 
text’s European dimension. Regarding the referendum, Mr. Socrates openly 
expresses his positivism on the outcome of an eventual public vote, pre-
dicts high turnout and does not fear a rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
by the Portuguese people, despite the decreased public support for the text. 
Furthermore, he is a keen supporter of the idea of a Europe-wide referen-
dum and expresses determination to revive the Constitutional Treaty when 
Portugal takes over the Council Presidency in the second half of 2007.
7
The current President of Portugal, who is to step down after the 22 January 
2006 presidential elections, Mr. Jorge Fernado Branco de Sampaio was 
among the main proponents of changing the  Portuguese Constitution to 
allow a public vote to be held on the entire Treaty, instead of asking the 
question "Do you agree with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the rule of 
qualified majority voting and the new institutional framework of the EU, as 
defined by the European Constitution?”
8, as proposed for the referendum 
that would have been held in April 2005. President Sampaio was affirma-
tive of his support for the Constitutional Treaty, as he perceived it as an 
instrument to move the EU ahead. Therefore, he was in favour of a Portu-
guese referendum and even expressed his willingness to lead a ‘Yes’ cam-
paign.
9 In an expression of his support for the Constitutional Treaty he 
wrote a common article ‘United for Europe’ in July 2005 together with his 
colleagues from Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia and Poland, ap-
pealing for more transparency, efficiency and abundance of information. 
6 http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1227&PHPSESSID=926 
73a9b34cbd1d2a3a399692f03350b
7 http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/051220180319.kpxogrse 
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_referendum_on_the_European_Constitution 
9 http://www.eubusiness.com/Portugal/050407134430.4yorg1fe Portugal
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Public opinion 
The first study of Portuguese public opinion on the Constitutional Treaty 
came out in July 2003 and showed a high degree of positivism, with 60% in 
favour of the text
10. It also had one of the highest scores of “Don’t know” 
answers in the EU15. One year later, in July 2004, polls reflected a positive 
development in the public perception of the Constitutional Treaty and an 
increased awareness of the population of its existence and consequences. 
67% have heard of the Constitutional Treaty, which signalled increased 
availability of information on EU issues in Portugal.
11 In any case the pub-
lic was very supportive (84%) of the idea to hold a referendum.
12 81 % 
were in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, while only 7% were against, 
according to the results of the poll.
13 By December 2004, the number of 
supporters has fallen down to 61% and opponents have risen to 11%. As in 
other European countries, the Portuguese people justified their decreased 
support of Treaty on the grounds of a lack of information. 
A January 2005 poll showed a dramatic reduction in the support of the 
Constitutional Treaty, with only 40% of Portuguese people being in favour 
and 7% being against it
14. Again the number of undecided citizens was 
spectacularly high, at approximately 53%. The level of information rose 
slightly by May/June 2005, when only 29%
15 had no opinion, which was a 
number still well above EU average. Nevertheless, the supporters figure 
increased to 59%
16, which signalled positivism compared to the numbers in 
the rest of the EU on average. However, this data is insufficient to draw a 
conclusion on the outcome of an eventual referendum and cannot serve as 
10 http://eucon.europa2004.it/Watch2ed/Answer2-1.htm#P 
11 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl159_2en.pdf 
12 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl159_2en.pdf 
13 http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1227&PHPSESSID=92 
673a9b34cbd1d2a3a399692f03350b
14 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_214_en.pdf
15 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,% 
20July%202005.pdf
16 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,% 
20July%202005.pdfVelyana Nickolova 
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grounds for optimism. According to the same opinion poll, 60%
17 of the 
French and 53%
18of the Dutch citizens were supporters of the Constitu-
tional Treaty, while in practice they rejected it in summer 2005 referenda. 
National priorities and the Reflection Phase 
After the Head of Government of EU member states launched a ‘period of 
reflection’ during their 16/17 June Summit, it is interesting to observe how 
governments took advantage of it to ‘sell’ the idea of Constitutional Treaty 
at home. Not taking into account the large percentage of undecided citizens 
in Portugal, the government is still lagging behind in its initiatives to in-
form the population. Only 4 out of the 25 debates from the joint initiative 
“1000 Debates on Europe”
19 have been conducted. Apart from that, the 
Portuguese authorities are trying to organise some seminars and lectures on 
the issue, primarily at universities and international institutes. Despite the 
honest intention to launch a large and informative public debate the Portu-
guese Government has not achieved major success so far, due to its tight 
political schedule at present. 
Despite the large percentage of uninformed citizens, the Portuguese voters 
have a very specific opinion about some parts of the Treaty. 
x Institutional reform: many Portuguese people object to it, as they per-
ceive it to be an instrument for marginalising the role of Portugal in the 
Union.
x Enlargement issues and redistributive policies: Portugal was one of the 
biggest supporters of the Eastern enlargement. Nevertheless, its Euro-
optimism might decline significantly once the losses from the European 
funds are felt. 
17 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,% 
20July%202005.pdf
18 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,% 
20July%202005.pdf
19 http://europa.eu.int/constitution/1000debates/index.cfm?page=dsp_debate_by_cnt& 
country_id=20&lng_id=1Portugal
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x Religion in the European Constitution: Portugal was among the propo-
nents of the idea to include Christianity in the Constitutional Treaty. 
Velyana Nickolova Poland
State of the Ratification 
The former governing party, the Social Democrats, was expected to hold a 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in October 2005, along with the 
presidential election. However, in July 2005, after the French and the 
Dutch said ‘No’, the referendum in Poland was postponed without setting 
any other date.
Moreover, in the same month, the Polish lower Parliament, the Sejm, voted 
to put off a decision on whether to ratify the Treaty by a referendum or by a 
parliamentary vote. 
The victory of the right wing parties, both in the parliamentary and the 
presidential elections in autumn 2005, has had much implication on the 
ratification of the Treaty since these parties are not as proactive in dealing 
with the issue as the former government was. 
Position of Political Actors 
The former ruling party, SLD (Democratic Left Alliances) had a pro-EU 
and pro-Constitution position. Unfortunately the SLD lost both, seats in the 
parliament and the presidency, after struggling with a low approval rating 
hovering only at around 10%.
The Law and Justice Party, the current leading right wing party, is euro-
sceptic, and opposes a rapid ratification of the Treaty. It prefers a referen-
dum in 2006 to be separate from any other elections. Another important 
right wing party, the Civic Platform, is mildly against the Constitutional 
Treaty and therefore wants the referendum to be held as late as possible.
Other small parties, such as the League of Polish Families and the Polish 
Peasant Party, are also halfhearted with respect to the ratification process. Eunsi So 
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The former wants the referendum as late as possible and the latter wants to 
hold it in 2006 along with the local government elections. 
Public Opinion 
According to the poll conducted in June 2005 by the Polish Public Opin-
ion
1, 41% of the respondents said the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty should be done by a referendum.  
Polish people tended to be in favour of the Treaty before the two disap-
pointing results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The ap-
proval rate for the Constitutional Treaty decreased from 60% to 43%, 
whereas the rate of the people opposing it increased by 10% (from 14% to 
24%), which shows that the Polish people were heavily influenced by the 
negative results. The rate of Polish people willing to go and vote is also 
decreasing, although the ‘will vote’ camp took up slightly more than 50% 
in June 2005. This issue is of high important when taking into account the 
50%-turnout rule for a referendum to be binding.
2 Therefore, it is important 
to monitor this decrease in the rate of the ‘will vote’ and its implication for 
the possible ratification of the Treaty in the near future. 
National Priorities and the Reflection Phase 
Polish people are rather supportive of the Constitutional Treaty, despite of 
the decrease of the approval rate after its rejection by the French and the 
Dutch. The sceptical position of the current political ruling party is very 
likely to affect the next step taken by Poland. Regarding the ratification 
process, the Law and Justice Party has published through its official web-
1 Figures from ‘Polish Public Opinion’, www.cbos.pl 
2 What is peculiar in Poland in the matter of the binding power of the referendum is that 
voter turnout should be more than 50% of the electorate for the referendum to be 
binding (Democracy International, ‘Study about constitutional conditions concern-
ing referendums on the EU constitution in the member states’, www.european-
referendum.org). That means before calculating how many people are for and 
against the issue, it is more crucial to calculate how many people are willing to 
vote.Poland
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site, that everyone wants a referendum. The support from the public to-
wards the Treaty is due to its support for the EU in general, rather than for 
the Treaty itself.  In other words, the public support is generated from the 
hope for the future of the EU and is not a result of a sharp assessment of the 
Treaty’s implications.  
However, there is a dispute going on regarding the date of the voting and 
the Treaty itself between the parties.
3 Since the eurosceptic right wing came 
into office, Poland has not taken an active part in ensuring the ratification 
of the Treaty and in finding solutions to the overall ratification crisis across 
the EU. Furthermore, as a new member of the EU, Poland seems to be in 
deliberation on whether the Constitutional Treaty would benefit Poland, 
and whether the Treaty would only reinforce the hegemony of the strong 
member states.
4 It is difficult to say whether the ratification of the Treaty 
will be held soon and whether it is one of the national priorities, because 
the current right wing government is not actively pushing for  the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty and is still trying to assess the political advantages for 
Poland, which the Treaty might bring. 
Eunsi So 
3 Law & Justice Party in Poland, www.pis.org.pl 
4 Ibid., a remark from Kazimierz Ujazdowski, a member of Law and Justice Party. Czech Republic 
State of ratification 
The ratification process in the Czech Republic (population: approx.10.3 
million) consists of the possibility for a referendum even if it is postponed 
to the middle of 2006 or the beginning of 2007. No final decision has been 
made so far because the atmosphere among the political actors has been 
changing and several scenarios are now on the table.
1
Position of political actors 
During the last months, the political scene in the Czech Republic has been 
changing and a referendum will not necessarily be the outcome. The Gov-
ernment, a strong pro-EU coalition of three parties (Social Democrats, 
Christian Democrats and Liberals) and the biggest opposition party-ODS 
(Conservative party), have not been able to agree on a date for holding a 
referendum. For the ODS, the proposed date by the government (June 2006 
along with the parliamentary elections) was unacceptable and its leaders 
claimed that there has to be at least half a year between the two votes, as 
this could influence the voters in a positive way to say “Yes”. The referen-
dum bill would have to be passed as a Constitutional Act, with the major 
parties being able to block any proposal made. This is likely to lead to a 
deadlock, which means that there will be no constitutional law on a refer-
endum and therefore the ratification of the Treaty will have to go the clas-
sical way, through parliamentary ratification.
2  It has been assumed that if it 
goes the parliamentary way, the Constitutional Treaty will not be ratified 
because of a strong opposition from both, the ODS and also the Commu-
nists in the Czech Republic. Recently, however, the scene has been chang-
ing, for several reasons: 
1 Referenda on EU Constitution-state of play in the member states> 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-130616-16&type=Overview  Arnar B. Sigurðsson 
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x Simple majority in both Houses of Parliament would be enough for the 
Government
x A change in the position of ODS. Despite the fact that it has opposed the 
text, the ODS might even say “Yes” to the Treaty. About 80% of ODS 
voters are pro-EU, and so it will be difficult for ODS to retain its rather 
euroskeptic profile in the long run. 
x Ongoing government crisis. There are different scenarios as how the 
process of the ratification will be influenced by a deal between the Gov-
ernment and the ODS.
3
The possible scenarios are: 
x Current Government supports the pending ODS proposal coming from 
the Senate to have a referendum earlier on; ODS has to deal with CSSD 
(i.e. ODS keeps the government in power for the rest of the election pe-
riod).
x ODS agrees to have the two elections joint together as proposed by the 
Government.
x No agreement on a constitutional act-no referendum. Constitutional 
Treaty will go to the Parliament where, on the one hand, the Court 
might rule that simple majority will be needed (goes easily through) or, 
on the other hand, three-fifths will be required (government begs for 
support and a deal would have to be made).  
Another strong political factor are the current and former Presidents of the 
Czech Republic. The former President and ODS member, Vaclav Havel, 
said that he believed a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty should not 
be held in the country because it was a complex text, which did not change 
the EU. The current President, Vaclav Klaus, argued that a referendum 
would now be pointless as the Treaty no longer exists.
4
2 http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-136570-16&type=Analysis  
3 David Král, 2005: The Czech ratification of Constitution Treaty 
4 The ratification process in the Czech Republic> http://www.unizar.es 
/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_Czech%20Republic.htm  Czech Republic 
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Public opinion 
According to the newest Eurobarometer the level of support among the 
public rose from 44% last spring to 50% last autumn.
5  The July 2005 
Eurobarometer showed the level of support among Czechs had fallen from 
63% in autumn 2004 to 44%.
6 This increase might be related to Plan D, 
which is aiming at bringing the EU closer to its citizens and to overcome 
the crisis brought on by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the 
French and the Dutch.
7 The Czech people seem to be overwhelmingly un-
aware of the Constitutional Treaty because the Government has done very 
little to communicate it to its citizens. The only text of the Constitutional 
Treaty, officially published, is on the website of the Ministry of Finance. 
The only printed version available in Czech was distributed by the Com-
mission through the EU Information Centre, but only a few copies were 
available.
8  67% of the population claim that they have not been at all in-
formed about the Constitutional Treaty but they have heard about it and 
26% say that they do not know about it at all.
9  A meaningful discussion 
about the impact of the Treaty on the people has not taken place.
10
5 Eurobarometer 64, December 2005; Public opinion in the European Union> 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf
6 Eurobarometer 63, July 2005; Public opinion in the European Union> 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,%
20July%202005.pdf
7 EC President unveils Plan-D in Prague; Daniela Lazarova, 21.nov 2005> 
http://www.radio.cz/en/article/72909
8 David Král, 2005: The Czech ratification of Constitution Treaty 
9 Eurobarometer Report: January 2005; The Future Constitutional Treaty > 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/eurobarometer,%
20on%20constitution  
10 Czechs need the Constitution; Hybásková, Jana>http://www.cafebabel.com 
/en/article.asp?T=A&Id=1137  Arnar B. Sigurðsson 
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National priorities and reflection phase 
There are four main national priorities: 
x Czech EU membership: concerns of the impact on the lives of the Czech 
citizens in areas of the economy, the legal environment and the quality 
of life in the EU. 
x Europe’s future: i.e. direction of the EU, further EU expansion, the fu-
ture of the Constitutional Treaty, reforms of the single EU agricultural 
policy.
x European programmes and funds – signposts for European money: fi-
nancial funds available to Czech entities in the EU. 
x The project “EU into Schools”: increase the level of information pro-
vided to the target group teacher - student – parents concerning current 
EU issues.
11
The reflection period, Plan D, and its objectives for the Czech Republic is 
to encourage debates in the country on the Constitutional Treaty, allow the 
citizens to go to the Eurocentre in Prague with their problems and questions 
concerning the EU, reduce the deficit between the people and the political 
parties, inform the people about European and Czech Republic affairs 
through public debates, which the Government will be hosting through na-
tional forums.
12 In the Czech Republic, a referendum is likely to help the 
prospects for ratification. A referendum would enhance the chances of the 
Treaty being passed because it is thought to be too difficult to obtain the 
necessary 60% in both Chambers of the Parliament.
13 Until recently, there 
was little down in the Czech Republic that there would be a referendum on 
the Treaty. However, today the outcome of a popular vote is somewhat 
“troublesome,” given the division of the Czech Republic’s political class on 
11 Communication Strategy Paper on the provision of information on European matters 
in the Czech Rep. 
12 The official opening of the New Eurocentre in Prague> 
http://www2.euroskop.cz/data/index.php?p=detail&c-
id=47582&h_kat_id=5586&id=5608
13 What prospects for the European Constitutional Treaty?> 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/kus01/kus01.pdfCzech Republic 
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the matter. The trend, however, has changed and various interesting scenar-
ios could emerge as to what will be the fate of the ratification of the Treaty 
in the Czech Republic.
14
Arnar B. Sigurðsson 
14 David Král, 2005: The Czech ratification of Constitution Treaty.> 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/Kral_the%20czec
h_debate_March%202005.pdfGreat Britain 
State of ratification 
The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in Great Britain (population: 
approx. 60 million) requires approval by both Parliament, consisting of the 
House of Commons and House of Lords, and the people through a referen-
dum. The European Union Bill was introduced on 24th May 2005 to give 
effect to Great Britain's commitment to ratify the Constitutional Treaty by 
referendum. The Foreign Secretary announced on 6th June 2005, that until 
the consequences of France and the Netherlands being unable to ratify the 
Constitutional Treaty were clarified, the Government would not set a date 
for the Second Reading of the Bill. 
Positions of political actors 
After Prime Minister Tony Blair signed the Constitutional Treaty, two dis-
tinct political camps in Great Britain have expressed great division upon 
the issue. At first, there was considerable debate about whether there 
should be a referendum. During the year 2003, the Prime Minister ex-
pressed repeatedly his unwillingness to hold a referendum, but he was fac-
ing great pressure of pro-referendum campaigns, the oppositional parties 
and the press. On 20th April 2004, he finally announced to hold a referen-
dum. However, the referendum debate is less significant than the debate 
over the ratification itself. On one side, the Labour party, which under 
Blair's leadership recognises a more interconnected Europe as a place that 
Britain could lead, declared its support for the Constitutional Treaty. The 
Labour leaders argue that the Constitutional Treaty is necessary to speed up 
the decision making process in an enlarged EU. Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw said that Britain will be weak and marginalised within Europe if it 
fails to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. Liberal Democrats joined Labour in 
supporting the ratification. On the other side, there are the Conservative 
and the Independence Party. Some of the key doctrines of the Conservative Mladen Dragasevic 
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manifesto are to keep the pound, oppose the Constitutional Treaty and 
bring back power from Brussels. Michael Howard, one of the leaders of the 
UK’s Conservative Party, declared on 1st June 2004: “I am totally opposed 
to the European Constitution. Countries have constitutions and I do not 
want to be part of a country called Europe”
1. Furthermore, the Torries say 
that the Constitutional Treaty will make Europe's economy even less flexi-
ble, even less competitive and even more sluggish than it is today. Along 
the same lines, Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK’s Independence Party, is 
of the opinion that the Constitutional Treaty does not reflect the thoughts, 
hopes and aspirations of ordinary people and that it does nothing for jobs or 
economic growth, while at the same time it widens the democratic deficit.  
Public opinion 
Standard Barometer’s UK National Report from September 2005
2 has been 
in compliance with the presumption that UK is one of the least enthusiastic 
members of the EU. On the question: “Generally speaking, do you think 
that our country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a 
bad thing or neither good nor bad?”, more than half of those polled (54%) 
across the European Union felt that their country’s membership to the EU 
was a good thing. In the UK, the comparable figure is 36%, down from 
38% six months previously but well ahead of the 29% recorded in spring 
2004.
Regarding the question: “Has the UK benefited from being a member of 
the European Union?”, across the EU, more than half (55%) of those polled 
believed that their country had benefited from being a member of the EU. 
The number of UK citizens, who believe that their country has benefited 
from EU membership has risen over a year from 30% to 39% and now to 
40%.
The disputes among the British population and media vary from the most 
frequent question all over EU: “Is it at all possible to think of a constitution 
1 www.conservatives.com 
2 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion Great Britain 
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without thinking of a State”, to the ones characteristically British, for ex-
ample: “Will the Constitution make Her Majesty the Queen an EU citizen”, 
but in the focus of the discussions tends toward the most obvious expres-
sions of a state’s sovereignty: money, police and military.  
National priorities and the Reflection Phase 
At the beginning of the negotiations over the Constitutional Treaty, British 
ministers, being aware of its importance to the people, have set out a series 
of "red lines" they said they will not allow to be crossed in. The Govern-
ment expressed Great Britain’s readiness to veto the whole project if it does 
not get its way on these key issues. The "red lines" were outlined in a white 
paper and consist of the following:  
x Defence: Great Britain said it must remain in control of its own defence 
and foreign policy. There must be no European defence cooperation 
which undermines or replaces NATO. 
x Justice: Great Britain said it is determined to stop majority voting being 
introduced for steps that would allow for harmonisation of European 
common law systems.  
x Tax: Taxation must be decided by nation states alone. The Constitu-
tional Treaty would allow for majority voting on measures to tackle 
cross border tax fraud.
x Social Security: The British argument here is that social support systems 
are very complicated and so the EU should only be allowed to make 
changes through unanimous voting.  
x European resources: Great Britain wants any changes to the EU's right 
to raise certain funds to be agreed by unanimity alone.  
The outcome of the great efforts the British representatives made in defend-
ing the “red lines”, during European Convention’s work in 2002/2003 and 
at the subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences in 2003/2004, was that 
almost all starting positions of Great Britain in negotiations were validated.  Mladen Dragasevic 
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First of all, British armed forces will remain under British control and 
could be deployed only with the Government's agreement. Furthermore, the 
British succeeded in protecting their issue of high priority, which ensures 
that European Defence does not undermine NATO. The Constitutional 
Treaty is clear: for those states which are members of NATO, it remains 
the foundation of their collective defence (Article I-41.7). Any develop-
ment of a European common defence must be passed unanimously by the 
Council (Article I-41.2). 
Regarding the main economic issues, unanimous agreement is still re-
quired. Great Britain keeps a veto over the contributions to the EU budget, 
in other words they can block any attempt to end their rebate. The Gov-
ernment also successfully negotiated to keep a national veto over tax pro-
posals. In addition, Social Security proposals are subject to an effective 
veto through a national 'emergency brake' mechanism allowing any Mem-
ber State to refer a proposed law to the European Council for decision by 
consensus. The Constitutional Treaty also does not change the terms of the 
UK's Protocol on Economic and Monetary Union and so the UK is under 
no obligation to join the single currency. In addition, Article III-256.2 of 
the Constitutional Treaty makes clear that EU laws shall not affect a Mem-
ber State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy re-
sources.
On the other hand, the Treaty provides that the provisions of the Charter of 
Citizens’ Fundamental Rights will be judiciable in the European Court of 
Justice - in spite of initial fierce opposition from the British government. 
These include some highly sensitive issues such as workers’ rights to 
strike. The text does stipulate that the ECJ must take “due consideration” of 
national laws in these areas when reaching judgments. However, the final 
decision on how to balance the contents of the Charter and the explanations 
of national circumstances will be left to the judges in Luxembourg.  
After the French and the Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair told the Parliament: "Realistically, given the 
'No' votes in France and the Netherlands, ratification cannot succeed unless Great Britain 
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and until those votes change"
3. Accordingly, the House of Commons, on 
the proposal of Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, has postponed the Second 
Reading of the European Union Bill. 
Mladen Dragasevic 
3 www.fco.gov.uk Constitutional Debates in “old“
Member States without Referendum Austria 
State of ratification 
Austria (population: 8,174,762) ratified the EU Constitution via the lower 
chamber of the Parliament, referred to as the Nationalrat. Members voted in 
favour of the ratification of the text on the 11
th of May 2005. 182 Members 
of Parliament voted in favour and one against. All 183 members were pre-
sent.
1 
The Austrian Constitution does allow for the possibility of a referendum. 
Article 43 of the constitution authorizes the Nationalrat to submit its acts to 
referendum after the adoption by the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of par-
liament, and before being approved by the President of the Republic. How-
ever, the President, Heinz Fischer said he was against the idea of a referen-
dum for ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. According to Article 50 of 
the Austrian Constitution, the ratification procedure for international trea-
ties implies the approval of a draft constitutional law to authorize ratifica-
tion by the government.
2 
Political Actors 
  The Nationalrat adopted the Constitutional Treaty unanimously on 2nd 
March. This draft was then to be transferred to the parliament and adopted 
by two thirds majority with at least half of the MPs present. Finally the 
Bundesrat also adopted the Treaty. Consequently, the upper house com-
pleted ratification on the 25
th May 2005 with three members of the right 
voting against the Constitutional Treaty, while the other representatives 
approved it.  
 
1 www.bbc.co.uk, 24th November 2005 
2 Deloy, Corrinne:  Austria is to be the 8th State to ratify the European Consitution; 
http://constitution-europeenne.info/an/autriche_constit_an.pdf Manasi Shailaja Gopalakrishnan 
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Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel of the Popular Party (ÖVP) asked to vote, 
“for a strong and democratic, pacific, social Europe thanks to the constitu-
tion,” that he believes, “protects the sovereignty of the 25 member states 
and increases citizens’ and individuals’ social rights”. He is also of the 
opinion that the Constitutional Treaty is, “like a second Treaty of State. 
That’s why the Parliament voted unanimously the law allowing its ratifica-
tion, which will be unanimous as well, I hope." 
3 The leader of the main 
opposition party the SPÖ, Alfred Gusenbauer declared that the Constitu-
tional Treaty was better than the present Treaties and voted for it. The 
leader of the Greens, Alexander von Bellen said, “a blank yes, since we 
have to choose between this text and the miserable Nice treaty”.  
Responses to the ratification have been mixed. Some Austrians have been 
concerned about the inclusion of a mutual defence Pact saying it could un-
dermine Austria’s neutral standpoint. The far right was also in opposition 
to the idea of the Constitutional Treaty overriding the national Constitution. 
There have also been suggestions to move the constitutional Court to rule 
on whether it is legal to ratify the constitution without a referendum. Le-
gally however, ratification by the parliament is seen as final. 
In the context of the EU constitution replacing all the existing Treaties and 
overriding the national Constitution along with two countries rejecting the 
constitution, there have been various debates and discussions on possible 
consequences. In a three and a half hour long debate, all political fractions 
in Austria clearly expressed their opinion on the EU. They praised the idea 
of the EU peace project (Friedensprojekt Europa) and identified with the 
idea of an EU constitution, although the feeling can not really be described 
as euphoric. Austria, according to them would need a stronger Europe in 
the coming years and a stronger Europe would need a Constitution. For the 
Vice Chancellor Hubert Gorbach, the Constitutional Treaty would mean 
more democracy and social rights. The ratification was however seen as a 
compromise more than anything else. The ÖVP, the SPÖ and the Greens 
wanted a pan-Europe referendum and the BZÖ also set its demands for a 
 
3 Quoted in Le Monde, dated 16.03.2005, http://www.unizar.es/euroconsti 
tucion/Home.htm Austria 
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national plebiscite. For the far-right leader Barbara Rosenkranz, the lack of 
a referendum was also justification against the ratification of the constitu-
tion. For the party leader Jorg Haider, the EU constitution would mean 
fundamental changes to the Austrian Constitution, and hence called for a 
referendum on the issue.
4 
Public Opinion 
A majority of the Austrian population seems to perceive the alleged disad-
vantage of EU membership more strongly than the disadvantages. The EU 
for Austrians, means primarily the Euro currency (50%) followed by nega-
tive points such as a waste of money, more crime (42%) and unemploy-
ment (36%).  Since fall 2004, only enlargement has seen rising support by 
the Austrian poll, which is now at 31%. 42 % Austrians display trust in the 
EU with around 39% saying they understand how the EU functions. 41% of 
Austrians see gains in EU membership, moving against the European trend 
of increasing perceptions of gains. Austria scores below the EU average in 
aspects regarding trust in the European Council and the European Parlia-
ment.
5 
National Priorities 
Austria presents an interesting case, it being a relatively late EU joining 
nation-state. Moreover, the new Austrian presidency since the 15
th of De-
cember has also involved a resetting of priorities. Contrary to Germany, 
which has already made clear it will try and revive the EU constitution dur-
ing its presidency in the first half of 2007.  Contrary to their earlier stand-
point of calling for a re-polling of countries that rejected the constitutional 
treaty in another two years,  Ms Plassnik said that Austria will not press for 
ratification of the text. "There are no quick fixes and no instant answers", 
the Austrian minister said, adding that Europe is currently engaged in a re-
 
4 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Home.htm 
5 Eurobarometer 63.4, Public Opinion in the European Union, Spring 2005, Executive 
Summary, Austria Manasi Shailaja Gopalakrishnan 
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flection period on the constitution. 
6The Austrian political change involves 
a “westernization” of the Austrian political system accompanied by the Eu-
ropeanization of policy areas. This is to further emphasize the point that the 
understanding of democracy and therefore independence has a role in a 
country that ratifies the EU Constitution. One needs to therefore identify a 
so-called “overlapping consensus” on basic values, ideas and conceptions 
of democracy if one requires a common understanding and practice of de-
mocracy in the Union.
7 
The two main issues before Austria ratified the constitution were the fol-
lowing: 
•  The future of EU financing  
•  The rejection of the EU Constitution by the French and Dutch voters.  
Austria’s concerns now include the contribution to the EU Budget, the 
enlargement, a new stringent asylum law and rising unemployment. New 
debates have emerged even after the constitution has been ratified, and the 
process of legitimizing the EU and the draft constitutional treaty still goes 
on. 
Manasi Shailaja Gopalakrishnan 
 
6 EU Observer, 20.12.2005 
7 Melchior, Josef: National and European understandings of democracy: The case of 
Austria and the EU; European Integration Papers Online, Vol 9, 2005 No.4 Italy
State of ratification 
Italy (Population: approx. 57 million) was the first “founding father” of 
European Union to ratify the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the Parliament was the 
only option considering that the Italian Constitution leaves no room for a 
popular referendum on international treaties
1. Both chambers had to ap-
prove the Treaty with a simple majority. The process of parliamentary rati-
fication ended on 6
th April this year. On this date the Senate gave its final 
approval with 217 “yes” and 16 “no” votes. Three months earlier on 25
th
January, the Chamber of Deputies had already given its approval. They 
voted in favour with 436 “yes” votes, 28 “no” votes and 5 abstentions
2.
Position of political actors 
In both chambers the number of votes in favour of the Constitutional 
Treaty shows that there was hardly any opposition regarding the ratification 
of the Treaty. Foreign minister Fini as well as Prime-minister Berlusconi 
supported a quick ratification of the Treaty in order to show Italy’s pro-
European spirit. Fini expressed in his speech in front of the Senate that he 
wished to “send a clear signal of optimism and determination to the gov-
ernments and public opinion of the rest of Europe
3”. Berlusconi even went 
a step further by stating that ratification without delay was a responsibility 
for the Italians, as he considered the Europeanist sentiment in Italy a part of 
their history. Almost all Italian politicians considered Italy as a country that 
has had, and will have a leading role in European integration in the future. 
1 Article 75-2 Italian Constitution.  
2 Kurpas, Incerti, Schoenlau, Epin Working Paper, What Prospets for the European 
Constitutional Treaty?. CEPS January 2005. 
3 Address by Minister Fini before the Senate on the final approval of the European 
Constitutional Treaty. 6th of  April 2005. Brenda Kramer 
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For this reason a quick ratification was seen as necessary. Berlusconi added 
in his speech in front of both chambers that the proceedings for ratification 
of the Treaty mark an important historical step, namely a European Consti-
tution based on the twofold and indivisible consensus of citizens and Mem-
ber States
4.
Although there was a wide-spread positive atmosphere among almost all 
political parties some voices objected to the Constitutional Treaty.  Those 
voices of opposition came from two sides. The first was the extreme right 
party (Lega Nord), which is part of the government coalition, and the other 
was the left party (the Communist Re-foundation). The main concern of 
both parties was that the Treaty would cause a loss of national and regional 
sovereignty.  
Furthermore, the Northern League stressed three key points that were re-
lated to concerns regarding the possible regression of the judicial protection 
afforded to citizens, in particular social rights, and secondly concerns re-
garding the role of national parliaments in decision making. The third ob-
jection was the fact that a reference to Christianity in the Preamble of the 
Constitutional Treaty was lacking. This objection was nevertheless not only 
expressed by the opposition, but also by many politicians who in fact had 
supported the Treaty.
Public opinion 
Basically we can say that virtually no public debate took place in the Italian 
Community. Overshadowed by regional elections that led to a political cri-
sis, the Italian media did not cover the ratification by the Senate more than 
just a report of the outcome of voting. For this reason it is hard to say 
something about the attitude of the Italian community towards the Consti-
4 Speech by Berlusconi before the Senate on the signing of the Constitution. 6th of April 
2005.Italy
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tutional Treaty. Nevertheless the level of support for the Treaty among Ital-
ian citizens can be described by using the polls of the Eurobarometer
5.
In January 2005 a special Eurobarometer was published on the future of the 
Constitution. The first question asked concerned whether people in Europe 
had heard something about the Constitution. In Italy 24% of the people 
stated that they had never heard of it, 58% stated that they knew a bit and 
18 % said they knew the overall content of the Treaty. Those results show 
that the Italians overall had a bit more knowledge of the Constitution than 
the average citizen in the European Union. European citizens on average 
answered in 33% to have no knowledge, 56% said to know a bit and 11% 
said they knew the overall content.  
A remarkable fact is that at the moment that their real knowledge was 
tested, only around 40% of the people who reportedly knew the overall 
content, answered the questions correctly. This shows that Italians seem to 
think they know more than they really do. 
Apart from the level of knowledge, the level of support for a European 
Constitution was also measured. Regarding this question Italy ended up 
being the most pro-European country in the EU, with 72% in favour of the 
Constitution and only 10% not supporting the idea of a European Constitu-
tion. On the basis of this Barometer one can conclude that support for the 
Constitutional Treaty was rather high during the process of ratification in 
Italy.
Measurements of support in spring 2005 do not change this picture and 
even show that 74% of the Italians supported a European Constitution. The 
Eurobarometer of this autumn, after the “no” votes in France and the Neth-
erlands, nevertheless shows a decrease in support to 70%. The level of 
people against the Constitutional Treaty has increased to 16%. This is re-
markable because we see at the same time that the level of support in the 
no-vote countries has increased again.
5  Based on the Special Eurobarometer of January 2005. The Future Constitutional 
Treaty First results.Brenda Kramer 
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National priorities 
The most important issue for Italy to push on the Convention’s agenda was 
the issue of competition. In this area Italy had a few particular priorities: 
x Trans-European networks to bring down remaining physical barriers 
x Cohesion policies, particularly the division of money between old and 
new member states were of importance. The Italian government realized 
that with regard to the cohesion funds it finds itself in competition with 
the new Member states which would most likely have a greater right to 
structural funds and cohesion policies. 
Besides the priorities related to competition the Italians also set some other 
priorities regarding the negotiations in the Convention:
x Reform of the institutions in order to preserve legitimacy even in an 
enlarged Union was regarded as a priority. Nevertheless this should not 
lead to a loss of national identities.
x The EU should be an international actor, favouring a common European 
Defence and Security Policy, and the reinforcement of transatlantic ties. 
After the work of the Convention was finished, the Italians were satisfied 
with the provisions that were included
6. Nevertheless the fear of loosing 
money to the new Member States persisted. Moreover the Italians think it is 
really important even in an enlarged Union to enable every member state to 
keep its own cultural, religious and political characteristics. Because the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty has already been ratified a phase of reflection 
has not been initiated in Italy. 
Brenda Kramer 
6 Italian ministry of Foreign Affairs, Negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty.
(www.esteri.it)Belgium
State of ratification 
The current situation in Belgium (population 10,36 million) regarding the 
Constitutional Treaty is that it was ratified in the Belgian Parliament with-
out holding a referendum (by 118 votes for and 18 against) on 19
th May 
2005. In terms of the regional parliaments, the Parliaments of theWalloon 
Region, Brussels-Capital Region, French Community and the German 
speaking Community ratified the Constitution. Whereas in the Flemish Par-
liament, the ratification procedure has been started, however it is not ex-
pected to be completed until Spring 2006 
1.
Positions of political actors 
In Belgium, the debate about the Constitutional Treaty stayed on a proce-
dural level, rather than discussing the essence or the content of the Treaty. 
The main debate was about whether to hold a referendum or not.  
When one examines the “referendum culture” in Belgium, there has never 
been a referendum on EU matters there. The only referendum held in Bel-
gium was in March 1950 and it ended in a civil war. This is known as the 
“Royal Question” in Belgium and showed that direct democracy was not 
possible or fruitful in Belgium 
2.
Moreover according to the Belgian Constitution (Art.167,2 & 53), the only 
kind of referendum that can be made in Belgium, is a consultative referen-
1 Answer of Dr.Dirk Rochtus, who is the Vice Chief of Cabinet at the Cabinet of Flem-
ish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 17.11.2005. 
2 Rigo, A. (2005). The Ratification of the European Constitution in Belgium: five 
months of negotiation concerning the question of convening a referendum. Faculte 
de Science politique, Department des Relations Internationales, Universite Ca-
tholique de Louvain la Neuve, pp.2-3. Elif Özkaragöz 
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dum if ordered by ad-hoc law 
3. So in order to make a referendum, one has 
to change the Constitution. The chronology of the ratification process is as 
follows:
x 01.06.2004: Belgian government proposed a non-binding referendum. 
x 29.11.2004: Council of State gave a negative opinion on this issue. 
x 24.01.2005: The government lost ground for a referendum on the Euro-
pean Constitution by a U-Turn of Spirit Party. 
x 17.02.2005: Constitutional Committee, which is part of the Belgian Par-
liament, rejected the referendum idea. 
x 28.04.2005: The Belgian Senate approved the European Constitution. 
x 19.05.2005: Belgian Federal Parliament ratified the European Constitu-
tion (by 118 votes for, 18 against)
4.
To understand this process, one should look at the position of the Belgian 
political parties and their internal debates
5, such as the: 
Parties for referendum 
x VLD (Flemish Liberals): Party of the Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, 
said “End the traumatism of referendum”. 
x MR (French Liberal Party): Favors also direct democracy. 
x SPA-Spirit (Flemish Governmental Party): At first they were in favor of 
a popular consultation, but in January 2004 they made a “U-Turn” since 
far right Vlaams Belang Party may use it as an internal political issue; 
for instance against Turkey’s integration into the EU which does not 
have much to do with the EC. 
3 The European Union Constitution: The Ratification Process in Belgium.
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Cons_Rat_Belgium.htm Re-
trieved in 20.10.2005. 
4 The European Union Constitution: The Ratification Process in Belgium.
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Cons_Rat_Belgium.htm Re-
trieved in 20.10.2005. 
5 Rigo, A. (2005), op.cit., pp.7-11. Belgium 
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x Vlaams Belang (Far Right Party): They favored a referendum, but tried 
to use it against Turkey’s EU membership. 
Parties against referendum: 
x PS (French socialists): They were sceptical about referendum because of 
the problem of representation of minorities, and it could be used against 
governmental issues. They preferred rather an “indirect consultation”. 
x ECOLO (French Greens): They were first in favor of a popular consul-
tation, but changed their position in the process of decision-making. 
x CdH (French Christian Democrats): They favored a referendum, how-
ever only if there was a neutral organization providing support.  
x CD&V (Flemish Christian Democrats): They were sceptical in the sense 
that “they missed the occasion to organize a referendum at the European 
level”.
Another issue discussed in Belgium was “the social dimension of the Con-
stitutional Treaty” since some of the trade unions were against ratification
6.
However, this did not affect the process of ratification.
Public opinion 
In general, “Belgium is the member state that shows the strongest support 
to the EU” (with 81% of the population in favour) and 70% favored a Con-
stitutional Treaty where the EU average was   48%
7. Moreover 60% of the 
Belgian population has heard and know something about the Constitutional 
Treaty and 41% of them saw it as essential to European construction. So 
even if there had been a referendum, they would have most likely re-
sponded positively.  
6 Kurpas, S., Incerti, M., Schönlau J. and De Clerck-Sachsse, J. Update on the Ratifica-
tion Monitor-What Prospects for the EU Constitutional Treaty? (May 2005). CEPS: 
Belgium. http://www.epin.org/index.php, p.16.   Retrieved in 22.11.2005. 
7 European Commission, Eurobarometer 61 (Spring 2004) : National Report Executive 
Summary Belgium. Elif Özkaragöz 
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National priorities and reflection phase 
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was definitely in favor of the 
Constitutional Treaty as well as a consultative referendum on it
8. He saw 
this as a “Process of Constitutionalisation” which started in with the Maas-
tricht Treaty and as an important step towards a “Federation Model” in 
which the future of Europe lies 
9. He stated that “We should all hope for the 
ratification by 25... I am in favor of a more integrated Union...”
10 However 
in the end, he could not get the support he wanted for a “popular consulta-
tion” in Belgium. 
In one of his recent interviews published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung
11 , he emphasized that the Constitutional Treaty was not ambitious 
enough and even with the lost French and Dutch referenda, hope of a 
United States of Europe should not be lost. 
Reasons for not having a referendum in Belgium were that: First of all, 
they had no experience with the “Referendum culture” and as the “Royal 
Question” stayed in their mind, they were even a bit anxious about holding 
a referendum. Also it is a mixed nation with many minority groups and if 
there had been a referendum in Belgium, it could have ended in internal 
unrest and been used against governmental policies. 
Concerning cross-national references, neither the French debate nor any 
other has had a particular influence on Belgium. Little debate showed that 
8 EU Constitution Newsletter (November 2004), p.5. London: The Federal Trust for 
Education and Research. 
9 Verhofstadt, G. (25.11.2003). The New European Constitution from Laeken to Rome
in  Humboldt-Reden zu Europa. Berlin Humboldt-Universität, p.2. 
10 Interview: Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium (11.03.2005). 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-136709-16&type=Interview.  Re-
trieved in 25.10.2005. 
11 Interview: Verhofstadt, G.(02.12.2005), Plädoyer für die „Vereinigten Staaten von 
Europa, Bundeskanzleramt Österreich Europa. http://www.austria.gv.at/DesktopDe 
fault.aspx?TabID=4760&Alias=bkaeuropa&cob=13895  Retrieved in 12.12.2005. Belgium 
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it was kind of a “silent approval” of the Constitutional Treaty both by the 
political parties as well as the public of Belgium.
12
Elif Özkaragöz 
12 Kurpas, S., Incerti, M., Schönlau J. and De Clerck-Sachsse, J. (May 2005). op.cit.,  
p.16.Greece
State of ratification 
On 19
thApril 2005 the Greek Parliament ratified the Constitutional Treaty
1.
In Greece (population: approx. 11 million) the process leading to the ratifi-
cation was executed within one week in only three parliamentary sessions. 
Furthermore, the ratification was overwhelmingly approved by 268 out of 
the 300 MPs
2.
Position of political actors 
The current governing party, the New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia), was 
strongly in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. Prior to the parliamentary 
ratification Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis argued for his Party’s sup-
port for the Treaty, as he found the text to be promoting Greek interests 
with the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause as well as the inclusion of 
tourism in EU policies
3.
The Greek Socialist Party (PA.SO.K), which is the second largest political 
party, was also in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. The Greek Socialist 
Party’s President George A. Papandreou, emphasised the creation of the 
position of an EU Foreign Minister as one of the reasons for being in fa-
vour of the Treaty. He also argued that the Constitutional Treaty could be 
1 Hope, K., Greece becomes sixth EU member to back treaty, April 2005 Financial 
Times. 
2 Siapkidou, E. (2005), The European Constitution and its ratification- National Update: 
Greece, URL: http://www.epin.org/pdf/RM-CR-Greece010505.pdf.  
3 Athens News Agency, PM Karamanlis: Euro-Constitution an important milestone on 
road to European integration, 15 April 2005, URL: http://www.hri.org/news 
/greek/apeen/. Anna Catharina Holl 
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used as a tool through which the multi-cultural and social dimensions of 
Europe could be furthered
4.
The other two members of the Greek Parliament are two small leftist par-
ties, the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the Greek Communist 
Party (K.K.E.). Both parties were against the Constitutional Treaty, but for 
different reasons. The Coalition of Radical Left is ideologically in favour 
of European integration and of a Constitutional Treaty, but it believes that 
the EU is too liberal, too protectionist against asylum seekers and immi-
grants as well as too submissive in relation to the US and NATO in the 
matter of foreign and defence policy. Thus, the Party saw the proposed 
Constitutional Treaty as an institutionalisation of wrong principles. The 
Greek Communist Party is against the EU and the Constitutional Treaty, 
which in its view reflects the will of the right-wing European govern-
ments
5.
In theory, the Greek Government could have called for a public referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty, as Article 28 of the Greek Constitution allows 
for both, the ratification by parliament and the ratification by a public ref-
erendum
6. In order to obtain a public referendum a proposal needs a 3/5 
majority in Parliament
7. This is an interesting fact, as the current New De-
mocracy Government holds 55% (165 seats) of the Parliament
8. Thus, a 
public referendum could only have taken place with the Government’s 
support.
4 Papandreou, G. A. (2005), Do we build the Europe we seek for?, URL: 
http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/opinionfolder.aspx?d=6&rd=773947
4&f=1402&rf=1363112986&m=-1&rm=-1&l=1.  
5 Siapkidou, E. (2005), The European Constitution and its ratification- National Update: 
Greece, URL: http://www.epin.org/pdf/RM-CR-Greece010505.pdf.  
6 Gogos, P. (2001), Die Diskussion über eine zukünftige Verfassung der Europäischen 
Union in Griechenland, in: Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union. 
7 Siapkidou, E. (2005), The European Constitution and its ratification- National Update: 
Greece, URL: http://www.epin.org/pdf/RM-CR-Greece010505.pdf. 
8 Athens News Agency, PM-elect Costas Karamanlis unveils cabinet, 10 March 2004, 
URL: http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/. Greece
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Public opinion
Overall the debate on the Constitutional Treaty in Greece has been limited. 
This can partially be explained by the fact that the two main political par-
ties, who together hold 282 out of the 300 seats in the Parliament,
9 were 
both in favour of ratification. However, there have been several attempts to 
enforce a debate, through seminars and conferences organised by associa-
tions, research institutes and think tanks. The Greek Foreign Ministry has 
also tried to stimulate public awareness, by organising discussions on the 
Constitutional Treaty in major Greek cities between January and May 
2005.
Prior to the ratification, public opinion polls showed that Greek citizens 
were optimistic about the positive effects of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Concretely, the polls indicated that Greek citizens expected the adoption of 
the Constitutional Treaty to make the EU more democratic, (EL: 67% - 
EU25: 64%), more efficient (EL: 69% - EU25: 63%) and more transparent
(EL: 58% - EU25: 56%)
10.
The negative results of the French and Dutch public referendums have in 
fact received more media attention than the ratification process in Greece 
itself
11. In early 2005, the political debate was especially centred on an-
other EU issue caused by the introduction of a controversial Greek law 
known as the ‘main shareholder bill’
12 . The bill enacted an article of the 
Greek Constitution that seeks to create greater transparency and prevent 
media involvement in the process of awarding public contracts. The intro-
duction of the new law raised questions about the compatibility of EU law 
and the Greek Constitution and ended in a formal dispute between the EU 
and Greece. Especially the primacy of EU law over the Greek Constitution 
9 The national Greek election numbers, URL:  http://www.greekelections. 
com/portal/en/municelect/results2004.asp?state=municelect. 
10 European Commission (2005), Eurobarometer 63.4 – European Union public opin-
ion.
11 Siapkidou, E. (2005), The European Constitution and its ratification- National Up-
date: Greece, URL: http://www.epin.org/pdf/RM-CR-Greece010505.pdf.
12 Athens News Agency, Commission formally asks Greece to change primary share-
holder law, 27 April 2005, URL: http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/. Anna Catharina Holl 
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and national law caused a furious debate. The Greek Government was wor-
ried about a potential confusion of the two issues and that it could create a 
refusing attitude towards the Constitutional Treaty. By some it is argued 
that this debate reinforced the Greek Government’s insistence on the par-
liamentary ratification as opposed to a public referendum
13.
On a note of relevance, the main shareholder bill issue was settled on 2
nd
November 2005, when a revised bill, which the European Commission 
found to comply with EU legislation, was approved by the Greek Parlia-
ment
14.
National priorities
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs 
The Constitutional Treaty makes a common task of three major issues, 
namely organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. Furthermore, 
the focus of the Community is foreseen to shift to the common protection 
of the external borders
15. 80% (EU25: 77%) of the Greeks are in favour of 
a common defence and security policy and 76% (EU 25: 67%)
16are in fa-
vour of a common foreign policy. The two major parties in Greece, the 
New Democracy and the Greek Socialist Party, also emphasise the signifi-
cance of the security policy as it is outlined in the Constitutional Treaty.
The provisions for the common protection of the external borders are of 
special interest for Greece, considering the geographical position of the 
country. Greece exclusively borders to non-EU states (Albania, Former 
Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey) and has had 
ongoing political disputes with these states.
13 Siapkidou, E. (2005), The European Constitution and its ratification- National Up-
date: Greece, URL: http://www.epin.org/pdf/RM-CR-Greece010505.pdf.
14 Athens News Agency, Primary shareholder bill approved, 3 November 2005, URL: 
http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/.  
15 Non-paper prepared by the European Commission, Summary of the Constitutional 
treaty, URL: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/summary_en.htm. 
16 European Commission (2005), Eurobarometer 63.4 – European Union public opin-
ion.Greece
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Tourism
Tourism provides 15% of the Greek’s GDP
17. The country has experienced 
a significant increase in tourism in recent years. The number of foreign 
tourist arrivals has risen from approximately 8.27 million in 1991 to 14.8 
million in 2004
18. The proposed Constitutional Treaty explicitly puts tour-
ism on the agenda of the EU. The aim is to strengthen co-operation be-
tween member states and to promote the competitiveness in this sector
19.
With tourism being included in the Constitutional Treaty, Greece hopes for 
continuing financial aid in the form of cohesion funds, in order to further 
improve its infrastructure, which is of great national importance at the mac-
roeconomic level. 
Anna Catharina Holl 
17 Cia factbook online, URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos
/gr.html.  
18 National statistical service of Greece (2005), Greece in figures. 
19 Non-paper prepared by the European Commission, Summary of the Constitutional 
treaty, URL: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/summary_en.htm. Germany 
State of ratification 
On the 12
th May the German Bundestag (568 members voting yes and 2 
abstentions) and then on 27
th May 2005 the German Bundesrat (66 mem-
bers voting yes and 3 abstentions) approved the Constitutional Treaty. The 
approval came from all federal states of Germany (population: 82,431,390) 
with only one exception of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which abstained.
1 
Nevertheless, the ratification procedure has not been completed, as Presi-
dent Horst Koehler has not added his signature. Even though the German 
Constitutional Court had resolved the legal issue on whether the treaty con-
forms to the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law), President Koehler may still 
be waiting to see what happens to the Constitutional Treaty in the rest of 
Europe.
2 
Positions of political actors 
Germany was considered the most powerful driving force behind the ratifi-
cation of the Constitutional Treaty. In view of increasing controversies 
around the French plebiscite on the Constitutional Treaty, German gov-
ernment supported French "yes" campaign by holding ratification in 
Bundestag on 12th May, 2005.  Since the positive outcome was practically 
taken for granted, it was expected to boost support for the Constitutional 
Treaty right before the French referendum. The absence of a heated debate 
on the Constitutional Treaty was a distinguishing feature of the German 
process of ratification. However, although practically all major German 
parties supported the Treaty, serious political discussions were held in re-
gard to the ratification method.  
 
1 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_germany.htm 
2 Deutsche Welle, Court Rejects German EU Referendum Plea, March 28, 2005, 
http://www.dw-world.de Irina Leonenko 
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The Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported the introduction of the 
plebiscite elements in the German Basic Law, with the aim of improving 
the confidence of the citizens and increasing the legitimacy of the political 
system. The SPD, however, did not emphasize their support for the refer-
endum on the Constitutional Treaty itself since the party was more inter-
ested in a secure and quick ratification through the parliament.
3 The debate 
regarding European integration has always been an elite issue in Germany 
and a referendum is forbidden in the constitution because of ‘historical is-
sues’.
The Alliance 90/The Greens were the strongest supporters of the referen-
dum on the Constitutional Treaty and viewed it as a way to increase its le-
gitimacy and to encourage European-wide debate. The party was in favour 
of general changes in the Basic Law in order to make possible referendum 
on major issues, such as the Turkish EU bid.  At the same time the Free
Democratic Party (FDP)  defended a reform of the Basic Law solely for a 
special case of having a referendum for historical decisions like the Euro-
pean Constitution. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) took an ex-
plicit stand against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, and was the 
only one that expressed that the Treaty was antidemocratic, antisocial and 
militaristic, in this sense the party refused the text and advocated for a ref-
erendum on the charter, carrying on a ‘No’ campaign. 
Both conservative parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the 
Christian Social Democratic (CSU), were traditionally sceptical about in-
troduction of popular vote at a federal level. Angela Merkel has pointed out 
on numerous occasions that German constitution promotes representational 
democracy that leaves little room for referenda. The CDU defended the 
parliamentary ratification, but demanded more competences for the 
Bundestag in the light of new enlargements and more clarity between the 
competencies of the German and the European Parliament. CDU also con-
sidered the issue of the Constitutional Treaty to be too complex for a 
3 European Union Research, October 19, 2005  http://www.isites.harvard.edu/icb 
/icb.do?keyword=k1662&pageid=icb.page11370Germany
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straightforward yes/no choice on the referendum but supported holding a 
popular vote on future Turkish accession
4.
Public opinion 
Unlike in neighbouring France, in Germany there was not much public de-
bate on the issue of the Constitutional Treaty. On the one hand, the public 
was not directly involved and the Constitutional Treaty was believed to be 
an easy pass in the parliament. On the other hand, German population had 
generally favourable views on the strengthening of the European integra-
tion. According to March 2005 Eurobarometer
5 report, 54 % of Germans 
supported the Treaty (49% being the EU-25 average) while 17% opposed 
it.  Out of those German respondents who were in favour of the Treaty 39% 
believed that the Constitution was essential to pursue European construc-
tion, 27%  believed that it will ensure smooth running of the EU institu-
tions and 21% thought that the Constitution was necessary to manage inte-
gration of the new member states. Germany particularly stands out in sup-
port of the Constitution as an important symbol of political unification of 
Europe and the way to strengthen the feeling of European identity. More 
than 24% of the proponents of the Treaty listed these as the reasons of their 
support, among the highest proportion in the EU.
6  However, despite the 
general support for the European project, the negative effects of the recent 
round of EU enlargement on German jobs appeared to have unsettled many 
citizens. When quizzed, some Germans said they felt the new EU states had 
entered the Union too quickly, and that the changes were too drastic. These 
emotions have been taken up by the country’s euroskeptics, especially 
Germany’s conservatives. 
4 Kölling, M. (2005), Working paper on the German parliamentary debate about the 
ratification of the European Constitution, University of Saragossa   
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_germany.htm 
5 Eurobarometer, The Future Constitutional Treaty, March 2005 
6 European Union Research, October 19, 2005 http://www.isites.harvard.edu/icb
/icb.do?keyword=k1662&pageid=icb.page11370Irina Leonenko 
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National priorities and the current reflection phase 
Since the European constitutional convention, Germany’s position on the 
Constitutional Treaty has been largely dominated by two factors: 
x Clear catalogue of competences, which was promoted by the German 
Länder, mirrors a federal governance structure in the sense that each 
level of governance needs to know precisely what its competencies are, 
according to the principle of subsidiarity.  
x Political leadership of the Union, especially the question of a future 
European executive, where Germany is also said to be ‘federal’, since it 
has traditionally defended the interests of the small states in the EU and 
has demonstrated some affinity for the communitarian method of the 
Commission and has a particular fondness for a strong European Par-
liament.
7
The new German chancellor Angela Merkel said, that her views on priority 
issues of the EU - such as the constitution, agriculture and future finance - 
were similar to the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder. During her first 
foreign trip to Paris and Brussels, just one day after she took over the of-
fice, Ms. Merkel had stated that she "stands by the EU constitution," vow-
ing to revive the shelved charter when Germany takes over the EU presi-
dency in 2007.
8
In their coalition agreement, the CDU/CSU and SPD (Germany’s new 
‘Grand Coalition’) reiterated their fundamental support for the Constitution 
Treaty and underlined that, in their view, it makes the EU more democratic, 
efficient and transparent. They wanted to press for a continuation of the 
ratification process after the one-year ‘period of reflection’ called for at the 
European Council in June 2005. Indeed, they said that they will try and 
give a new impetus to the process during the German EU Presidency in the 
first half of 2007. Meanwhile, during the ‘period of reflection’, the coali-
7 Dr. Ulrike Guerot, Germany and the Convention on Europe’s Constitution: On the 
way to federalism? 15 October 2002 
8 Euobserver/Brussels, Merkel champions adoption of 'whole' EU Constitution, No-
vember 24, 2005   Germany
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tion said that it will engage in a broad debate with citizens, social partners, 
churches and other civil society groups.
9
Irina Leonenko 
9 Wagner, M. (2005), Fresh Faces, Tired Policies? - The German ‘Grand Coalition’ and 
the EU, European Policy Brief, Issue 18, Dec 2005 Sweden
State of ratification 
The ratification procedure, concerning the Constitutional Treaty, is to be 
decided by the Swedish Parliament. The Government was of the opinion 
that the Constitutional Treaty should be ratified by the Parliament. For 
Sweden, the decision at the European Summit on 16th /17th June 2005 
meant that the Government did not have to present a bill before the Swed-
ish Parliament in autumn of 2005 and consequently, the Parliament did not 
have to decide on the Constitutional Treaty by the end of 2005. The Swed-
ish Government was to submit a bill in September 2005 in preparation for a 
decision by the Riksdag in December of the same year. However, the refer-
enda in France and the Netherlands resulted in the postponement of the 
ratification of the Treaty in the other member states. Therefore, the Swed-
ish Government has decided to postpone the ratification until further notice. 
The Government and a majority of the Parliament want the Parliament to 
decide on the Treaty before the next election, which will be held in 2006. 
Position of political actors 
Prime Minister Göran Persson is the key actor in coordinating Sweden's EU 
policy. On 30th May 2005, he released comments on the French referen-
dum, in which he noted that the outcome of the French referendum called 
for reflection and that the French 'No' vote would not halt the process of 
ratification, by mentioning that nine countries had said 'Yes' to the Treaty 
so far. Moreover, he insisted that a 'No' in France did not short-circuit the 
consideration of the Treaty by the Swedish Parliament any more than a 
'Yes' in Spain. He foresaw a thorough discussion among the EU Heads of 
State and the Governments at the Summit in June 2005 would be important 
for continuing the process. Concerning an assumed demand for renegotia-Kim Myong Chol 
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tion of the Treaty as a result of the French vote, he regards it difficult to see 
that renegotiation would be the way forward
1.
Furthermore, in the Statement of Government Policy, presented to the 
Swedish Parliament on 13th September 2005, he stated that the EU, follow-
ing the referenda on the Treaty, must be shaped so that it meets the de-
mands of a new era. 
Foreign Minister 
At the Europe Update on 8th November 2005, the Prime Minister illus-
trated that the EU could continue to function with the present Nice Treaty 
in the coming few years, but however, in the longer perspective, it was 
necessary to consolidate the Union and make it more efficient. He also 
stressed the need for strong multilateral institutions. According to him, this 
will be satisfied by making good use of the credibility and mandate that are 
inherent in truly multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. 
Parliament
The majority of the political parties in the Swedish Parliament, which has 
the power to decide whether a referendum should be held, are of the same 
opinion as the Government. The parliamentary majority deemed that it was 
in the interests of the member states and the EU citizens that the main as-
pects of the Constitutional Treaty should be implemented. 
Not everyone, however, is in agreement as to how the decision should be 
reached and there are those who are still trying to bring about a referen-
dum. Two parties, the Left Party and the Environmental Party, want the 
issue to be decided via referendum. 
There is also an ongoing discussion about whether the Constitutional 
Treaty is in contradiction with the Swedish Constitution. The Left Party 
and the Green Party feel that the Constitution will hand over further deci-
sion-making authority to the EU to a degree that is against the Swedish 
1 Government Office of Sweden „Prime Minister Göran Persson’s comments on the 
French referendum“ , http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5646/a/45522   Sweden
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Constitution. The Government and the other parliamentary parties, how-
ever, do not share this view. 
Public opinion 
According to an opinion poll in May 2005, 65% of the Swedes want to 
have a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and only 27% of the popu-
lation prefers the Parliament to decide on this issue. Compared to an earlier 
survey in February 2005, there where only 58% pro referendum and 32% 
against. The increased support for the idea of a Constitutional Treaty does 
not only pertain to France and the Netherlands but also to Sweden. A sur-
vey by Sifo for the Newspaper Aftonbladet in May 2005 came to the result 
that 23% would have voted ‘Yes’, 41% ‘No’ and 36% were undecided if 
the Swedes would have voted on that particular day. Nevertheless, the sup-
port for the Constitutional Treaty is very low compared to other Member 
States
2. A Eurobarometer poll shows that only 27% of the Swedish voters 
support it. The level of support has fallen from the 50% 'rather agree' to 
26% recorded in February 2004. Almost one third of the Swedes, who were 
in favour of the Draft Treaty claimed that they were in favour because they 
had always been in favour of the European construction
3.
To a large extent the work to encourage public debate and to get citizens 
involved is carried out by a parliamentary Committee called the “EU 2004 
Commission”
4. The Swedish Government appointed the Commission in 
April 2001. The Government decided on 20th October 2005 to prolong 
the assignment for the EU 2004 Committee until 31st December 2006. The 
Committee shall also deliver a report about the Swedish debate before the 
2 Swedish EU Relay, “Ratification process in Sweden” 
http://www.eu2004.se/extra/pod/?action=pod_show&id=48&module_instance=9  
3 Eurobarometer Spring 2005 , 
 http://www.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_214_en.pdf
4 The full name of the Committe is “The Commission for the Debate on the Develop-
ment and Future of the European Union prior to the Intergovernmental Conference 
in 2004” Kim Myong Chol 
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EU Summit in spring 2006. Several hearings and conferences open to the 
public have been organised in Sweden by different actors
5.
National priorities and the Reflection Phase 
In November 2001 an opinion poll on how interested the citizens are in the 
EU was carried out on the initiative of the EU 2004 Commission. The in-
quiry showed that people are interested neither more nor less in EU-matters 
than in the last inquiry in spring 2001. Almost 40% stated that they often 
speak about the EU, the men (44%) more often than the women (33%). 
There is also a strong connection between one’s line of work, degree of 
education and the level of interest in discussing EU-matters. 32% of blue-
collar workers stated that they discussed EU-matters often, compared to 
55% of the academics. 
Among those asked, 96% were of the opinion that co-operation on envi-
ronmental issues is an important question for the European Union to deal 
with. To the same extent people regarded combating international crime as 
a task for the EU. 81% thought that EU should defend the Union’s com-
petitive power. This support is evenly distributed among the different 
groups asked, although men considered it more important than women did. 
Surprisingly enough, considering the low turn out in the 1999 European 
parliamentary elections, according to the inquiry European elections are 
something that engages people. 76% think it is important to vote and par-
ticipate in the EU-elections
6. Finally it could be mentioned that different 
Swedish national movements have established a network with the focus on 
the future of the EU. 
Kim Myong Chol 
5 Swedish EU Relay; “EU 2004 Committee’s Activities”,   
  http://www.eu2004.se/extra/pod/?action=pod_show&id=21&module_instance=9   
6 Swedish EU Relay, EU 2004 Commission “Sweden’s national debate”
  http://www.eu2004.se/extra/pod/?action=pod_show&id=20&module_instance=9  Finland
State of ratification 
After the decision of the European leaders to extend the period of ratifica-
tion by taking a “reflection break“, Finland put its ratification process on 
hold. A Government report was issued in November 2005 to lay the foun-
dations for a thorough parliamentary debate in the coming year. Whether or 
not the Constitutional Treaty in its present form can be ratified will not be 
decided before spring 2006.
Position of political actors 
The ratification process in Finland has not stimulated a political debate (as 
it did in other European countries) on the content of the Treaty. This is cer-
tainly due to the fact that the majority of the eight parties represented in the 
Eduskunta supported the Government’s position favouring the Constitu-
tional Treaty.
The only real political debate, which took place, focused on the question 
whether or not a referendum should be held. Several representatives across 
the political spectrum, among them almost half of the members of the 
European Parliament, reckoned that the Finnish people should have a say in 
this decision. Although the Government initially did not seemed to object 
the possibility of a referendum, in August 2004 Prime Minister Matti Van-
hanen, in an official press release, made clear why he was excluding the 
necessity of a public vote: “the Constitution would not change the funda-
mental nature of the EU“.
1 The governing coalition of the Centre Party,
Social Democrats and Swedish People Party, although with a few excep-
tions, generally upheld this position. These parties, however, had never se-
riously taken the idea of a referendum into consideration. Criticism was 
1 Gouvernment Information Unit, Press release 242/2004, “Prime Minister Vanhanen 
on a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty“, 15.08.2004, http://www.vnk.fi. Christiane Sieveking 
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mainly raised by the extreme left and the extreme right wing, as well as 
from the Green League. While the Left Alliance was especially concerned 
about social issues, such as changes in the Finnish welfare system, the 
right-winged True Finns generally had a fairly anti-European position. The 
Green League was the only party supporting a referendum without reject-
ing the Constitutional Treaty per se.  
However, despite the general consensus within the biggest parties in favour 
of parliamentary ratification, a number of prominent Finnish politicians, 
inter alia the Ministers Mauri Pekkarinen and Johannes Koskinen as well 
as the MEP Paavo Väyrynen, disagreed with the Prime Minister’s state-
ment that the Constitutional Treaty would not change the fundamental na-
ture of the Union. Väyrynen argued that “the Constitution established a 
new Union which moved decision-making power away from the member 
states to the European level“.
2 In view of such decisive changes, the politi-
cians called for an at least advisory referendum, held in time with the 
presidential elections in January 2006.   
The Prime Minister’s view was challenged once again by a “referendum 
initiative“, undertaken in February 2005 by 50 members of the Eduskunta,
aiming to justify a referendum before Parliament. The initiative was based 
on two arguments: First, the supporters focused again on the changes 
brought by the Constitutional Treaty and pointed out that “reinforced com-
petence of the EU in police and criminal law matters was significant and 
extended into the sphere of the national legal system“. Also, the change of 
competences in security and defence matters should be an issue to discus-
sion.
3 Secondly, the question was raised about whether the Finns really 
wanted to be part of a Europe built by the Constitutional Treaty and 
whether the Finns would be less able than the French or the Dutch to have 
their say. A referendum might also have the effect of stimulating the public 
debate and of bringing Europe closer to its citizens. The initiative was in 
particular supported by members of the Green League and the Left Alli-
ance, but also by some representatives of the Centre Party and the Social
2 Helsinki Sanomat, “Prime Minister Vanhanen praises agreement on EU constitution“, 
21.06.2004.
3 Eva Storskrubb, „The question of a Referendum Revisited“, 24.02.2005. Finland
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Democratic Party. In the end, they only succeeded to postpone the ratifica-
tion process, as the government still had the majority of the Parliament on 
its side.
Public opinion 
In 2003, almost 50% of the Finns were of the opinion that the EU should 
have a Constitutional Treaty.
4 The support increased over time, reaching its 
highest level in 2004 with 58% being in favour.
5 However, within the on-
going political debate on a referendum, the former rather pro-constitutional 
support in the population appeared to change into confusion. In spring 
2005, 42% of the interrogated persons stated that they did not know what 
they would vote for in the case of a referendum, while 20% stated that they 
would not even take part in the vote.
6The number of opponents of the Con-
stitutional Treaty climbed up to 35%. As a primary reason for this, one 
third of the population named the lack of information. In fact, compared to 
other European countries the Finns felt particularly badly informed about 
constitutional issues, even though their knowledge actually turned out to be 
on an average level.
7 Further reasons for opposing the Treaty corresponded 
to the fear that Finland could loose too much of its sovereignty and to the 
concern of the Constitutional Treaty advancing too quickly and not being 
democratic enough.
8 The negative outcomes of the referenda in France and 
the Netherlands have stimulated the public debate in a decisive way: now, 
more than half of the population state to be against the Constitutional 
Treaty.
National priorities and the Reflection Phase 
When negotiating the Constitutional Treaty, Finnish priorities had been 
over all the voting system and the Common European Defence Policy. In 
4 Eurobarometer 60.1, autumn 2003, national report Finland. 
5 Eurobarometer 62, autumn 2004, national report Finland. 
6 Eurobarometer Flash 159. 
7 Eurobarometer Flash 159. Christiane Sieveking 
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other words, the main concerns were those, not to loose influence in an EU 
25 as for being a small state and to pursue the traditional policy of non-
alignment by insisting on the Finnish neutrality status.
However, national priorities concerning the Constitutional Treaty have not 
been an issue for debate during the Reflection Phase. By the end of No-
vember 2005, the promised Government’s report on the Constitutional 
Treaty was released. It also represented the Prime Minister’s intention to 
send a political message to the EU that Finland was supporting the Treaty. 
The Report was received positively in Parliament. There was, however, 
dissention on the question on how the ratification process should continue. 
While Prime Minister Vanhanen held that the Treaty should primarily be 
implemented in its complete form and that breaking it into parts should 
only be a last resort, other politicians, inter alia members from the Green 
League and the Social Democratic Party did not believe that the Constitu-
tional Treaty could take effect in its current form.
9
In view of the upcoming Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006, the 
Government has sent a political signal that it will support the Treaty, al-
though the operational Austrian-Finnish Council programme for 2006 
merely states that an overall assessment of the general debates will be the 
basis for an agreement on how to proceed. Nevertheless, the ratification of 
the Constitutional Treaty in Finland in the first half of 2006 could 
strengthen Finland’s position and its influence as a holder of the Council 
Presidency in the second half of the year. 
Christiane Sieveking 
8 Eurobarometer 63.4, Spring 2005. 
9 Helsinki Sanomat, “Finnish Parliament takes positive view on EU constitution treaty“, 
30.11.2005.Constitutional Debates in “new“
Member States without Referendum Lithuania
State of ratification 
On 11
th November 2004 Lithuania (population:  3.7 million) became the 
first of the 25 member states to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. Its parlia-
ment – the Seimas – ratified the document with an overwhelming majority 
of 84 yes, four no-votes and three abstentions.
1 The whole ratification 
process involved a first reading of the constitutional text on 5
th of Novem-
ber and then the subsequent ratification. Valdas Adamkus, the President of 
the Republic, signed the treaty on 19
th November.
Position of political actors
All of the important political actors and parties were in favor of ratification, 
and considered a referendum unnecessary. President Valdas Adamkus 
pointed out, that during the referendum on joining the EU in 2003, 90% of 
the Lithuanian electorate voted in favor of it. Therefore, the parliament 
would be capable of expressing the will of the Lithuanians to ratify the 
constitution.
2 Like Adamkus, foreign minister Antanas Valionis also re-
ferred to the 2003 referendum on EU-membership as justification for the 
treaties’ immediate ratification at the same time confirming the publics´ 
decision of joining. He further highlighted that the treaty marks a new stage 
in the EU development which would contribute significantly to making the 
activities of the EU more effective.
3 Along these lines, Prime Minister Al-
girdas Brazauskas declared that the Constitutional Treaty is both needed for 
Lithuania and the whole of Europe, in that it will validate reforms in order 
1 See Deloy, C. ‘Lithuania is the first of EU 25 states to ratify the constitution’, in: 
http://constitution-europeenne.info/special/lithuania.pdf .
2 Ibid.
3 See Institut für europäische Politik (2004) EU-25 Watch No.1 (Berlin: Institut für Eu-
ropäische Politik), in: www.iep-berlin.de/publik/EU25-Watch/EU-25_watch.pdf,
p.37.Anke Barnewold 
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to ensure a more transparent and efficient EU.
4 As a matter of fact, parlia-
mentary ratification in Lithuania occurred very smoothly, and the vote on 
the Constitution did not coincide with any real public debate.
The only voices of criticism were small ones coming from the opposition 
party: Although being in favor of ratification, the opposition did condemn 
the rapidity of the ratification process. Arturas Zuokas, leader of the oppo-
sition party
5, criticized that the Constitutional Treaty had been approved 
without any significant national debate. In his opinion, the treaty deserved a 
debate corresponding to its importance. Moreover, he remarked that the 
country’s rush to make history did not demonstrate courage, but rather dis-
respect to the Lithuanian citizens.
6 Correspondingly, the Members of Par-
liament who voted against the text merely feared a loss of sovereignty and 
were concerned about the country’s independence.  
Public Opinion/ Media Debate
As a result of its quick ratification, there has not been any considerable 
public debate about the Constitutional Treaty in Lithuania. The marginal 
discourse that did occur was mainly based on emotional and ideological 
(“back to Europe”) rather than rational arguments. On the one hand it was 
argued that ratification was the only way for Lithuania to become an inte-
gral member of the Union, and then on the other hand, the loss of Lithua-
nian identity and independence was feared, which had just recently been 
regained after decades of Soviet domination. In addition, the Constitutional 
Treaty and its ratification had not been a major focus of the Lithuanian me-
dia. If there was any media coverage, it paid special attention to the matter 
4 See Baltic News Service (June 21, 2004) ‘EU Constitution is useful for Lithuania’.  
5 Liberal and Centre Union
6 See Deloy, C. ‘Lithuania is the first of EU 25 states to ratify the constitution’, in: 
http://constitution-europeenne.info/special/lithuania.pdf .Lithuania
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of Christianity and the mention of God in the preamble of the Constitu-
tional treaty.
7
The recent Eurobarometer poll (January 2005), examining the attitude of 
the citizens towards the EU constitution also included the Lithuanian citi-
zens. As the fieldwork had been done in November 2004, the results did 
not have any political implication for the ratification process in Lithuania 
but can be seen as a contribution to the overall debate and a reflection of 
the general degree of debate. In November 2004, 34% of all Lithuanians 
had not even heard about the Constitutional Treaty, 59% had heard about it 
but knew little about its content and 7% were informed about it in every 
respect. In the same context, 51% of the Lithuanians stated that they were 
in favor, 11% that they were opposed to the draft Constitutional Treaty 
(Based on what you know, would you say that you are in favor of or op-
posed to the draft Constitutional Treaty?). The major reason why the polled 
Lithuanians were in favor of the European Constitution was the necessity 
of the Constitution in order to pursue European construction (34%). Apart 
from that, 21% stated that they had always been in favor of European con-
struction. The lowest level of consent was given to the “creation of a sym-
bol of political unification of Europe” (7%) and the “strengthening of the 
feeling of a European identity” (4%). Considering the findings as a whole, 
it is quite interesting that 33% of the Lithuanians were opposed to the Con-
stitutional Treaty because of a lack of information.
8
National priorities
Although the Convention’s Constitutional Treaty was seen as a good start-
ing point, Lithuania’s delegation proposed only a few amendments during 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003-2004. Prior to the IGC, 
Lithuania together with six other states9 sent an open letter to the Italian 
7 See Franck, C. and  Pyszna-Nigge, D. (2004) New Members, IGC and the Constitu-
tional Treaty. Positions of acceding countries from Central Europe in the debate on 
the EU future  (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain), p.32. 
8 See Special Eurobarometer 214 (2005) The Future Constitutional Treaty, in: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_214_en, p.75-80 
9 Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia  Anke Barnewold 
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Prime Minister Berlusconi with additional suggestions to the IGC agenda. 
They wanted to re-open the negotiations on the status of the European 
Council, the permanent Council’s presidency and the allocation of seats in 
the European Parliament. 
The main points of priority which dominated the Lithuanian agenda all re-
ferred to the principle of “equality of all states"
10:
x no reduction of the number of commissioners 
x no reduction or reallocation of seats in the European Parliament  
x reference to European Christian values in the preamble
After the completion of the IGC, the results of the conference have been 
assessed positively by all government representatives – although not all 
proposals and positions that Lithuania had defended were put into the final 
treaty.
As Lithuania has already ratified the Constitutional Treaty  and  was 
therefore not affected by the French and Dutch no-vote, there was no need 
for an extensive national reflection phase concerning the ratification proc-
ess.
Anke Barnewold 
10 See Jakniunaite, D. ‚National Report Lithuania’, in: Franck, C. and Pyszna-Nigge D. 
(2004) IGC 2003: Positions of 10 Central and Eastern European Countries on EU 
institutional reforms. (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain), p.54-
9.Hungary
State of ratification 
On 20
th December 2004 Hungary (population: approx. 10 million) became 
the second country to ratify the Constitutional Treaty with a parliamentary 
vote only seven months after joining the EU. 322 MPs in the National As-
sembly were in favour of the text, 12 MPs voted against it, 8 MPs abstained 
and 44 MPs were absent at the time of voting. Among the twelve MPs who 
voted against seven belonged to the main party opposition (FIDESZ), the 
rest were right-wing independent legislators. The Constitutional Treaty was 
ratified by an overwhelming majority as according to Article 24 of the 
Hungarian Constitution a positive vote by two thirds of the 386 representa-
tives in the National Assembly (i.e. 258 MPs) was required for the text to 
be approved
1.
Position of Political Actors 
With regard to the means of ratification the Hungarian government had a 
choice between a vote in Parliament and a referendum. Only one parlia-
mentary party (SzDSz, holding 20 parliamentary seats) were in favour of a 
referendum
2. Two reasons accounted for the government’s choice not to 
call for a referendum but to ratify the Constitutional Treaty via a parlia-
mentary vote:
First, considering Hungary’s future in the EU, the Hungarian public had 
already declared their will on the most important issue in a referendum held 
in April 2003: namely, whether to support Hungary’s accession to the EU. 
84% of the voters were in favour of accession whereas only 16% said 
1 University of Zaragoza (2004) The European Union Constitution: The Ratification 
Process in Hungary, http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_ 
Rat_Hungary.htm   
2 Ibid Nina Eschke 
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“no”
3. Second, in the case of a referendum being held, the turnout was ex-
pected to be very low. The turnout for the referendum on Hungary’s acces-
sion to the EU was only 46% and 38.5% for the European Parliamentary 
elections in June 2004
4 respectively. Hungarian electoral law stipulates that 
for referendum result to be valid the “Yes” or “No” must win at least three 
quarters of the vote of those on the country’s electoral role. In fact, two 
popular consultations held in December 2004 concerning domestic issues 
failed due to insufficient participation
5.
Although there has been little debate on the Constitutional Treaty among 
the political actors before and after its ratification, during the drafting pe-
riod voices were raised with regard to two aspects relating to the content of 
the text. 
With respect to the mentioning of Christian values in the Preamble, the 
government coalition and its opposition had divergent views. The centre-
right opposition coalition (Fidez-MPP & MDF) supported the inclusion of 
the clause. Jósef Szájer (MP, opposition) was among the 25 Convention 
members who submitted a joint contribution in January 2003, emphasising 
their wish to allow for a “reference to God” in the Constitutional Treaty
6.
The Hungarian government coalition (MSzP & SzDSz), on the contrary, 
took a much more diplomatic stand by emphasising that the clause was not 
a priority but that it would support its incorporation if the majority of the 
EU Member States was in favour of it
7.
3 Binzer, H. S. (2004); EPN - EU Policy Network, Keen Europeans? A Resounding Yes 
to Europe in the Accession Referendums,  http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk/      
research/holbolt.pdf
4 European Parliament (07/ 2004) European Election: 10th-13th June - official results,
http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/
5 Deloy, C. (2004) Hungary is the second country to ratify the European Constitution,
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/ratification_hung
ary.pdf
6 European Convention (31/01/2003), Joint contribution signed by Mr. Szájer: Reli-
gious Reference in the Constitutional Treaty” CONV 480/03, http://european-
convention.eu.int/doc_register.asp?MAX=191&LANG=EN&Content=CONTRIB 
7 Hungary’s International Monthly - Diplomacy and Trade (01/03): Embedding Chris-
tian values, http://www.dteurope.com/january/english/region.html Hungary
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The second aspect concerned the inclusion of a clause on the protection of 
minorities, as approximately 4.5 million people of Hungarian origin live 
abroad. In fact, this was Hungary’s main priority and was supported by all 
political actors, which were involved in the process. 
Public Opinion/Media Debate 
There has been little debate about the Constitutional Treaty before and after 
its ratification among the Hungarian public and media. 
Although there had been strong support for an organisation of a referendum 
(in June 2004 an opinion poll showed that 87% of those questioned were in 
favour of a referendum
8) to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, there had not 
been any significant criticism among the public when the government de-
cided to heed the polls and go along with the parliamentary vote. In fact, 
public support for the Constitutional Treaty was relatively high one month 
before its ratification: 62% of those surveyed were in favour of the text 
(EU25 average was 49%), 23% were against it and 16% did not express an 
opinion
9.
The incorporation of a religious reference in the Constitutional Draft did 
not erect any significant public debate, such as in Poland for instance. This 
was mainly due to the government’s attitude towards the issue and the fact 
that a Christian Preamble would have been in contradiction with the Hun-
garian Constitution, as it contains a strict separation between the church 
and the state
10.
Media coverage on European affairs has been very weak and thus the world 
of the EU has remained alien to most Hungarians, which is one explanation 
for the lack of public debate on the Constitutional Treaty. According to a 
survey of spring 2005 most Hungarians believe that they are not suffi-
ciently informed about the EU. Only 1% of the respondents claimed that 
8 Deloy, C. (2004) 
9 European Commission (10/05); Special Eurobarometer 214/Wave 62.1: The Future 
Constitutional Treaty – First Results,  http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_    
opinion/archives/ebs/ebs214_/en_first.pdf
10 Hungary’s International Monthly (01/03) Nina Eschke 
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they knew it very well. With regard to the Constitutional Treaty, only 9% 
said that they knew its content
11.
National Priorities 
After the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands in May/June 2005, 
the Hungarian government made its position regarding the future of the 
Constitutional Treaty very clear. In a joint statement of the Visegrad Group 
on 10
th June 2005, Prime Minister Peter Medgeyessy said that it is the EU 
leaders’ responsibility to provide the citizens with a “positive vision of the 
benefits of a politically and economically strong European Union”. In his 
view the ratification process should proceed as it was foreseen at the Inter-
national Governmental Conference in October 2004. Hungary would not 
accept the Constitutional Treaty to become binding only for those Member 
States, which have ratified it
12.
Public support for the Constitutional Treaty has been the highest in Hun-
gary since the negative votes in France and the Netherlands. Whereas in 
December 2004 only 62% of those questioned were in favour of it, in July 
2005 78% believed that the EU will be stronger in the world if all the 
Member States ratify the Treaty
13.
Nina Eschke 
11 European Commission (Spring 2005), Standard Eurobarometer 63.4/Spring 2005-
TNS Social & Opinion: Public Opinion in the European Union-National Report 
Hungary,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_exec_
hu.pdf
12 Visegrad Group (10/06/05); Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad 
Group Countries, http://www.visegradgroup.org/main.asp?MainOBIID=15738 
13 European Commission (09/2005) Standard Eurobarometer 63/Spring 2005TNS 
Opinion & Social: Public Opinion in the European UnionSlovenia
State of ratification 
Slovenia (population: appox. 2 million) was the third country among the 
Member States of EU to ratify the constitutional treaty. The process of rati-
fication was completed without a referendum, by parliamentary ratification. 
A two-thirds majority was needed for the ratification in the Parliament. The 
Slovenian Parliament ratified the Constitutional Treaty by an overwhelm-
ing majority on 1
st February, 2005. Within the 90-member Parliament 79 
members voted in favor of the treaty, seven members abstained and only 
four members opposed
1. As the results show, the Constitutional Treaty 
passed with 87% of the parliamentary votes easily breaking the 2/3 major-
ity required. 
Positions of political actors 
After signing the Constitutional Treaty in Rome, the coalition parties of the 
Government, then in power, sent out conflicting signals concerning the rati-
fication procedure they favoured. At different times, they seemed to favour 
a simple parliamentary ratification, while at others times the possibility of a 
national referendum seemed the favoured option. Until the general election 
in October 2004, the leading party of the governmental coalition, the Lib-
eral Democrats (LDS), seemed inclined to accept parliamentary approval 
without a general referendum. After the general elections the coalition of 
government changed and is now composed of the Conservative Social De-
mocrats (SDS), the New Slovenia Party (NSi), the Slovenian People’s 
Party (SLS) and Party of Pensioners (Desus). All members of this new coa-
lition favoured a ratification by the Parliament and that is what happened in 
Slovenia.
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm#slovenia Ryang Song Ho 
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The current Slovenian Parliament consists of 7 different political parties, 
which are mainly supporters of the EU. The largest parties in the Parlia-
ment are the Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS) and the Slovenian De-
mocratic Party (SDS) led by Prime Minister Janez Jansa, whose position 
can exert influence concerning decisions on EU issues. Basically all politi-
cal parties represented in the Parliament were in favor of the Constitutional 
Treaty. The exception was the Slovenian National Party that opposed the 
text during the ratification process.  
The key political elites such as the President, the Prime Minister, and the 
Foreign Minister were inclined to support the Constitutional Treaty and 
European integration in general. 
After the ratification of the constitutional treaty Prime Minister Janez Jansa 
gave a speech in front of the Parliament in which he said: "By voting for 
ratification, you will allow Slovenia to push the EU constitution a step 
closer to its implementation, that way Slovenia will meet its great responsi-
bility towards the common future of Europe." 
The public debate and the media 
Most of political parties and groups in Slovenia agree with all major points 
of the Constitutional Treaty. The media campaign, which was launched by 
the Slovenian government, shows that they attached a lot of importance on 
the people supporting the idea of a Constitutional Treaty for Europe. On 1
st
January 2005, the Slovenian government decided to embark on a two-year 
public awareness campaign on the Constitutional Treaty. The Slovenian 
people were given knowledge about their rights and duties, and the signifi-
cance of the EU Constitutional Treaty. 
The Eurobarometer of Spring 2005 measuring public opinion shows that 
Slovenians most often associate the EU with the Euro (62% mentioned it), 
freedom to travel, and the ability to work and study anywhere in the EU 
(54%). Generally speaking, Slovenians associate the EU with mostly posi-
tive characteristics, since the first negative characteristic (more crime) is 
ranked in eighth place. 83% of Slovenians support the European monetary Slovenia
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union and one common currency, the Euro. On the other hand, 37% of the 
population fears losing the Slovenian national currency, the Tolar
2. As we 
can see the Constitutional Treaty was not yet really present in peoples’ 
minds in the beginning of 2005. 
The support of Slovenians for the EU constitutional Treaty before the start 
of the campaign was the following: 60% in favor, 9% opposing the Consti-
tutional Treaty and 31% that did not have an opinion at all! In the spring of 
2005, the support for a Constitutional Treaty had already increased to 76%. 
Since then not much has changed. One can see in the last Eurobarometer of 
Autumn 2005 that in spite of the negative referenda Slovenia has remained 
more or less on the same level of support, namely 74%
3. After the start of 
the media campaign the level of support in Slovenia moved noticeably up. 
Since spring 2005 they belong to the countries with the highest level of 
support. The level of opposition has more or less stayed the same, namely 
9%. This means that in essence people who did not have an opinion before 
moved towards supporting the EU Constitutional Treaty.  
National priorities and the Current reflection phase 
Slovenia gives priority to strengthening its international position and repu-
tation as a democratic, stable and successful European state. With regard to 
this background, the Slovenians have set accession to the Euro Monetary 
Zone as their main priority. In their eyes a quick ratification would help to 
show the rest of Europe that they strongly support the European project. It 
is remarkable to see that although the Government wants to enter the Euro 
zone, the people actually are not that supportive. In a survey of the Slove-
nian government last year it turned out that 59% of the people think that the 
euro will have more negative than positive consequences for Slovenia.
Furthermore the Slovenian government pays special attention to the posi-
tion of the Hungarian and Italian minority in Slovenia as well as to the 
Slovenian minorities in neighbouring countries. Another key priority is to 
2 http://www.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_exec_sl.pdf
3 http://www.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdfRyang Song Ho 
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supplement educational reform so that Slovenia can become more competi-
tive with other EU Member States, and in addition to being able to attain 
the Lisbon Agenda goals
4. Within the European Union, Slovenia wants to 
be able to maintain its own identity and ideas even under a European Con-
stitution.
After the referenda in France and the Netherlands the Slovenian Prime min-
ister Janez Jansa expressed that Slovenian is still fully supports the Euro-
pean Constitution: "Europe must take the message of the French referen-
dum on the Constitution seriously, yet this is no reason for a general uncer-
tainty on the European political or business scene." The Slovenians still 
believe in the European project and will keep on working on it. 
Ryang Song Ho 
4 http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/publications/slovenia-news/1656/1658/Slovakia
State of ratification 
In accordance with the Slovak Constitution, the Constitutional Treaty was 
offered for ratification to the National Parliament in May 2005. After a 
short discussion, on 11
th  May the Parliament ratified the Treaty with an 
overwhelming majority: 116 of the 147 deputies voted “Yes,” 27 said “No” 
and 4 abstained. The last step to be taken, before Slovakia (population: 
approx. 5 million) can complete the ratification process, is the signing of 
the Constitutional Treaty by the President of the country, Ivan Gasparovic.  
Although the ratification process entered its final stage, in July 2005 thir-
teen Slovak citizens appealed to the Constitutional Court. Quoting another 
provision of the Slovak Constitution, which provides that a referendum 
should be held on a decision for Slovakia to enter a state-union
1, the citi-
zens requested that the Constitutional Treaty should be offered for referen-
dum to the Slovak people.    
The Constitutional Court approved the citizens’ appeal and on 14
th July 
2005 it issued a preliminary ruling on the status of the ratification, urging 
President Gasparovic not to sign the document until a final decision had 
been reached.  
Positions of political actors 
As Slovakia largely agrees with all major points of the Constitutional 
Treaty, no extensive debate ensued in the country in the period between the 
signing of the Treaty in October 2004 and its ratification by the Slovak Par-
liament in May 2005.  
1 http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/eu-reform/ratifikation/slowakei.php  Mariyana Radeva 
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Almost all political parties represented in Parliament are pro-European. 
Only two of the parties present tend to express some euroskepticism. These 
are the Christian Democratic Union (KDH), which is currently in the gov-
erning coalition, and the Communist Party (KSS), a small opposition party 
in the Parliament. Yet, even these parties were not willing to stop or slow 
down the integration process through their actions. A Member of Parlia-
ment from the KDH openly admitted that although his party had reserva-
tions towards the Constitutional Treaty, it would not let it fail at the vote in 
the Slovak Parliament.
2 On the contrary, Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan 
from the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union was particularly active in 
outlining the positive aspects of the Constitutional Treaty to the Slovak 
people.
One argument used by both, the KDH and the KSS, is the general fear of 
the loss of sovereignty observable in most of the smaller member states. In 
addition, the KDH insisted on there being a mentioning of Christian values 
in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, and expressed its sentiments 
when this reference was foregone.
Both, the KDH and the KSS, insist on a public vote on the Constitutional 
Treaty, as opposed to the parliamentary vote. The arguments in favour of a 
referendum are largely based on the fact that the Slovak Constitution pre-
scribes a vote by the people when the country is about to enter a state-
union. In addition, the proponents of a referendum claim that the over-
whelming “Yes” in May 2003 on the accession of Slovakia to the EU
3 car-
ries a different meaning from a vote on the Union’s Constitutional Treaty. 
In contrast, for representatives from the majority of parties it is sufficient 
that the Slovak population decisively said “Yes” to the country’s member-
ship to the Union. Furthermore, according to opinion polls the majority of 
Slovaks (57%) are happy with their country’s membership to the EU, 
which provides for a larger support for the Union’s actions.
4
2 Statement by Pavol Hrušovský, KDH representative, http://www.cap-
lmu.de/themen/eu-reform/ratifikation/slowakei.php
3 With a voter turnout 52%, 92% of the people voted “yes” and 6% voted “no.” 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_slovakia.htm  
4 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.pdfSlovakia 
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Public opinion
A public debate on the Constitutional Treaty was absent before its ratifica-
tion in the Slovak National Parliament. In accordance with the euroskeptic 
outlook of the Christian Democratic Union, the general discontent that the 
mentioning of Christian values in the Preamble of the document was omit-
ted appeared to be the major concern of the public. In addition, the parties 
opposed to the Constitutional Treaty held publicly that Slovakia will lose a 
large part of its national sovereignty through accepting the Treaty. This 
perception became part of the political discourse between the elite and the 
people.
Yet, the support for the Constitutional Treaty among the people, as meas-
ured by Eurobarometer, has undoubtedly remained high. The slightly nega-
tive trend can be explained in the context of the general attitude of doubt in 
Europe on the eve of the French and Dutch negative votes, but does not 
jeopardise the support for the Constitutional Treaty among the Slovaks: 
Slovak support for the Constitutional Treaty fell from 70% in February 
2004 to 60% in July 2005.
5
The missing debate on the Constitutional Treaty did not prevent Slovak 
citizens to become acquainted with it. Slovakia, along with the Czech Re-
public and Finland, has the highest percentage of people (67%), who claim 
they not only have heard about the Constitutional Treaty, but they also 
know “about its contents,” even though they might have little in-depth 
knowledge.
6 The existence of knowledge about the Constitutional Treaty in 
contrast to the backdrop of no or little debate might suggest that the people 
generally would agree with the document, should it be put to a referendum.  
National priorities and the current reflection phase   
The most important national priorities with regards to the Constitutional 
Treaty include:  
5 http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_slovakia.htm  
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs214_tables.pdfMariyana Radeva 
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x Retaining the country’s sovereignty and reasserting its role as an inde-
pendent actor on the European and international stage.
x Reference to Christian values. 
The current reflection phase throughout the EU coincides with the halt in 
the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty in Slovakia. Amidst the 
lack of any further political debate or attempts to spark a public discussion 
on the Treaty, a decision from the Slovak Constitutional Court on the ratifi-
cation is still pending. 
Mariyana Radeva Latvia
State of ratification 
On 2
nd June 2005 Latvia’s Parliament, the Saeima, ratified the Constitu-
tional Treaty with an overwhelming majority. With this, Latvia (2.299.600 
citizens) became the 10
th member state to ratify the Treaty. The outcome of 
the vote in the Saeima was 71 in favour, 5 against, 6 abstentions and 11 
deputies did not vote at all.  
Position of political actors 
At first it seemed as if the Latvians were putting the ratification of the 
Treaty at risk. The Constitutional Treaty was submitted to the Latvian Par-
liament for ratification in January 2005, but it was withdrawn when it was 
found to contain many translation mistakes, including judicial terminology 
errors. Although only ten out of the 500 mistakes spotted in the translated 
Treaty were corrected
1, the Latvian government handed the Treaty to the 
Parliament in May 2005 for ratification once again. A clear two-thirds ma-
jority (necessary for a successful ratification) of the parliamentarians voted 
in favour of the Constitutional Treaty.  
There was not much discussion among the political parties regarding the 
ratification process or the Treaty itself. One reason for this was Latvia’s 
main political objective to preserve the regained independence and to guar-
antee freedom to its citizens. In this respect, the accession to the western 
economic and political frameworks were regarded as the main instruments, 
which were achieved by 2004 with the integration into the EU and NATO.  
1 All judicial terminology errors were indeed corrected. Mistakes were just technical 
and did not change the substance of the treaty. In: Latvian parliament to vote on lin-
guistically faulty EU constitution: in http://www.eubusiness.com/ Lat-
via/050510124120.gyoy06zq. 2005-10-28.Martina Jüttner 
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The governing parties (a centre-right wing coalition) supported the Treaty. 
Those who abstained from voting were members of the “For Human Rights 
in a United Latvia” (a left-wing party). Members of another left-minded 
parliamentary group (Latvia's Socialist Party) voted against the Constitu-
tional Treaty. Unaffiliated members of parliament voted against or did not 
vote at all. Members of the centre-right wing “For Fatherland and Free-
dom/LNNK” did not vote either. 
After the French “No” vote the Latvian government did not wait for the 
outcome of the Brussels-Summit in mid-June 2005, where it was discussed 
whether the ratification process should be stopped or continued. Latvia’s 
advancement should not be hampered and the ratification was to send a 
positive signal to Brussels after the negative votes in France and the Neth-
erlands.
2
Nevertheless, the “No” vote had an impact on the political parties’ position. 
While most left wing political parties in Latvia do not support Latvia’s 
membership to the EU and therefore did not support the Constitutional 
Treaty, the centre-right wing members of the “For Fatherland and Free-
dom/LNNK” supported the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty until its 
rejection in France and the Netherlands. They announced that they would 
not participate in the vote, because there was not sufficient time for prepa-
ration. They considered that the Latvian people did not have enough infor-
mation on the Constitutional Treaty, and in their view Latvia should await 
the outcome of the Brussels-Summit.  
Public opinion 
There does not seem to be much interest about what is happening in Brus-
sels. A mere discussion among interested individuals and organisations on 
the future of Europe and Latvia’s place in it emerged but did not result in a 
full-fledged national debate. The government clearly failed in launching an 
appropriate information campaign. It is therefore not surprising that 41 % 
of the Latvians claim not to have heard of the Treaty. 
2 Ferguson (2005): Latvia ignores France: in http://euro-reporters.com. 2005-10-25.  Latvia
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One reason for the lack of knowledge on the issue among the public is the 
wrong structure of the implemented three-stage information campaign. 
During the first and second stage a lot of seminars and conferences at uni-
versities, schools etc. were held. Programmes on the radio and television 
were planned for the third stage (beginning after the ratification).
3 How-
ever, the sources from which to obtain information about the EU in Latvia 
is the television, followed by the radio and the daily newspapers. The most 
trusted source of information, however, are journalists.
4
Nevertheless, the support for the Constitutional Treaty is rather high. 56 % 
of the Latvians are in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, only 13 % are 
against it and 32 % are undecided. This could imply that Latvia may have 
some difficulties in assessing its membership to the EU.
5
National priorities and reflection phase 
Since 1991, when Latvia regained its independence, national activities were 
based on five values: freedom, sovereignty, peace, security and democ-
racy.
6
In regard to the EU, Latvia has the following interests: 
x strict observance of the principle of subsidiarity 
x existence of a union of nations, not a federal state 
x common foreign and security policy 
x equal rights for old and new member states  
x free market economy 
x pro-enlargement
x emphasising national identity 
3 Public information activities on the EU Constitution: in http://www.am.gov.lv 
/en/news/press-releases/2005/May/24-3/?print=on. 2005-10-25.
4 Eurobarometer (2005): EB 63.4.
5 Eurobarometer (2005): EB 63.
6 Latvia’s values and Latvia’s interests in the European Union: in http://www. 
am.gov.lv/en/eu/EuStrategy/ ValuesAndInterests/?print =on. 2005-10-25.  Martina Jüttner 
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x strenghtening of the European Commission 
Besides the financial perspective, Latvia’s most important challenge proba-
bly lies in the field of foreign policy. Its driving force, however, is the de-
velopment and spreading of democracy in the former Soviet countries, such 
as Georgia and the Ukraine.
A priority for Latvia is security in reference to Russia, however, not be-
cause of historical reasons, but because of the still non-existing Latvia-
Russia border treaty. Therefore Latvia is more than willing to assist its 
neighbours (i. e. other former Soviet countries) to start an integration proc-
ess towards the EU based on this mutual understanding. In Latvia’s opin-
ion, the best way to guarantee peace and security is through exporting sta-
bility and democracy.  
Being aware of the the communication gap between the citizens and the 
political elite, the Latvian government started a survey aiming to define and 
to assess public opinion on significant issues related to Latvia’s member-
ship to the EU. Furthermore, it welcomed the Communication Plan D 
launched by the European Commission with the hope that the plan would 
promote a mutual dialogue. In addition, a conference devoted to problems 
of translated EU terminology was held in Riga in November 2005 to im-
prove the quality of the Latvian official EU documents. A full-fledged na-
tional debate, however, has not started yet. 
Martina Jüttner Estonia
State of ratification 
The government of Estonia (population: approx. 1.4 million) decided 
against holding a referendum. This means that now the ratification is in the 
hands of the Estonian Parliament. The ratification decision was originally 
scheduled to take place on 3rd June 2005 but it was delayed to the Fall of 
2005. Prime Minister Ansip explained that his Government and group of 
analysts needed more time in order to evaluate the legal side of the ratifica-
tion process
1. Once Parliament meets, a simple majority is needed in order 
to ratify the Treaty. Estonia was the only country which was expected to 
take action related to this issue in the remaining part of 2005, yet, as of 
January 2006, nothing has happened. 
Position of Political Actors 
There are 20 registered political parties in Estonia. The most influential are 
the Centre Party, People’s Union, Reform Party, Pro Patria and Res Publica 
among others. Most of the parties have not expressed significant concerns 
regarding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty nor have they voiced 
very clearly their positions regarding the issue. However, there seems to be 
a general consensus of agreement regarding the ratification. The Future 
Party is the only party that has a truly euroskeptic voice, but they represent 
a minority in parliamentary elections. The Head of Government, Prime 
Minister Anisp, has expressed in various occasions his optimism and has 
stated that: “For the most part, Estonian lawmakers are in favor of the EU 
Constitution”
2 2
1 Estonia Postpones European Treaty Ratification. June 4, 2005. Sharewatch. 
http://www.sharewatch.com/story.php?storynumber=72427 
2 Estonia Postpones European Treaty Ratification. June 4, 2005. Sharewatch. 
http://www.sharewatch.com/story.php?storynumber=72427 Catalina Villegas 
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The country will not be holding a referendum.  This decision was made be-
cause according to the Estonian Constitution, no international treaty can be 
ratified via referendum. Therefore, the decision of ratification is for the 
Riigikogu, Estonia’s national Parliament, unless a constitutional amend-
ment is considered.  
Public Opinion 
In the early 1990s, during the accession negotiations, the elites of the coun-
try supported a fast track negotiation regardless of the cost. The elites of 
the country were in favour of joining the EU and they compromised much 
of the national interest for a speedy process. As EU membership came 
closer, different opinions emerged among the political parties and there was 
a shift towards protecting national interest. In the past few years, there has 
been an increasing move towards euroskeptical policy positions in the po-
litical parties as national interest are becoming more important and the 
government’s popularity is decreasing
3 3.
One aspect of the public opinion of the Estonian population can be grasped 
through the results of the 2003 referendum. However, public opinion has 
been a roller coaster directly correlated to the government’s popularity. Po-
litical parties have attributed responsibility for unpopular policies to the 
EU. They argued that these policies were a requirement for the accession 
process creating a negative view on EU membership
4. Nonetheless, in  Oc-
tober 2005, according to the Estonian Market Opinion Research, public 
support for EU membership remains at 63% and 58% of those questioned 
think that they have benefited from EU membership. In regards to the 
Constitutional Treaty, 52% of Estonians (9% below EU average) support 
the Treaty, 12% are against it and 36% have no knowledge of it
5.  Al-
3 EU Constitution: Where member states Stand. BBC News UK Edition. November 27, 
2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm#estonia 
4 Current and Future Issues in European Integration: Public Opinion and EU Enlarge-
ment. University of Cambridge: Center of European Studies. 14 June 2001. 
http://www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk/centre/news/fco2001/fco-pubop.html 
5 European Commission. Eurobarometer 63. Spring 2005 http://europa.eu.int 
/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm Estonia
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though public opinion regarding the EU and related issues is scattered, the 
government has clearly shown its support for the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Treaty, supposed to be ratified in the Fall 2005 by the Riigikogu, is 
still a pending matter. 
National Priorities and the Reflection Phase 
Estonia’s national interests are the competitiveness and the openness of 
Europe, an effective economic and fiscal policy, the sustainability of the 
economy, the closeness to its citizens, safety and security and the world-
wide promotion of democracy and well being
6. Also, during the accession 
negotiations, Estonia emphasised the importance of and requested transi-
tional periods in the areas, which needed major investment and are either 
socially or politically complicated or give rise to economic difficulties 
such as free movement of persons, transport and agriculture
7.
Estonia will not take advantage of the Plan D or the Reflection Period, as 
it believes it will not have any impact on the Estonian population. Pille 
Vaher, the press officer in the Representation of the European Commis-
sion in Estonia says: “In Estonia we have no plan of allocating any money 
for the project. The people of Estonia would not show up for debates if the 
Government, political parties or NGO’s arranged them. Estonians feel that 
they have more important things to think about in their everyday lives then 
what is going on in the EU”. 
8
Catalina Villegas 
6 Estonia’s Priorities in the EU. Estonia in the European Union. May 3, 2005.
http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_486/2760.html 
7 Estonia’s Experience in Accession Negotiations. Estonia’s Accession to the EU. Feb-
ruary 11, 2005. http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_535/5208.html 
8 Estonia Rejects the EU Debate. Estonia in Transition. December 12, 2005. 
http://medianet.djh.dk/sites/Estonia/democratic_deficit/folder.2005-12-
07.4293004302/Malta
State of ratification 
Malta (population: approx. 400.000) became the twelfth country to ratify 
the Constitutional Treaty. On 6
th July 2005 the Maltese Parliament unani-
mously ratified the Treaty.  
Malta, which joined the EU in 2004, is the smallest EU country and has 
traditionally been deeply divided about the benefits of becoming a member 
of the Union. Although 54 % of the Maltese electorate were in favour (46 
% were against) of EU accession in the referendum in 2003, it is remark-
able that only four referendums have ever been held in Malta and none of 
them received the approval of a majority of all registered voters. Most 
likely this is due to the fact that in June 2004 the possibility of referendum 
for the approval of the Constitutional Treaty was excluded. The parliamen-
tary approval needed a simple majority, which was likely to be obtained 
according to the survey of Eurobarometer 2004, because Malta is the only 
European country where only two parties are represented in parliament and 
one of the six EU countries (including France, Greece, Italy, Poland and 
UK) in which a single party (the Nationalist Party) holds a majority of par-
liamentary seats (35 seats belong to the Nationalist Party).  
Positions of political actors 
The national government and the political parties appeared as the key ac-
tors in the constitutional debates in Malta. Initially, the division between 
“in favour” and “against” was nearly equal among the Maltese government 
represented by the Nationalist Party (NP) and the opposition represented by 
Malta’s Labour Party (MLP). In January 2005, the Eurobarometer has 
evaluated the level of approval on the Constitutional Treaty in the follow-
ing way: 31 % “in favour” and 13 % “against”. The more intensive and 
comprehensive constitutional debate started only in spring 2005 after the Inga Skuþaitơ
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Maltese Prime Minister, Lawrence Gonzi, had announced the preliminary 
date of the ratification (July 2005). First of all, the position on the Constitu-
tional Treaty was divergent within Malta’s Labour Party. The contempo-
rary leader of the Party, Alfred Sant, had fallen in the europhiles, while the 
former Prime Minister and the member of the Labour Party, Karmenu Mif-
sud Bonnici, opposed to the Treaty. Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, the Head of 
the “Campain for National Independence” was arguing that it would be im-
possible to have a fruitful constitutional debate unless everyone was in-
formed and that MLP should stay officially neutral. Meanwhile, in April 
2005, some splits started to appear within the opposition party (NP). Fol-
lowing intensive inward discussions the Maltese Labour Party (MLP) even-
tually took a positive stance towards the Constitutional Treaty in May 
2005. The parliamentary group of the MLP agreed that the Constitutional 
Treaty should be considered only as an international treaty that has to be 
ratified by the Parliament. After reviewing reports drafted by the national 
experts concerning the Constitutional Treaty, the National Executive de-
cided to organise a general conference (preliminary date was set for the end 
of June and beginning of July 2005) in order to shape the official notion of 
delegates of the MLP. After the “against” votes for the Constitutional 
Treaty in France and the Netherlands, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici published 
a motion which was planned to be presented at the general conference. He 
was appealing to MLP delegates to approve the motion and vote “against”, 
because the new Constitutional Treaty would overrule the Maltese Consti-
tution, introduce financial burdens and leave out the affirmation of neutral-
ity. In the conference “The Constitution is ours too” the Prime Minister 
stated that “barring the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would mean 
depleting Malta’s ability to express its opinion independently of other EU 
states, putting through a positive message in favour of the ratification, we 
will be significantly contributing to the European ratification”
1. On 1
st July 
2005 MLP began debating about the Constitutional Treaty in the MPL’s 
extraordinary general conference. The contradictory motions presented by 
the national executive, parliamentary groups and the euroskeptic Karmenu 
1 See article “PN holds national conference about EU Constitution” 2005 in: 
www..maltamedia.com  Malta
121
Mifsud Bonnici were positively discussed. Despite some reservations, 
MLP’s National Executive approved the decision taken by the Party’s par-
liamentary group to vote in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. In turn, the 
Nationalist Party NP welcomed the MLP’s delegates’ overwhelming ap-
proval of the Constitutional Treaty (ratification by 85,6 %). The NP con-
cluded that “the unanimous vote of the Maltese parliament will contribute 
to reinforcing the EU”.
2 After the House of Representatives ratified the 
Constitutional Treaty on 6
th July 2005, the Prime Minister presented a mo-
tion which requested Parliament to authorise the ratification. As the final 
agreement on the political level was reached on 7
th July 2005, the Maltese 
Parliament unanimously ratified the Constitutional Treaty. 
Public opinion 
According a public survey, published in the “Times of Malta” on 9
th June 
2005, less than 42,7 % of the population wanted to go ahead with the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty, while 57,3 % said that the ratification should not go 
on. The 57,3 % are made up of 21 %, who said the process should just stop 
and 36,3 %, who said that they wanted a referendum. The Maltese popula-
tion was not well informed and did not positively participate in the consti-
tutional debates. Only a few prominent Maltese politicians expressed their 
reservations and criticisms about the content of the Constitutional Treaty 
and the ratification procedure. Former Secretary General of the Maltese 
Nationalist Party Viktor Ragonesi applied true nationalist ideology to the 
Constitutional Treaty. He stated that “if the opposition agrees with the 
Constitution, a referendum doesn’t make sense as the people have already 
expressed themselves twice”
3. He has also said that the Constitutional 
Treaty was a cumbersome document, which did not make any sense by be-
ing too long and too confusing.  
Anna Mallia, the former member of the Labour Party, blamed the govern-
ing parties for disregarding the opinion of the Maltese people on such an 
2 See article “Sant and PN welcome MLP vote on EU Constitution ratification ” 2005 
in: www..maltamedia.com 
3 See article “A Nationalist gentleman” 2004 in: www..maltamedia.com  Inga Skuþaitơ
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important issue, as the Constitutional Treaty, and for not showing enough 
interest in Malta’s hard-earned neutrality. She highlighted, that the Consti-
tutional Treaty claims the supremacy of EU law, limited decision power on 
the foreign policy and is in contradiction with the clause of neutrality.
National priorities 
During the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, Malta’s priorities were 
the insertion of the reference to God, the retention of unanimity voting for 
more policy areas ( security and defence policy, however, should be in ac-
cordance with Malta’s neutrality) and the equality principle for the compo-
sition of the European Commission (one Commissioner per member state). 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta Michael Frendo has highlighted 
several important arguments in favour for the ratification of the Constitu-
tional Treaty, such as the more powerful role of the national parliaments, 
the reinforced subsidiarity principle and the consolidation of Europe’s en-
tity. Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi also stressed the enlarged number of 
European parliamentary seats for Malta (6 seats) and the eligibility for 
more regional aid. Malta’s ratification of the Constitutional Treaty repre-
sents a significant contribution to the European ratification process and 
adds economic benefits to the country. 
Inga SkuþaitơCyprus
State of ratification 
The ratification debate in Cyprus (population:  780,133
1) started in the 
House of Representatives – the Cypriot parliament – on 4
th February 2005. 
About five months later, on 30
th June 2005 the country ratified the treaty by 
parliamentary vote with following results:  out of the fifty-six Members of 
Parliament, thirty supported the European Constitution, twenty rejected it, 
one abstained and six were absent. While the absolute majority of 29 votes 
in favour of the treaty were barely reached, the reasons for rejection and 
abstention were varied. 
Positions of political actors 
The general mood of the parties that are in the Cypriot parliament seems to 
be pro-European; however, objections have been raised by the Green Party 
and by the communist-socialist Party. The abstention of the Green Member 
of Parliament, George Perdikis, was justified by the fact that “his Party’s 
calls for a referendum on the Constitution had been ‘ignored’”
2. Although 
there might be various arguments supporting the demand of the Green 
Party of Cyprus to hold a referendum, the Cypriot constitution simply does 
not plan for the consultation of the electorate. In fact, it would require the 
parliament to change the constitution with a two-thirds majority (Art. 182 
III, II ConstCyprus). Moreover, it was argued that Cyprus did not have a 
referendum on its accession to the EU unlike the other accession countries 
of 2004 – so why should it have one on the Constitutional Treaty? 
While the Green Party made its position clear by abstaining from voting, 
the communist-socialist Restorative Party of the Working People (AKEL) 
1 The World Factbook, July 2005 est., available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/print/cy.html. Liesa Naumann 
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went even further by rejecting the Treaty. Their main objections were that 
the Constitutional Treaty would, as a ‘neo-conservative’ and ‘militaristic’ 
charter, position the rights of workers second to big business and militarise 
the European Union
3. They wanted more weight placed on social aspects 
and less compliance with economic issues. Moreover, the Party aimed at 
strengthening the efforts for the renegotiation of the Treaty that became 
possible after the French “non” and the Dutch “nee”.This position points to 
a division of the government over the Constitutional Treaty as the second 
coalition party, namely the conservative Democratic Party (DIKO), were 
clearly in favour of Cypriot engagement in the European Union including 
support for the Constitutional Treaty. Together with the Democratic Rally 
(DISY) and the Social Democrats Movement (KISOS), which represent the 
right-conservative and extreme right wing respectively, DIKO supported 
the aims declared by the European Union since “they saw through the Con-
stitution a chance to ensure for human rights and to avoid deviations from 
the acquis when negotiating again for a settlement of the Cyprus prob-
lem”
4. Moreover, DIKO, DISY and KISOS pointed out that the Constitu-
tional Treaty reflected progress and improvement on past conventions.  
Public opinion 
Despite a high Cypriot turnout of 71% in the European Parliament elections 
in 2004, there was hardly any debate among the Greek Cypriot community 
on the Constitutional Treaty. Media coverage was low; the only programme 
on the European Union on CyBC was taken off the air and national press 
claimed that events in Cyprus, however small they might be, were not leav-
ing enough space for issues happening at the European level.  
The unwillingness of the government to inform the population about the 
Constitutional Treaty and the lack of public interest resulted in shocking 
2 EUbusiness, Cyprus ratifies troubled EU constitution, 30 June 2005, available at 
http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/050630161250.3455pcf9. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A. Sammoutis (personal communication, 23 November 2005), consul at the Cypriot 
embassy in Berlin. Cyprus
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results of a Eurobarometer survey published in January 2005. It revealed 
that 65% of Greek Cypriots had not even heard of the Constitution; no 
population of any other member state showed such a high percentage of 
ignorance. Based on this, the humble figure of 23% of Cypriots in favour of 
the draft constitution should not be interpreted as scepticism towards the 
Union or the Constitutional Treaty but rather as a consequence of a lack of 
knowledge. This is supported by public opinion seeing the position of the 
communist Party AKEL as counter-productive since the Europeans could 
conclude again – the first time being the rejection of the UN plan
5 – that 
Cypriots were not ready for Europe yet.  
However, the ensuing information campaign of the government was obvi-
ously a success: In the Eurobarometer poll of July and September 2005 the 
percentage of Cypriots not having an idea of the Constitution decreased to 
38%; this is still above the EU average of 18% but showed a considerable 
improvement. Moreover the majority of citizens of the Republic of Cyprus 
are in favour of the idea of a European Constitution and thinks that it will 
have a positive impact on the running of the European Union.  
After the Constitutional Treaty had been rejected by the French and the 
Dutch population, public opinion changed in Cyprus as well. The most re-
cent Eurobarometer of December 2005 shows that the percentage of Greek 
Cypriots saying that European Union membership is “a good thing” has 
decreased from 43% in spring 2005 to 41%; they feel they were not bene-
fiting as much as they could from EU entry
6. In contrast to this figure Cyp-
riots still seem to have a fairly good image of the European Union: The 
percentage of 52% is significantly higher than the total of all member states 
(47%). To conclude one can say that there are signs that excessive pro-
European feelings seem to be fading in Cyprus. A possible reason might be 
the unsatisfactory situation on the island where Cypriots seem to have had 
5 The UN Plan, also called Annan Plan, has been drawn up by UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan to re-unify Cyprus; however, the Greek Cypriots rejected it on 24 April 
2004 claiming that the basic philosophy of the plan violates fundamental human 
rights and the acquis communitaire.
6 J. Christou, Do we really want it? – All signs point to the euro becoming a political 
football, 25 December 2005, at: http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/. Liesa Naumann 
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unrealistic expectations towards the European Union. However in this re-
gard, it makes them even stronger supporters of the Constitutional Treaty 
as it fuels new hopes.
National Priorities
The main priorities of Cyprus reflect the high awareness of the European 
Union’s contribution to the establishment of peace and stability throughout 
Europe. The country is a strong supporter of:
x the Charter of Fundamental Rights: its incorporation “lends credence to 
the view 
x that a Cyprus solution must create the context within which Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots may enjoy the rights appurtenant to their EU status”
7
x the start of accession negotiations with Turkey: the negotiations may 
open a way to put
x pressure on Turkey regarding the solution of the Cyprus Problem 
x the solidarity clause: as a consequence of the ongoing occupation of 
about a third of the island the Greek Cypriot government thinks that the 
mutual defence clause could even be stronger 
Despite the launch of Plan D
8, there seem to be as little debate in Cyprus 
now as there had been before on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Liesa Naumann 
7 Dr. K. Chrysostomides (2005), The EU Constitution and Cyprus, 21 April 2005, at: 
http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/F97E7CEDDD0B2BE9C2256FEA0037
7278?OpenDocument&highlight=the%20eu%20constitution%20and%20cyprus
8 Plan D stands for democracy, dialogue and debate; it puts in place a framework for a 
25-country debate on Europe’s future. Constitutional Debates among the
Factions in the European Parliament Party Groups in the European
Parliament
On 12
th January 2005, the European Parliament (EP) voted with an over-
whelming majority in favour of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe in a non-binding but politically symbolic vote with 500 votes in 
favour (68.3%), 137 against (18.7%), and 40 abstentions (7.5%). 7.5% of 
the MEPs did not participate at all in the vote.
1
The percentage of ‘Yes’ votes among political groups: 
x ALDE Group (Liberals): 97.6% 
x PES (Socialists): 93% 
x Greens/European Free Alliance:  80.5% 
x EPP-ED (Conservatives): 79.7% 
x UEN: 69.2%
Abstention:
x EPP-ED Group: 47.5% 
x PES: 30% 
x GUE/NGL: 5% 
x Greens: 2.5%
x Non-Affiliated: 15%.
2
In this sense, the Liberal Group appears to be the most pro-European politi-
cal group in the EP. 
64 out of the 732 MEPs in the 2004 – 2009 Parliament are in what is 
broadly defined as eurosceptic party groups (Independence/Democracy and 
Union for Europe of Nations). The ‘No’ votes mainly came from the euro-
1   http://www.bonde.com/index.phtml?sid=840&aid=18123 (October 31st, 2005) 
2    http://www.affairespubliques.fr/publicaffairs/2005/01/index.html (October 31st, 
2005)130
sceptic Independence & Democracy group, which were unanimously 
against the Treaty. The GUE/NGL group (Communist parties and the Nor-
dic Green Left) as well as a majority of the far-right MEPs also voted 
against the text.
Shortly after the accession of the ten new member states in May 2004, a 
new EP was elected. The current distribution of seats held by the different 
parliamentary groups is depicted in the following diagram: 
x European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED): 268 seats, 
36.61%
x Party of European Socialists (PES): 200 seats, 27.32% 
x Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE): 88 seats, 
12.02%
x European Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA): 42 seats, 
5.73%
x European United Left - Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL): 41 seats, 5.60% 
x Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM): 37 seats, 5.01% 
x Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN): 27 seats, 3.69% 
x Non-affiliated (NA) right-wing (16 seats) / non-affiliated others (13 
seats): 3.96%
3
After the negative referenda the EP tried to re-enforce the European consti-
tutional debate. On 4th October 2005, the EP’s Constitutional Affairs 
3   http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/parties_perc.html 
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Committee (AFCO) declared that the Europeans should engage in 
a dialogue on the future of European Integration
4. The aim of this discus-
sion is to install a European Constitution until 2009, which would coincide 
with the next European parliamentary elections.
5 In the “Report on the pe-
riod of reflection: the structure, subjects and context for an assessment of 
the debate on the European Union” 
6, which AFCO adopted on 16th De-
cember 2005, the Committee calls for a profound analysis of the ratifica-
tion crisis and affirms its conviction that the Treaty of Nice is not a viable 
basis for the continuation of the European integration process. The Com-
mittee also stresses its commitment to achieve, without undue delay, a con-
stitutional settlement as well as its conviction that it is not possible to 
enlarge the Union any further on the basis of the Treaty of Nice after the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. AFCO warns that a strategy 
based on the selective implementation of the Constitutional Treaty could 
destroy the consensus that achieved a balance between the institutions and 
among the member states, thereby aggravating a crisis of confidence. The 
Committee suggests using the current period of reflection to re-launch the 
constitutional project on the basis of a broad public debate on the future of 
European integration. On 19th January 2006, the EP has adopted the above-
mentioned report with a great majority of 385 votes in favour, 125 against 
and 51 abstentions.
7
4   European Commission’s “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate” 
(COM(2005)0494)
5    European Parliament Press Service, 04. 10. 2005. http://www.europarl.eu.int 
/news/expert/infopress_page/001-977-276-10-40-901-20050929IPR00908-03-10-
2005-2005--false/default_en.htm  (December 7th, 2005) 
6   http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade3?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT 
+A6-2005-0414+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S&LSTDO 
C=Y (January 15th, 2006) 
7   http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/public/story_page/005-4526-16-1-3-901-
20060119STO04525-2006-16-01-2006/default_en.htm (January 20th, 2006) European People’s Party 
The EPP’s objectives for the Constitutional Treaty
1
The majority of EPP’s MEPs voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, 
since it took into account a lot of things the EPP had pushed for. Subsidiar-
ity is the centrepiece of the EPP’s proposals for redistributing the compe-
tencies between member states and the EU. If the EU can deal with a policy 
area much more efficient than any individual member state, it is imperative 
that the EU assumes both, legislative and executive power. However, 
member states must clearly state in the Constitutional Treaty the policy 
fields where the EU should be an actor. Moreover, the necessity of action 
on EU level should be re-examined on a regular basis. The EPP demands 
more EU involvement in policy fields that have hitherto not seen much EU 
participation because of the member states reluctance to cede more sover-
eignty to Brussels. In the eyes of the EPP, this deeply seated reluctance has 
been made obsolete by recent developments in both the political and the 
economic field. In contrast to the loss of sovereignty to Brussels, the EPP 
argues that in many policy fields the individual member state has lost its 
ability to exert influence on its own. In order to regain this sovereignty and 
make their voice heard in the world, the individual member states must 
come even closer together under the umbrella of the EU. 
x Apart from the traditional exclusive competencies of the EU over single 
market issues, including competition and the four freedoms, and the 
common agricultural program, the EU should extend its domain to a 
common foreign and security policy. A Europe speaking with a single 
voice and acting with a single hand in foreign affaires would match its 
economic influence, at last. Thus, the position of a European foreign 
minister should be installed, in order to give the voice a face, too. In ad-
1 All objectives are found in the EPP Congress Document “A Constitution for a Strong 
Europe”, Estoril, 2002; and a speech by Hans-Gert Pöttering, chairman of the  EPP-Oliver Lorenzen 
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dition, the Foreign Minister should be a vice-president of the Commis-
sion and chair the Foreign Affairs Council.
x The EU should become involved in judicial issues, immigration, home-
land security, communications and infrastructure, R&D, environmental 
protection, and health policy as soon as there is a supranational dimen-
sion. The EU should have no involvement, other than coordinating ca-
pacity, in affaires of civic and cultural society. These affaires cover the 
internal organisation of the member state, family policy, social security, 
education, culture and sports.  
x The newly established allocation of competencies should be monitored 
by a specially installed supreme court. 
Reforming the institutions is led by two objectives: accountability and 
transparency. Thus, especially the mingling of executive with legislative 
powers has to be reduced. The EU citizens have a right for a clear and un-
derstandable way of drafting laws. Furthermore, democratic control of 
various EU-institutions has to be strengthened. Similar to the parliamentary 
control that most governments of the member states have to comply with, 
the European Parliament should be given the power to exert more control 
as a system of checks and balances. Taking this step leads in the right di-
rection for overcoming the democratic deficit that a majority of EU citizens 
perceive.
x National parliaments should have a control function over their respec-
tive governments in European issues, without adding another institution 
in Brussels representing the national parliaments.  
x The EU should have legal personality, that is, the capability to conduct 
legal acts on its own. 
x The EP needs to become an equal partner of the Council with respect to 
its legislative powers, meaning that co-decision should become standard 
operating procedure every time the Council decides with QMV. This 
equality between EP and Council also covers budgetary powers.  
ED fraction, at the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation on Thursday, 28 November  2002, 
Berlin.European People’s Party 
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x Every state should be represented proportionally to its population in the 
EP, while taking into consideration a guaranteed minimal representation 
of the smaller states. The number of MEP is to be restricted to 700 seats, 
which are elected according to a common European election law. Na-
tional parties’ influence on the MEPs needs to be curbed somehow, that 
is, the listing of candidates must follow democratic guidelines all the 
time.
x The Council is in desperate need of reform, since the coinciding of leg-
islative and executive powers have led to self-obstruction and confusion 
far too many times, while the decision-making process is quite non-
transparent. Transparency can be enhanced through holding meeting in 
public and publishing the meetings’ protocols.  
x The Council should abandon its executive powers to become a second 
chamber in the system of EU-institutions. QMV should become the 
standard operating procedure, with the exception of cases like treaty 
change, admittance of new member states and the redistribution of con-
siderable financial means, where unanimity should be employed.  
x The Commission must be the sole executive body of the EU. Like it is 
the case in most member states, the executive needs to be under the con-
trol of the legislative in form of the EP. The President of the Commis-
sion must be elected by the MEPs and confirmed by the Council. Fur-
thermore, the President should have the competence to pick his/her 
commissioners as he/she sees fit. The whole Commission should be 
elected by the EP and confirmed by the Council. 
Fundamental values, especially in the field of human rights, need to be-
come an integral part of the Constitution, thereby gaining legally binding 
status. The Charter could function as a glue of European civil society, 
strengthening the sense of the Community, while guaranteeing individual-
ity. Moreover, the European Court of Justice needs to be provided with the 
first instance competency to guard the citizens’ rights.  
In the eyes of the EPP, Europe should not forget that the fundamental val-
ues come from its Judeo-Christian roots. Thus, a reference to God in the 
Constitutional Treaty’s Preamble is indispensable.Oliver Lorenzen 
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Reaction to the negative referenda and future outlook 
The EPP does not consider the Constitutional Treaty dead. Firstly, those 
countries that would like to go ahead with the ratification process should do 
so. Secondly, the countries that have already ratified the Treaty do have the 
right to have their opinions taken into account. There are two approaches 
that do not find any support in the ranks of the EPP: Renegotiating the 
Constitutional Treaty and trying to get through only parts of it. Opening up 
the Treaty text to discussion would be like opening up Pandora’s Box. At 
the moment, especially the governments threatened by a negative referen-
dum would fight fiercely for their national interest. Ratifying only parts of 
the Treaty would further splinter the Union. 
Thus, the only course of action that the EPP supports as being feasible is a 
‘Phase of Reflection’ until June 2006. Maybe by then, political factors will 
have shifted in such a way as to release another window of opportunity for 
the supporters of a European Constitution. Until then, basically nothing 
should be undertaken. 
Oliver Lorenzen Party of European Socialists 
Objectives for the Constitutional Treaty 
The Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES) voted 93% in favour 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Among the grounds for the broad support was 
the view that a constitution will serve as a firmer foundation on which so-
cialists can build a Europe that is socially just, globally secure, environ-
mentally sound and economically competitive. It will enable socialists to 
fight more effectively for the hopes and concerns of European citizens and 
will put emphasis on democracy and freedom. Moreover, PES supports the 
Constitutional Treaty because it gives more rights to the citizens, such as 
social rights, the right to call for a referendum and the right to fair and just 
working conditions. The President of the Party, Martin Schulz, stated that 
“without the new Constitution, Europe cannot have greater solidarity, better 
workers' protection and more parliamentary rights“
1.
The PES, led by Martin Schulz, is the second largest party group in the 
European Parliament and is comprised of left-wing political parties from 
the EU member states. In general, the Party is seeking to identify a political 
direction for the renewal of Europe’s social and economic models in the 
light of globalisation, enlargement and demographic change.  
In relation to the Constitutional Treaty, the PES is of the opinion that it will 
enable the EU to make considerable improvements in terms of efficiency 
and will ensure a fuller commitment, than the preceding Treaties, concern-
ing the European Social Model. According to the views of PES’ members, 
the Constitutional Treaty will further the project of European integration 
and will reaffirm the objectives of peace, prosperity, solidarity and citizen’s 
NB Mr. Martin Schulz is the president of the Group of the Party of European Socialists 
in the European Parliament. Mr. Rasmussen is the president of the Party of Euro-
pean Socialists in general. In this paper we refer to the president of PES as Mr. 
Schulz as we talk about this fraction in the European Parliament. 
1 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=10418 Velyana Nickolova 
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rights.
2 Other advantages of the Constitutional Treaty are more protection 
against negative effects of globalisation, the citizens’ power to control the 
open market with political decisions and higher EU standards for environ-
mental protection. Moreover, the PES believes that the Constitutional 
Treaty would help Europe to fight against poverty and promote equality. 
Due to the institutional changes it brings, the European institutions will be 
able to coordinate employment policies with economic ones. All in all, the 
opinion of the PES can be summarised in the statement they made during 
the ‘Yes’ campaign, which they led for the referendum in France: "We all 
strongly and unanimously support the European constitution.  It is the key 
to advancing social policy in all our countries. It is good for all our citizens, 
good for our countries and good for Europe.”
3
The PES led campaigns for positive outcomes in the French but also in the 
Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. One of the arguments used 
by the PES in trying to ‘sell’ the Constitution Treaty was that it creates a 
safer and more efficient enlarged EU, by ensuring the application of fair 
social rights. Thus, the Constitutional Treaty is a step ahead to make the 
EU more democratic, transparent and to bring it closer to its citizens. The 
PES was of the opinion that the Constitutional Treaty will create a Union of 
solidarity and equality between the smaller and large member states. Fur-
thermore, this Union will be one for the benefit of citizens and their needs 
will occupy a central position.
Reaction to the negative referenda and future outlook 
The President of the European Socialists, Martin Schulz, retained some op-
timism for the Constitutional Treaty even after the negative results of the 
French and the Dutch referenda. He expressed his conviction that “the ma-
jority of 'No' voters […] were not anti-EU as such.”
4  In his opinion, the 
French and the Dutch citizens were merely trying to attract the attention to 
problems, which need to be addressed “urgently not just by the EU institu-
2 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/presentation.do?lg=en 
3 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=10251 
4 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=10694 Party of European Socialists 
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tions but also by the national governments.”
5 Another member of the 
Group, Rasmussen, submitted a statement, which also clearly illustrates the 
opinion of the PES about the impact of the French and the Dutch rejections: 
“It is now up to the European Heads of Government to come forward with 
a proposal for tackling the institutional issues, which the constitution is in-
tended to resolve.” Furthermore, he added that “the future of the constitu-
tion must be clarified. But even more important is the need to create jobs 
and a sense of economic security.”
6
The PES also gave its full support to the ratification process and noted that 
all countries must express their will on the text. Despite the negative out-
comes of the French and Dutch referenda, Schulz warned that it is early to 
declare the Constitutional Treaty dead. He pointed out that the current legal 
basis provided by the Treaty of Nice is insufficient to solve the decision-
making and institutional problems, facing the enlarged EU. Therefore, he 
urged his colleagues from all over Europe to intensify the ‘Reflection Pe-
riod’ and search for a mutually acceptable solution to the current deadlock. 
The position of the PES on further steps that might be taken to rescue the 
Constitutional Treaty revolves around the idea of a more efficient use of 
the ‘Reflection Period’. Furthermore, the Party proposed specific measures 
to regain the trust of the citizens in the EU, namely: 
Clear organisation of the "pause for reflection" on the constitution through 
citizens' discussion forums organised by national governments and parlia-
ments, the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
Joint adoption of directives on services and working time. "These two di-
rectives are more suited than any other to demonstrate that the demands of 
the market and social stability belong together," he writes. 
Reduction of bureaucracy and improvement of law-making procedures - 
along with a review of legislation in the pipeline - on the basis of proposals 
from a working group of the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament. 
5 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=10694 
6 http://www.pes.org/content/view/22 Velyana Nickolova 
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Dovetailing of foreign policy at EU level to prepare for the later introduc-
tion of a European Foreign Minister. Schulz states in the letter that "the 
principal objectives of the incoming British Council Presidency .... demand 
an ever stronger definition of common foreign and security policies, with 
the involvement of all institutions." 
National parliaments would be involved in EU decision-making, from the 
earliest stages, under a voluntary agreement.
7
The PES was among the strongest supporters of the Duff-Voggenhuber 
Report for the salvation of the Constitutional Treaty, which passed a vote in 
the European Parliament on 19th January 2006.
8 According to the members 
of the PES, the Report reflected all the major amendments put forward by 
the Party.  Therefore, they gave “the same support as we gave to the Euro-
pean constitution when we voted on that.”
9
Velyana Nickolova 
7 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=10762 
8 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=21715 
9 http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/msc/newsdetail.do?lg=en&id=21715 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe
Objectives for the European Constitution 
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE, voted 98% in 
favor of the Constitution.  They were also very clear on the fact that they 
wanted the incorporation of a ‘bill of rights’ into the constitution.  This was 
sometimes a strenuous activity for the British members where law is based 
on precedent, and they have no physical constitution. Overall it can be 
noted that the party pushed for a more centralized Europe.  They were also 
clearly in favor of more stringent environmental laws, and this was made 
clear at the constitutional convention.  A unified immigration policy was 
also put on the table as well as improved capabilities to stop cross border 
crime. 
The ALDE is the third largest party in the European Parliament, EP, with 
90 members and as well as observers from Romania and Bulgaria.  It has 
members from 20 of the 25 Member States.  The party believes that as the 
EU has widened so must it also deepen.  Logistically, the existing treaties 
were not meant to operate under the stresses of twenty-five nations.  More-
over, they believe that by putting the fundamental freedoms at the heart of 
European law, it will serve to protect civil and political freedoms for eve-
ryone.  Furthermore in addition to an enhancement of transparency and 
qualified majority voting (QMV), on all issues except for sensitive ones 
such as taxes and foreign affairs, the constitution will serve as the only ef-
fective means of preventing a deadlock in the Council of Ministers.  Fi-
nally, the constitution even opens the door to member states beginning to 
work together on a common defense policy. The overwhelming majority of 
the members that voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty is the reason Thomas Malick 
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for Party leader Graham Watson declaring the ALDE the most ‘European’ 
party in the EP.
1
Reaction to the Negative Referenda and Outlook 
The ALDE believes that the constitution, in its present form, is in fact 
‘dead’.  Nevertheless they believe that all nations should voice their opin-
ion.  In the words of Graham Watson, the party leader, “we must now pre-
serve to ensure that all 25 Member States speak their mind.  This will allow 
a breathing space in which France can reflect on its decision.”
 2
In reference to the ‘next step’ that could potentially be taken, they believe 
the first step is acknowledging that the same problems, which existed be-
fore the first Constitutional Convention convened, remain.  Second, the EU 
must analyze why the voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the 
constitution.  Were those nations opposed to the ideals within the constitu-
tion, or were they simply expressing dissatisfaction with their current state 
of politics in their own countries?  Next the EU must examine and be flexi-
ble on some of its older policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).  In relation to this, the area of the constitution covering the func-
tioning and policies of the EU, Part III, needs to be “radically redrafted.”  
This redrafting should also include a more forceful and centralized com-
mon budgetary plan.  
Lastly, the constitution must be amended to form a true hierarchy among 
the four different parts of the document.  Specifically Part III needs to be-
come distinctly subsidiary to the provisions of Part I, which puts forth the 
values and aims of the Union, draws the Union’s competences and the con-
ditions of membership, and describes the structure and powers of its institu-
tions.
The real challenge will be to persuade the governments, where ratification 
has already occurred, to attempt another round of referenda and debates.  In 
1 http://alde.europarl.eu.int/Content/Default.asp 
2 http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05-045.pdf Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
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France and the Netherlands the amended constitution must be especially 
attractive to voters in order for politicians to even consider resubmitting it.
3
With the ‘period of reflection’ in mind, on the 13th of January Andrew 
Duff, a MEP and a member of the ALDE from eastern England, and Jo-
hannes Voggenhuber, a MEP and a member of the European Greens from 
Austria, became the first MEPs to comment of the reflection period.  Duff-
Voggenhuber have said they will promote a number of Parliamentary Fo-
rums during 2006-07 period so that the nature and future course of the EU 
can be discussed: 
x what is the goal of integration? 
x what role should Europe have in the world? 
x what is the future of the European social and economic model? 
x how do we define the EU's boundaries? 
x how do we enhance freedom, security and justice? 
x how do we finance the Union? 
Logistically speaking Duff-Voggenhuber intend to commission and publish 
‘European Papers’ in order to facilitate debate at the Parliamentary Forums 
and in Member States alike.  In a plenary debate the EP voted 385 MEPs in 
favor, 125 against with 51 abstentions on 19
th January to adopt the Duff-
Voggenhuber report. Duff-Voggenhuber have proposed a number of 
amendments:
x making more explicit the fact that ratification of the present text has 
stalled and that the eventual constitution will have to be modified; 
x saying that the period of reflection should lead to a revision process 
which nevertheless respects the constitutional core of the current text; 
x reflecting the decision of December's European Council to conduct a 
radical overhaul of the financial system of the EU in 2008-09; 
3 http://www.europa.gv.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=4760&Alias=bkaeuropa&cob=
13353Thomas Malick 
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x calling for a consultative ballot to be held across the EU on the same 
day as the European elections in 2009.
4
Thomas Malick 
4 http://www.andrewduffmep.org.uk/news/184.html The Greens/European Free Alliance 
Main objectives for the Constitutional Treaty 
The Greens/EFA Party has been in favour of the adoption of the Constitu-
tional Treaty as it complies with their manifest of objectives of building a 
society respectful of fundamental human rights and environmental justice, 
increasing freedom within the world of work, deepening democracy by de-
centralisation and direct participation of people in decision-making, build-
ing a EU of free peoples based on the principle of subsidiary, and lastly, re-
orientating the EU, which, in the view of the Party, is currently over-
emphasising its economic conception at the expense of social, cultural and 
ecological values.
1
The Greens/EFA Party announced its position on 15
th December 2004 in a 
paper called “Yes to the European Constitution, The path towards the fu-
ture of Europe does not lead back to Nice” by Johannes Voggenhuber, Vice 
Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Green/EFA’s 
coordinator. Although the Constitutional Treaty is evaluated as being far 
from satisfying all the demands of the Party, it is considered to be a step 
forward. Monica Frassoni, one of the co-presidents of the Greens/EFA 
group, calls: “...to approve this Constitution so that we can quickly lay the 
foundations for its successor.”
2
 The achievements of the Constitutional  Treaty are outlined in the position 
paper “...the first step of the European Constitutional Process, setting the 
basis for a European democracy, anchoring the EU in basic rights and in a 
consensus of values and goals, binding all of the Unions external action to 
international law, simplifying both, treaties and procedures, expanding the 
scope for joint-decision making, clarifying competences, enhancing trans-
1 ‘Protocol of Understanding’ ,“http://www.greens-efa.org/en/ “ 
2 http://www.greens-efa.org/en/issues/?id=43#2Onur ùaylan
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parency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and increasing the citizen  
participation   possibilities in the decision making process.”
3
The main deficiencies of the Treaty, which make the Greens/EFA calling 
for a successor immediately after its adoption, can be summarised as a lack 
of a European social order, incomplete European democracy, maintenance 
of the unanimity rule in crucial political fields, and the veto power of 
member states over any future revision of the Constitutional Treaty. More-
over, they described the International Governmental Conferences (IGC) as 
a pool of nationalism, inter-state mistrust and as a demand for sovereignty 
of national governments, which in their opinion, had a negative effect on 
the Constitutional Treaty. Lastly according to the Party, the absence of a 
Europe-wide referendum to approve the Treaty is the main deficit of the 
European Constitutional process.
4
In order to address all these shortcomings, the Greens/EFA is planning to 
call for the first amendment of the Treaty after its ratification. Voggen-
huber stated on 11
th January 2005: “ratification across Europe will not be 
the end of the constitutional process…when the last European state ratifies 
the Constitutional Treaty, we will initiate the first European petition 
through which we will collect at least one million signatures in alliance 
with European civil society.”
5 The main goal of the first amendment is to 
deepen European democracy through increasing the power of the EP and 
the abolishment of the IGC; creating an area of social security, justice and 
solidarity and a European order for peace through a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.
6
Reactions to the Negative Referenda and Future
Outlook 
Nevertheless, due to the negative outcomes of the referenda in France and 
the Netherlands the Greens/EFA had to abandon all their projects. The 
3   http://www.greensefa.org/pdf/documents/greensefa_documents_103_en.pdf, p:1 
4 http://www.greensefa.org/pdf/documents/greensefa_documents_103_en.pdf, pp:3-4 
5 http://www.greens-efa.org/en/press/january11
6 http://www.greensefa.org/pdf/documents/greensefa_documents_103_en.pdf, p:2 The Greens/European Free Alliance 
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French “Non” led the co-presidency of the Party to announce that: “our 
project of a strong political union of Europe today is more difficult to real-
ize but Europe should not stop today… The best answer is a positive initia-
tive to re-launch the European project.”
7 However, on 2
nd June 2005, after 
the Dutch referendum, the Greens/EFA was no longer positive and hopeful: 
“We do not favour halting the ratification process…but to go on with busi-
ness as usual would be a mistake... we need a new European initiative; a 
change of direction.”
8
The Green/EFA Party has been trying to keep the issue alive through press 
releases, conferences and seminars since then. Moreover, through close co-
operation, not only with other EU institutions but also with NGOs, net-
works and trade unions, which are in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the Greens/EFA has been in the search of ways out of this crisis. Recently, 
the most important event has been the Draft Report written by Andrew 
Duff and Johannes Voggenhuber on the “Period of Reflection”, which is to 
be discussed and to be voted in January 2006 at a plenary session in Stras-
bourg.
9 The paper talks about the structure, subjects and context for an as-
sessment of the Constitutional debate in the EU. In the Draft Report, a 
number of options were suggested, such as abandoning the project as a 
whole, continuing with the present text, embarking on a complete re-write 
and the modification of the text. Furthermore, it proposes to use the current 
period of reflection to re-launch the constitutional project through parlia-
mentary reforms (series of conferences between the EP and the national 
parliamentarians), Citizens Forums (at national, regional and local level), 
Citizen’s petitions and a European Dialogue (large public debate about the 
future of European Integration). Then, the Draft suggests that conclusions 
from the period of reflection should be drawn during the second half of 
2007, and if it is decided to revise the text, a new Convention is to be held 
7 http://www.greens-efa.org/en/press/may29 
8 http://www.greens-efa.org/en/press/june2
9 http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade3?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6 
-2005-0414+0+DOC+WORD+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S&LSTDOC 
=YOnur ùaylan
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during 2008, which would then submit the new Constitutional Treaty to a 
ballot across the EU along with the next EP elections in 2009. 
In conclusion, although the Constitutional Treaty has not been ratified, and 
the Greens/EFA original plan to amend the Treaty after its introduction had 
to be abandoned, due to the law of the unintended consequences, the Party 
has achieved its main goal: the opening of the Constitutional debate among 
the European People. The adoption of the Draft Report will give the 
Greens/EFA a chance to resume all their efforts and to continue to advocate 
the Constitutional Treaty. For them, the end is nowhere near; in fact, the 
constitutional journey of the EU has just begun. 
Onur ùaylanThe European United Left - Nordic 
Green Left 
Objectives for the Constitutional Treaty 
The idea of the European Constitution generated a huge debate not only 
among member states and countries joining the EU, but also among repre-
sentatives of different parties in the European Parliament. The Party’s main 
constitutional goals were to facilitate the process of the EU Enlargement 
through a series of institutional reforms and to codify the legal basis of the 
EU. This would allow the Union’s bodies to function more efficiently and 
make the legal system more understandable for citizens. However possible 
effects of the introduced changes were interpreted and assessed differently 
by defenders of different values. 
The position of the Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament reflected the party’s disagreement 
with the current development of the process of European integration. They 
argued against the Constitution, maintaining that it would only enhance 
ongoing processes, started by the Treaty of Maastricht. They put an empha-
sis on the “ineffectiveness” of the liberal pattern of development and the 
“unfair character” of competitiveness inherent in the process of European 
integration. From the party’s position, some changes should be introduced 
to bring the decision-making system closer to the common people. 
For a better understanding of the party’s position it would be sensible to 
analyze the statements and views of its representatives at different stages of 
the debate, taking into account party’s declared goals and values. The 
party’s participation in the debate on the Constitutional treaty can be di-
vided into the following stages:  
x 2002 – Work of the “Convention on the Future of Europe”; 2003-2004 
Intergovernmental conference 
x Until 2005 – Discussions before the ratification Olga Laletina 
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x Summer 2005 – Rejection of the Constitution at the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands 
First, let us refer to the party’s declared goals, in order to understand which 
values shaped its position on the Constitutional Treaty.  The main goal of 
the GUE/NGL is a new form of European integration. From the point of 
view of the United Lefts the current process, started by the Maastricht 
treaty, is characterized by democratic deficit, lack of solidarity and domina-
tion of the most powerful countries within the framework of the Union. 
“We want a Europe that operates on a basis of complete solidarity in order 
to bring ever closer the real parameters of the economies of each Member 
State”.
1
At the early stages of the Constitutional debate the party’s criticism of the 
Constitution’s content was related to the policies introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty and further legislation, reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. 
Francis Wurtz, leader of the European United Left Group, criticized “re-
moval of any obstacles to the free circulation of capital”.
2 From his point of 
view, such policies were not facilitated by necessary measures in social and 
fiscal fields. He also argued against the strengthening of the European insti-
tutions, as the changes proposed by the draft of the Treaty would allow 
them to function “out of the public control”.  
Indeed, the implementation of the draft Constitution would extend some 
powers of the EU bodies. More leadership and transparency on the Euro-
pean level, and flexibility of the decision-making process could help to 
achieve one of the Constitutions’ goals, which is to raise the efficiency of 
the EU bodies’ functioning in light of the enlargement. For instance, the 
reduction of number of Commissioners, on one hand, and the Parliaments’ 
right to choose the Commissions’ President on the recommendation of the 
Council on the other, would strengthen the connection between EU bodies, 
and decrease Commissioners’ accountability to the national governments.
3
Francis Wurtz argued against such changes, maintaining that they would 
1 http://www.guengl.org/showPage.jsp?ID=639 
2 http://www.euronews.net/create_html.php?page=agora&lng=1 The European United Left - Nordic Green Left 
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increase the gap between EU structures and common people. As it can be 
seen from the Party’s position, it opposes concentration of powers on 
European level.
Another point of criticism was related to the “institutionalization of the 
model of liberal Europe” (Francis Wurtz). The party leader believes that a 
liberal pattern of development failed and insists on the pursuit of the so-
cially-oriented policies. In the year 2003, Francis Wurtz complained about 
the lack of the debate on this issue. The third part of the Treaty, devoted to 
liberal development, raised the majority of his criticism. Wurtz believed 
that there was no opportunity for rival opinions to influence preparation of 
this part of the draft. “They (the chapters concerning liberalization) were 
added afterwards… so that the majority of the versions of the Constitution 
in circulation, purely and simply, ignore them”.
4
In the year 2004 the Party’s leader argued that liberal mechanisms turned 
out to be inefficient for the achievement of goals set on the Lisbon Agenda. 
Francis Wurtz stated that as a result of such a policy, “more working places 
were shed, than provided”.  At this stage the party proposed to conduct a 
referendum on the future of the EU, which should include broad debate at 
different levels. People should be provided with all the needed information 
to be able to choose the most appropriate way of further development and 
to influence the decision-making process. An appeal to broad public par-
ticipation in policy shaping is also in line with the ideology of the Left 
Group. This measure was proposed earlier in the declaration 1994
5, so one 
can conclude how consistent this Party is in the pursuit of its goals. 
Reactions to the negative referenda and future outlook 
The Referendums’ results in France and the Netherlands were regarded by 
the United Left as a victory for the Lefts because they advocated significant 
changes in the existing system. Giving an interview to the newspaper 
3 Tömmel Ingeborg, Eine Verfassung  für die EU: institutionelle Anpassung oder Sys-
tem-Reform? Integration, 27. September 2004, 3\04 
4 http://www.vguengl.org/invoke.asp?folderid=3066&method=display&lang=se 
5 http://www.guengl.org/showPage.jsp?ID=639 Olga Laletina 
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L'Humanite, Francis Wurtz assessed the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty as the rejection of, “European policies and the treaty's plans to per-
petuate them”.
6 From his point of view, the reason for this was the “crisis 
of confidence between the citizens and the European institutions”
7, caused 
by neo-liberal developments and consequences of the Single Market intro-
duction. “Competition at all costs… will no longer work!”
8 After the rejec-
tion of the Constitutional Treaty the European United Left proposed to 
withdraw the current liberalization directives, like the Bolkestein Directive, 
and the Working Time Directive. It also returned to the idea of a broad 
public debate concerning the priorities of the European development. Such 
a debate “through various progressive European parties and groups”
9 would 
give the citizens access to the decision-making process, “without restricting 
it to the parliamentary framework”. The United Left believe that such a 
process could help to secure achievements in the social sphere, whereas the 
liberal character of the draft Constitution could be regarded as hostile to the 
social model of development. 
To sum up, the position of the Group European United Left on the Consti-
tutional treaty was shaped by its perception of the process of European in-
tegration. The Draft Constitutional Treaty, prepared on the basis of the ex-
isting system and aimed at its simplification and improvement, could not 
have been accepted by the party, arguing against this system and insisting 
on profound changes. Participating in the constitutional debate at different 
stages the party’s representatives referred to the Party’s goals declared in a 
Constituent Declaration in Brussels (1994). Arguing against the “Eurocen-
tric approach”, the Party opposed those parts of the Constitution, which 
implied extension of the EU powers. The third part of the Treaty, devoted 
to the liberal development was a matter of severe criticism of the United 
Left, because this group initially regarded the liberal character of the Euro-
pean Integration as the wrong way of development, insisting on more so-
cially oriented policy. Finally, debating on the Constitutional Treaty, this 
6 http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/wurtz2.htm 
7 http://www.jonassjostedt.com/query:invoke/folderid:3576/method:display/lang:se/
8 http://www.jonassjostedt.com/query:invoke/folderid:3576/method:display/lang:se/
9 http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/wurtz2.htm The European United Left - Nordic Green Left 
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party again and again referred to the idea of an open European referendum 
aimed to introduce profound changes in the further process of integration. 
It can be concluded that for 10 years  (from 1994 till 2004) the party was 
consistent to question the ongoing processes inherent in the European inte-
gration, thus its protest against the Constitution as means to make the Un-
ion closer was predictable and related to the Party’s initial goals and values. 
Olga Laletina Independence/Democracy Group 
Main objectives for the Constitutional Treaty 
The Independence / Democracy Group
1 evolved from the euroskeptic party 
formation Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and was estab-
lished after the last European parliamentary elections on 20
th July 2004. 
The main goal of the Independence / Democracy Group is the rejection of 
any European Constitution and further European integration. The euroskep-
tic group opposes centralisation and bureaucratisation in Brussels. Instead, 
they call for the respect of national sovereignty and values, which, how-
ever, should not equalise xenophobia or anti-semitism. Some members, 
such as the UK Independence Party, even advocate the complete with-
drawal of their country from the EU
2. The Independence/ Democracy 
Group includes 36 parliamentarians from 10 different member states. The 
national parties are mainly from northern and eastern Europe. During this 
parliamentary term the group’s leaders are the British Nigel Farage (UK 
Independence Party), Jens-Peter Bonde from Denmark (JuniBevægelsen - 
Mod Unionen) and the Polish parliamentarian Maciej M. Giertych (Liga 
Polskich Rodzin). 
Despite its euroskeptic view, the Independence / Democracy Group did not 
abstain from constructive participation in the European Convention. The 
Parliamentarian Jens – Peter Bonde, in his contribution “about the Futures
of Europe”
3 to the Convention in October 2002, postulated to not only fo-
cus on one possible model of European cooperation. He proposed, next to 
the existing federative model, a new form of intergovernmental cooperation 
between sovereign nation states in Europe. Moreover, in cooperation with 
1 http://www.europarl.eu.int/inddem/ 
2 Statute: Independence/Democracy (Ind/Dem), http://www.europarl.eu.int/inddem 
/docs/statute.pdf.
3 Jens-Peter Bonde, "The Convention about the FutureS of Europe" Contribution. The 
European Convention: Secretariat, CONV 277/02, CONTRIB 96, Brussels, October 
1st 2002. Christiana Tings 
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parliamentarians from other party groups he submitted the contribution 
“Referendum on the European Constitution”
4, which calls for a European 
wide popular vote on the Constitutional Treaty. This shows that even 
though the Independence / Democracy Group is euroskeptic, it is not iso-
lated from the policy-making process in the European institutions and even 
gained importance through the inclusion of a wide variety of actors in the 
European Convention. After all, one of the group’s goals, the possibility of 
European member states to leave the EU, was included in the pending Con-
stitutional Treaty (Art. IV 59). Nevertheless, the Independence / Democ-
racy Group unanimously rejected the Constitutional Treaty in the European 
Parliament. The party leader Nigel Farage, (UKIP) argued: “we are all in-
volved in a one sided exercise in selling this constitution to the peoples of 
Europe” […], I will be campaigning for a ‘No’ vote”
5.
The Independence / Democracy Group actively campaigned against the 
Constitutional Treaty before and after the referenda in France and the 
Netherlands. It provided information on the Treaty text itself, such as the 
publication of a reader-friendly version of the European Constitution
6 and it 
developed a negative argumentation paper
7 with ten reasons why to “vote 
against” the Constitutional Treaty. As the Party Group was only formed 
recently, it is not certain how much media and public attention these initia-
tives gained. In addition, the domestic influence of euroskeptic parties is 
generally low as they have no or few seats in the national parliaments. 
Nevertheless, in the European parliamentary elections voters tend to sup-
4 J.P. Bonde etc., "Referendum on the European Constitution", Contribution submitted 
by several members, alternate members and observers, CONV 658/033, CONTRIB 
291, Brussels, March 31st 2003. 
5 Nigel Farage, Debate on the Constitution for Europe, Strasbourg, January 11th 2005. 
6 Jens-Peter Bonde (eds.) The Proposed Constitution The Reader-Friendly Edition, 
2005,  www.EUabc.com, Brussels,  http://www.europarl.eu.int/inddem/docs/Reader 
FriendlyCol15June05.pdf
7 Ind / Dem Group, Ten reasons to vote ‚No’ to the European constitution, 2005, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/inddem/10%20reasons%20for%20PDF.pdf.Independence/Democracy Group 
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port euroskeptic parties
8. Euroskepticism is seen as an attitude “opposed to 
European integration in general and in opposition to the EU in particular”
9.
The influence of euroskeptic parties and consequently the size of the eu-
roskeptic group have grown steadily over the last years. Their percentage 
of voter share rose from 1 % in the 90s, to 3 % in the parliamentary term 
1999-2004, to 4.9 % in the current European Parliament. There is, how-
ever, no representative of the Independence / Democracy Group in the Col-
lege of Commissioners or holds a national ministry to take part in the 
Council or the European Council
10. In addition, next to their opposition 
against the Constitutional Treaty and European integration in general, the 
Party Group does not have a common political ideology. Art. 5 of the 
Group’s statute states: “the Independence / Democracy Group respects the 
freedom of its delegations to vote as they see fit”
11. This strongly dimin-
ishes their influence in the concrete policy-making process. Nevertheless, 
through cooperation with other societal actors, for example the internet 
platform European No Campaign
12, and the negative turnout of two refer-
enda on the Constitutional Treaty, the public awareness of euroskepticism 
and euroskeptics, such as the Independence / Democracy Group, was 
raised.
Reaction to the negative referenda and future outlook 
On 18th October 2005 the Independence / Democracy Group gathered in 
Prague and declared:  
 “The Independence and Democracy Group of Members of the European 
Parliament considers the Constitution for Europe legally dead and shall re-
8 Christopher Lord, The history of the European integration and the democratic chal-
lenge, Lecture at the Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI), October 2005. 
9 For more information on Euroskepticism see: Aleks Szerbiak / Paul Taggart, Theoris-
ing Party-Based Euroskepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causal-
ity, in: SEI Working Paper, No 69, 2003. & Nick Sitter, Opposing Europe: Euro-
scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition, in SEI Working Paper No 56, 2002. 
10 Simon Hix, The Political System of the EU, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p.188. 
11 Statute: Independence/Democracy. 
12 The European No Campaign: http://www.europeannocampaign.com/. Christiana Tings 
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sist any attempts at imposing such projects, as a whole or piecemeal, upon 
sovereign countries” (Declaration of Prague, 18th October 2005).
The parliamentarians furthermore postulated a new method of “transparent, 
democratic and accountable cooperation between sovereign countries” as 
an alternative to the federative model in the pending Constitutional Treaty. 
Moreover, the European citizens should have the possibility in a European-
wide referendum to vote on a possible constitution
13. The Declaration 
shows that the members of the Independence / Democracy Group continue 
to actively oppose the pending and any European Constitution. In the at-
tempt of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
on 4th October 2005 to revitalise the Constitutional Treaty, the Independ-
ence / Democracy Group’s representative Jens-Peter Bonde on the contrary 
called for an ‘open end’ debate. He criticised that the European institutions 
embark only in a one sided propaganda campaign in favour of a common 
constitution
14.
The Independence / Democracy Group gives voice to those European citi-
zens, who do not support a common European Constitution and European 
integration
15. The existence of an opposition to the governing party is an 
essential part of parliamentary democracy. Schumpeter already postulated 
that democracy only really exists if there is a choice between competing 
policies and politicians
16. However, as discussed above, the Independence / 
Democracy Group comprises very diverging parties, which endangers the 
group’s unity and diminishes their influence. The European Convention in 
its work to develop a common European Constitution contributed to the 
integration of the euroskeptic political group in the policy-making process. 
This was not at least due to the personal influence of one of the group lead-
ers, Jens-Peter Bonde. In conclusion, their euroskeptic input to the Euro-
pean constitutional debate should not be overestimated but nevertheless 
13 The Declaration of Prague on the Future of Europe, Ind / Dem Group, October 18th 
2005, http://www.europarl.eu.int/inddem/focus_on/declarationofprague191005.htm. 
14 European Parliament Press Service, Constitutional Affairs Breaking the deadlock 
over the Constitution: MEPs propose a 'European dialogue', October 4th 2005. 
15 Hix, p. 175. 
16 See Schumpeter, Socialism, States and Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 
1942.Independence/Democracy Group 
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guarantees the democratic principle of freedom of opinion. Therefore, one 
can underline the slogan of the Independence/ Democracy Group during 
the European constitutional debate: “Let the people decide”. 
Christiana Tings Union for Europe of the Nations 
Main objectives for the European Constitution 
In line with their overall objectives the Union for Europe of the Nations
(UEN) pursued a rather active policy. They support an EU that fully re-
spects national traditions, preserves cultural heritage and safeguards lin-
guistic diversity in Europe. In addition, they want to strengthen the princi-
ple of subsidiarity and support a Union, which respects the competencies of 
national governments and the powers of the institutions of the EU. As far 
as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concerned, UEN 
supports a common policy as long as national sovereignty and political tra-
ditions are not being compromised by it. Coherently, they support the de-
velopment of a CFSP in close co-operation with the United Nations Or-
ganisation and with the United States in order to effectively address global 
problems like international terrorism, organized crime and fraud. Also, 
some social objectives are part of their agenda like the protection of the 
elderly, children and the less well-off.
1
In the Convention on the future of Europe that drafted the Constitutional 
Treaty, UEN was represented by Cristiana Muscardini. She lobbied in a 
strong way for the interests of UEN and its national members in the follow-
ing ways: 
x A very important issue for them was the inclusion of a reference to God 
(like in the Polish Constitution) and Christianity, the mentioning of 
Europe’s Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman roots and its secular and 
liberal traditions. 
x During the Convention and working group meetings, Cristiana Muscar-
dini tried through different suggestions to push her objectives through. 
Although not all of them were actually accepted by the Convention, she 
1 http://futurum2005.eun.org/shared/data/spring2005/docs/roleplay/ws_Parliament_en. 
doc (21st October,  2005) Anna K. von Groote 
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managed to specify a number of issues. Most prominently was one of 
her amendments to delete the phrase “on a federal basis” from article I-
1. This was an important amendment that succeeded. 
x She suggested establishing a member state’s right to suspend its own 
membership to the Union for a limited period, which did not come 
through. However, UEN believes that the voluntary withdrawal from the 
Union (art. I-60) strengthens national sovereignty as it introduces a ma-
jor expansion of member states’ rights.  
x The principle of subsidiarity and the fostering of the role of national 
parliaments was a very important objective for UEN during the Conven-
tion.
2 They inserted phrases like the reference to each member state’s 
political and constitutional fundamental structures and identity, (art. I-5) 
as well as the principles of national constitutional law. Furthermore, 
they supported the idea of a constructive abstention in order to grant the
member-states the right not to participate in decisions or initiatives that 
could clash with their legitimate national interests.
3 In the area of Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (art. I-57), UEN plead for a reference for 
the need of the proposed special relationship to respect basic values 
such as democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights.  Mus-
cardini specifically referred back to the values set out in the Constitu-
tion.
4
x As to UEN’s social objectives, the respect for human life and the eld-
erly, the protection of the less well-off, the promotion of well-being 
throughout the Community, as well as clauses prohibiting discrimina-
tion on any grounds were introduced at the Convention. 
2   Convention on the Future of Europe. Summary sheet of proposals for amendments 
concerning Union membership: Draft Articles relating to Title X of Part One (Arti-
cles 43 to 46). CONV 672/03. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03 
/cv00/cv00672en03.pdf (21st October, 2005) 
3   Convention on the Future of Europe. Summary of proposed amendments regarding 
the area of freedom, security and justice. CONV 644/03. http://register
.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00644en03.pdf (21st October, 2005) 
4   Convention on the Future of Europe. Reactions to draft Article 42 (The Union and 
its immediate environment) – Analysis. CONV 671/03. http://register.consilium 
.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00671en03.pdf (21st October, 2005) Union for Europe of the Nations 
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x UEN was able to point out several times that further integration had to 
take heed of the preservation of the linguistic diversity and all specific 
national features and traditions. 
x One of the Party’s overall goals was to make the policy- and decision-
taking processes more transparent in order to foster democratic life 
within the Union.
 5
In fact, many claims of UEN have been met by the Constitutional Treaty 
such as a strengthened principle of subsidiarity, the strengthening of the 
role of national parliaments,  the respect of national traditions as well as the 
preservation of the cultural heritage and the linguistic diversity in Europe. 
However, their ‘Yes’ to the draft Constitutional Treaty cannot be under-
stood as a wholehearted ‘Yes’ to a Constitution as such, but is only a way 
to enable the EU to continue its work in the future. 
Reaction to the negative referenda and future outlook 
In the aftermath of the negative referenda in France and in the Netherlands, 
it is difficult to trace reactions from UEN. However, as the Party was split 
on the issue before the referenda, it is highly probable that there were posi-
tive as well as negative reactions. Only days before the rejection in France, 
Charles Pasqua (Rassemblement pour la France), former French Minister 
of the Interior and former leader of the UEN group in the EP, stated in an 
article in the French newspaper Le Figaro that a rejection of the Constitu-
tional Treaty would be a “salutary shock” for Europe.
6 The Polish govern-
ment party Law and Justice was strongly against the Constitutional Treaty, 
mainly because “it substantially strengthens the EU’s powers. […] the 
Treaty is based on false premises from its very first lines”. A ‘No’ to the 
5   Convention on the Future of Europe. Summary sheet of the proposals for amend-
ments relating to the democratic life of the Union: Draft articles for Part One of the 
Constitution, Title VI (Articles 33 to 37). CONV 670/03. 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00670en03.pdf (21st October, 
2005)
6 http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/Bulletins/PressReview/fullpressreview.htm?wbc_pur 
pose=Basic&bulletindat e =18-Feb-2005 (17th October, 2005) Anna K. von Groote 
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constitutional Treaty was considered to be a ‘Yes’ for a Europe of Nations 
which the party stands for.
7
However, other national members of UEN had been more open to the 
Treaty provisions. The Irish Fianna Fàil Deputy and Co-president of the 
group, Brian Crowley, stated that the Constitutional Treaty was a good 
document which clearly set out the competencies of all levels of govern-
ment and fully respected the powers of member states, in particular the 
smaller ones.
8 Cristiana Muscardini, an Italian Alleanza Nazionale MEP 
and Co-president of the Party, whose party was elected into the EP in Italy 
on the basis of the slogan “More Italy in Europe, a stronger political right 
in Italy”
9, said that the Treaty regarded Europe “not as a federal super state 
that has gradually eroded away identities, traditions and cultures, but as a 
Union of federal states.”
10
Anna K. von Groote 
7   Szymanski in the EP debate (11th January, 2005). http://www.europarl. 
eu.int/omk/sipade3?L=EN &PUB REF =-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20050111+ITEMS+ 
DOC+XML+V0//EN&LE#creitem6 (23rd October, 2005) 
8    Crowley in the EP debate (11th January, 2005). 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade3?L=EN &PUB REF=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+ 
20050111+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&LE#creitem6 (23rd October, 2005) 
9   http://www.alleanzanazionale.it/an/documenti/040522_programma_europee.pdf 
(23rd October, 2005) 
10   Muscardini in the EP debate (11th January, 2005). http://www.europarl.eu.int 
/omk/sipade3?L=EN &PUB REF=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20050111+ITEMS+DOC+
XML+V0//EN&LE#creitem6 (23rd October, 2005) Conclusion
Currently, Europe is in its ‘period of reflection’, launched at the Summit 
held on 16
th/17
th June 2005. The duration of this stage is far from certain 
and to a large extent depends on the reshuffling of political leadership in 
Europe to come. Moreover, along with the forthcoming presidential elec-
tions in France and the European Parliament elections in 2009, the future of 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional 
Treaty) is also in the hands of the forthcoming presidencies of the Council, 
from Austria to Germany and even further, which will have to overcome 
this deadlock. The Austrian Presidency has already expressed its determi-
nation to revive the Constitutional Treaty during its term and the European 
Parliament has come up with a plan on 13
th January 2006 on how to sal-
vage the text by 2009.
1 In light of the present situation, we envisage four 
possible options. 
Option one 
One way out of the current deadlock is to declare the Constitutional Treaty 
dead and leave aside the whole idea for the present time. Nevertheless, 
such a radical solution neglects the work of the Convention, which created 
the revolutionary text and the opinion of those member states and their citi-
zens, which have already ratified it. However, this option has a number of 
supporters, who argue that the EU is served well enough by its current 
Treaty basis and the whole idea of a European Constitution is an unneces-
sary formality as it just reaffirms something that already exists. Radical as 
it seems today, this solution still holds some optimism for the future. Look-
ing back at the history of other EU Treaty crises it is likely that in some 
time the idea of a common European Constitution will come out of the dust 
again, in one form or another.  
1 http://euobserver.com/?aid=20681&rk=1 166
Option two 
Another option is to follow the historical pattern of reactions to other EU 
derailments, as in the cases of the Danish and Irish ‘No’ votes in the refer-
enda on the Maastricht and the Nice Treaties, which would allow for a sec-
ond referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, 
however under different circumstances. A more suitable timing and condi-
tions will have to be chosen and a new public vote in these countries would 
only be possible under new governments. Moreover, the problems that the 
French and the Dutch citizens had with the Constitutional Treaty at hand 
should be taken into consideration and a stronger public debate needs to be 
organised to achieve positive results in the second vote, as it was the case 
with Ireland and Denmark in the past. Nevertheless, such option is imperti-
nent of the opinion of the member states that have already ratified the text. 
Option three 
The third solution calls for partial renegotiation and application of the pat-
tern of the Schengen Agreement and the Euro, which would be a kind of 
‘opt-out’ possibility for those member states, which rejected the text. Under 
this option, the Constitutional Treaty would only enter into force for those 
who have ratified it while the Nice Treaty shall remain valid for all. In this 
way those member states, whose people or parliament have accepted the 
text, would not feel offended as they would in the case of burial of the 
Constitutional Treaty but the text would lose its ‘constitutional’ and collec-
tive meaning, as it would only apply to a number of member states and not 
all of them. This solution might even go further by re-establishing the Nice 
Treaty’s ‘constructive geometry’ notion, where the EU would be even more 
divided along lines of interest and in accordance to the level of integration 
that groups of member states would desire to achieve. However, such a 
multi-speed EU would add to the decision-making inefficiency and would 
further complicate the functioning of the Union in light of the latest 
enlargement.Conclusion
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Option four 
The next proposal considers a way out of the ‘constitutional crisis’ by re-
ducing the text of the Constitutional Treaty and then handing it back to all 
governments for ratification. In this way the Dutch and French citizens will 
not feel singled out but the other member states would also remain in-
volved. This idea is connected with the proposal to have an EU-wide refer-
endum. Indeed, some Members of the European Parliament have already 
envisaged such possibility in a plan discussed on 13
th January 2006. The 
Duff-Voggenhuber Report foresees an intensified ‘reflection period’, which 
will culminate in a European referendum on a revised text of the Constitu-
tional Treaty in 2009, alongside with the European Parliament elections.
2
Nevertheless, the question on how to organize a referendum at the Euro-
pean level, when some Constitutions of member states prohibit holding 
such a public vote, as is the case Germany, needs to be answered. A non-
binding European referendum might be an option but the question is 
whether people are going to take such public vote seriously enough. Still, 
the idea of a collective referendum excludes the option for the EU to be-
come a prisoner of just one or two states, which are against the text. Yet, it 
is too ambitious as it raises the question where the common EU people 
suddenly came from in the context of having so many difficulties in build-
ing a collective identity. 
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